

MANZIKERT TO LEPANTO
THE BYZANTINE WORLD AND THE TURKS
1071-1571

Papers given at the Nineteenth Spring Symposium of
Byzantine Studies, Birmingham, March 1985

edited by
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EDITORIAL NOTE

ANTHONY BRYER AND MICHAEL URSINUS

A note is called for to explain why over 200 Byzantinists and Hellenists, Ottomanists and Turkologists, from 18 countries, gathered in Birmingham from 23-25 March 1985 to discuss "Manzikert to Lepanto: the Byzantine world and the Turks, 1071-1571". The meeting, the papers of which are edited here, arose from developments which were largely academic but partly institutional.

To take the lesser, institutional, factor first. British Universities are not alone in being littered with the debris (often in outdated library holdings) of great projects which lie abandoned after their academic entrepreneurs have left, when they can safely be sacrificed to the knife of subsequent cuts. At first sight Birmingham is an improbable home for the founding, let alone survival, of the project which gave rise to the Symposium of 1985. Jane Austen's Mr Elton entertained "no great hopes from Birmingham. I always say there is something direful in the sound"¹. By 1902 Compton Mackenzie had even less expectation of its Greek: "the University of Birmingham is not a very stern Alma Mater"². Yet, with hopes, some sternness and considerable imagination, the University of Birmingham committed itself to both Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies in the salad days of the early 1960s, to which it had the temerity to add Ottoman Studies to complete an unique triple alliance of disciplines in the colder climate of 1984, long after the founding fathers had gone — leaving their books to the project.

From 1967 the University's Department of Extramural Studies

¹ *Emma*, chapter 36.

² C. Mackenzie, *First Athenian Memories* (London, 1931), 195-96.

collaborated with Birmingham's Byzantinists in organising an annual Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, which became more than local conferences by 1971. From 1978 the University's Centre for Byzantine Studies and Modern Greek has also held the meetings for the British National Committee of the International Byzantine Association with the sponsorship of the British Academy. In 1983 a Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies arose from the chrysalis of the Committee and the Symposia became its Annual General Meeting. The Symposia began performing a transhumance from Birmingham elsewhere in Britain in alternate years in 1982 (Edinburgh), followed by Oxford (1984) and Manchester (1986). Like the annual U.S. Byzantine Studies Conference (from 1975) and Australia's equivalent meeting (from 1981), the British Symposia are open to all; unlike them they are directed to a specific theme and retain a sense of Extramural didacticism.

The theme for 1985 was partly inspired by the arrival of a 'new blood' Ottomanist at Birmingham. The event was not haphazard. Birmingham's Centre had already declared an interest by collaborating with Harvard on a four-year project in late Byzantine and early Ottoman society, which culminated in a Symposium at Dumbarton Oaks in 1982³. But while the formal teaching of Byzantine Studies in Britain appeared marginally less under threat than Modern Greek by 1984, Ottoman Studies seemed to be in an even more parlous state. This view comes, of course, from the struthocamelotic vision of those, like your editors, who thought that the state of a subject depended upon how many designated lecturers were being paid from public funds to pursue Byzantine, Ottoman or Modern Greek Studies — in Birmingham's case under the roof of a single Centre. But taking our heads out of the sands, we saw a wider academic need for our Symposium than a single celebration of a local institutional, if related, development in Birmingham.

Not unlike other countries, in Britain Ottoman Studies are even

³ *Continuity and change in late Byzantine and early Ottoman Society*, ed. A. Bryer and H. Lowry (Birmingham-Washington D.C., 1986).

younger than Byzantine: founded in effect by Paul Wittek and Victor Ménéage at SOAS, London. As '*Orchideenfächer*' both share the same problems of vast orchards and few skilled labourers. But there are two more such common characteristics which impelled the choice of the Symposium subject. *First*, while neither Byzantinists nor Ottomanists would regard 1453 as a beginning or an end, there has been a growing preparedness to move into the other's field — not to pursue the legendary ancestry of Osman, or to seek 'Byzance après Byzance', but to assess the common experience of the same lands and peoples over several centuries. Thus the Symposium did not, for example, attempt to demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was the Byzantine Empire in disguise but aimed at comparisons of how Byzantines and Ottomans, Greeks and Turks lived and reacted in the land of Rum, between confrontation and symbiosis. The battle of Manzikert of 1071 was one obvious terminus; the symbolic date of Lepanto in 1571 was much disputed as the other (F. Braudel's revisionism has evidently been re-revised). But it was a convenient end, for many aspects of Orthodox communal life in the *Tourkokratia* changed by then. To do this we aimed to bring together as many active Byzantine and Ottoman scholars as possible. As this does not seem to have been done on this scale before, their very meeting was a virtue of the Symposium: both sides claim to have learnt from the encounter. Indeed, what had emerged was a *second* characteristic: Byzantinists and Ottomanists found they were talking the same language.

This was because both sides had independently been going through a bout of re-appraisal of their historical method, and in both cases had looked to contemporary historiography of western Europe in their period. This most dictated their common social and economic, intellectual and material concerns. The historic necessity of national schools of Balkan and Turkish historiography hardly obtruded, because it did not interest us, although we unwittingly concluded the Symposium on Greek National Day with an Ottoman Court Feast. Some thought that in view of the awesome quantity of Byzantine and Ottoman evidence — partic-

ularly Ottoman — which has still to be digested, that we were trying to run before we could walk in allowing ourselves the indulgence of discussing what we should be doing with it. For example, if the English Domesday Book, which has been available for nine centuries and subjected to scholarly analysis for one century, still stimulates a minor industry of interpretation which shows no sign of abating, what hope is there for the vastly greater range of *tahrir defteri*, Ottoman Domesdays, of which serious discussion of the fraction that is available has only begun in our generation? But mutual exposure of ignorance was right in the context of the revelation of what seemed to be largely common aims and interests. The meeting of the two disciplines and the discovery that they were approaching roughly the same questions in roughly the same way made the Symposium peculiarly invigorating.

Not all Spring Symposia of Byzantine Studies have been published⁴. This is because it is notorious that the heady champagne of a conference such as this goes flat when served again in cold print in the light of day. We believe that the papers presented here are an exception. They are arranged according to the original discussion groups of the meeting, to which some of the 28 volunteered communications have been added where appropriate to the theme. Not all the main papers are included. Some will

⁴ One-hour videotapes were made at the VIIth Symposium, 1973 (The Ceremonies of Constantine Porphyrogenitus); the VIIIth, 1974 (Byzantine Society and Economy); and the Xth, 1976 (Mark Antonios Foskolos, *Fourtounatos*). The papers of the following Symposia have been published:

IX, 1975: *Iconoclasm*, ed. A. Bryer and Judith Herrin (Birmingham 1977) (out of print).

XII, 1978: *The Byzantine Black Sea = Archeion Pontou*, 35 (1979), available from the *Epi trope Pontiakon Meleton*, Kolokotronis 25, Athens 125, Greece.

XIII, 1979: *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition*, ed. Margaret Mullett and R. Scott (Birmingham, 1981), available from the Secretary, Centre for Byzantine Studies and Modern Greek (CBS&MG), University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT, England.

XIV, 1980: *The Byzantine Saint*, ed. S. Hackel (a special number of *Sobornost*, London, 1981), available from the CBS&MG.

XVI, 1982: *The Byzantine Aristocracy, IX to XIII Centuries*, ed. M. Angold (BAR International Series 221, Oxford, 1984).

XVIII, 1984 (Oxford): see the previous *Forschungen*.

appear elsewhere or be incorporated into larger works, and others are not here for the good reason that their authors (for whom we have great sympathy) just never found time to write them up for publication. But for the sake of record, the missing papers are noted below, and abstracts of them are published in the *Bulletin of British Byzantine Studies*, 12 (1986), 41-54⁵.

There are three *Framework Lectures* (Angold, Lilie, Majer), to which COLIN HEYWOOD (SOAS, London), added a fourth at the Symposium, on "The Ottoman State in the fifteenth century: Mehmed II and his historians".

Discussion Section I, on *Security and Warfare* (Bartusis, Finkel), was at the conference completed by papers by COLIN IMBER (Manchester) on "Turkish pirates and Ottoman fleets (1300-1453)"; and by A.R.E. NORTH (Victoria and Albert Museum, London), on "Byzantine and Ottoman arms and armour".

Discussion Section II, on *Contacts and Inheritance* has papers by Flemming and Kyrris (the latter the only one which we have not edited), to which we add communications by Ellis, Belke and Paviot. Missing is STEPHEN REINERT (Dumbarton Oaks and Rutgers), on "Bayezid I (1389-1402) in Byzantine and early Ottoman historiography".

Discussion Section III, on *Societies and Economies* (Hopwood, Slot) is enriched by three others which were to have been delivered at the Symposium, but through illness or travel problems were not: we welcome Faroqhi, Asdrachas and Dimitriades to the feast at last. RUDI LINDNER was also to have spoken in this Section, on "Turanian nomads and Anatolian shepherds", to balance Hopwood: see his *Nomads and Ottomans in medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington, 1983). Of related communications not represented here, we are happy to report that of our most venerable Turkish Symposiast, FARUK SÜMER, has since been published as *Yabanlu Pazarı*.

during the Seljuk period (Istanbul, 1985).

Discussion Section IV was on *Monasteries, Tekkes, and their*

⁵ Available to members of the Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies; for membership forms apply to its Secretary, CBS&MG.

fates (Lowry, to which we added Balivet). Missing is KLAUS KREISER (Bamberg) on "The economies of the late Byzantine monasteries and early Ottoman *tekkes*".

Discussion Section V looked *Beyond Byzantines and Ottomans* (Nielsen and Collins, to whom we have attached McGann and Eskenasy). Not a rag-bag: it is just what the theme proposes.

Discussion Section VI was on *Patronage in art and literature* (Petković, to whom we are pleased to add Gavrilović, Kiel and Calofonos in support). Missing, but widely known for their publications elsewhere, are papers by MANOLIS CHATZIDAKIS (Academy of Athens, and Secretary-General of the International Byzantine Association), on "Le patronage d'art pendant les premiers temps de la Tourcocratie en Grèce"; JULIAN RABY (Oriental Institute, Oxford), on "Mehmed the Conqueror (1451-81) and the Greek heritage"; and ROSEMARY BANCROFT-MARCUS (Lausanne), on "Authors and patronage in Crete during the period of Venetian rule to 1669"⁶.

It is a pleasure to thank ADOLF M. HAKKERT, Symposiast and also publisher of the Oxford Symposium of 1984 in these *Forschungen*, but we are especially grateful to our speakers, whether authors or not, for making what was, we sensed, the right academic meeting at the right time. Some events cannot be reproduced here: an exhibition of *Twelfth-thirteenth-century Muslim coins and their classical and Byzantine prototypes*, organised at the Barber Institute of Fine Arts by NUBAR HAMPARTUMIAN and MICHAEL URSINUS (a field on which work continues); and, not least, the taste of an Ottoman Court Feast for the season, cooked by SYLVIA BUTTERWORTH.

No *cranbo repetite*, we serve you a pretty substantial menu from a memorable Symposium.

⁶ We have attempted to impose the Dumbarton Oaks conventions for editing and abbreviations, but so long as they are internally consistent have, in some cases, left transliteration to the vagaries of individual contributors.

POSTSCRIPT, 1990

To contributors and readers, more than apology but an explanation is due to the lateness of this publication of a Symposium held in 1985. It had already passed through two proofs by 1988. In 1989 our publisher regretted that the bulk of the proofs had been lost in the post somewhere between Birmingham, Gran Canaria and Athens, and offered to reset them. Your editors agreed to start again, because even after four proofs (which somehow gather imperfections), the Symposium *rechauffe* seemed to retain useful and distinctive flavours. I am grateful to Annegret Strauss for help with the second set of final proofs.

Inexorably five further Spring Symposia of Byzantine Studies have been held since this Editorial Note was written. Abstracts of papers given at each are published in the subsequent *Bulletin of British Byzantine Studies*. To complete the list in note 4 above, they were:

XX, 1986 (Manchester): *Church and State in Byzantium*, ed. Rosemary Morris (Birmingham, 1990).

XXI, 1987 (Birmingham): *The Byzantine Eye* (not published).

XXII, 1988 (Nottingham): *Latins and Greeks in the Eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, Frank Cass, 1989).

XXIII, 1989 (Birmingham): *Salonica: The Second City* (not published).

XXIV, 1990 (Cambridge): *Byzantine Diplomacy*, to be published, ed. Jonathan Shepard.

XXV, 1991 (Birmingham): *The Sweet Land of Cyprus*, to be published ed. Anthony Bryer and George Georgiades.

Inexorably, also, my co-editor Michael Ursinus has moved on to the Chair of Ottoman studies at Freiburg University, but has happily been replaced in Birmingham as Lecturer in Ottoman Studies by Johann Strauss. The success of the XIXth Spring

Symposium, 1985, presented here, and the subsequent firm embodiment of Ottoman Studies and Modern Greek by Drs Ursinus and Strauss in Birmingham have also led to a change of the Centre's own title.

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THE FRAMEWORK : 1

THE BYZANTINE STATE ON THE EVE OF
THE BATTLE OF MANZIKERT

MICHAEL ANGOLD / EDINBURGH

The battle of Manzikert may not matter very much. Battles seldom do. It does not even seem to have been, in military terms, a particularly serious defeat for the Byzantines¹. At other times, it might have been shrugged off. As Romilly Jenkins wrote, "If such a battle had been fought in 1021, instead of fifty years later, it would scarcely have obtained a mention in our history books"². The assumption is that the structure of the Byzantine state was a great deal stronger at the end of Basil II's reign than it was half a century later. My purpose will be to test this assumption, but this is to presume that there was such a thing as the 'state' at Byzantium. Paul Magdalino has singled out 'state' along with 'snobbery' as "one of those words which one applies to the ancient and medieval world at the risk of one's scholarly credibility"³. There can be little doubt that the idea of the 'state' existed at Byzantium. As David Jacoby put it, "The abstract concept of *politeia*, or *res publica*, implied the existence of public law and public taxation"⁴. But this thought can profitably be turned around: it was the existence of public law and public taxation that gave meaning to the abstract concept of *politeia*. In this sense, the state existed at

1 J.C. Cheynet, 'Manzikert. Un désastre militaire?', *Byzantion*, 1 (1980), 410-38.

2 R. Jenkins, *Byzantium: the Imperial Centuries AD 610 to 1071* (London, 1966), 370.

3 P. Magdalino, 'Byzantine Snobbery', in *The Byzantine Aristocracy IX to XIII centuries*, ed. M.J. Angold (BAR International Series 221) (Oxford, 1984), 58.

4 D. Jacoby, 'The Encounter of Two Societies: Western Conquerors and Byzantines in the Peloponnese after the Fourth Crusade', *American Historical Review*, 18 (1973), 875 [= D. Jacoby, *Recherches sur la Méditerranée orientale du XIIe au XVe siècle* (London, 1979), no. II].

Byzantium not just as an abstract concept, but as a concrete fact. There was a properly constituted and generally recognized public authority. It provided for the welfare of the community at large through the provision of law courts and the application of a more or less uniform system of law. It offered protection in the shape of military and naval forces. In return, it was empowered to raise taxes.

The character of the state at Byzantium was complicated by being nearly identical with imperial authority (*basileia*). To quote David Jacoby once again, "The emperor, who personified the state and was the repository of political and judicial authority, was also the source of all grace and responsible for the implementation of the law"⁵. There was a relative, but not an absolute, identity of the state and imperial authority at Byzantium. It was recognized that the state as a fiscal agency (*demosion*) had a continuous existence that reached back before the creation of the Empire. The *Peira*, a law book of the mid-eleventh century, includes the following opinion: "Those things are *demosia*, which are called *demosia*, which the *demosia* had and enjoyed before there was an emperor and which passed to the Empire once it had been constituted"⁶. It concludes: *demosia ta tou demou onta*. Though more than a shade gnomic, it does indicate the meaning to be ascribed to *demosia*: public rights and property. This was the core of the state and lay at the basis of its right to tax. It was also a recognition that imperial authority at Byzantium went back to the Augustan settlement, through which it had been grafted on to the republican institutions, or democracy, as Greek would have it. Democracy only very occasionally raises its head in Byzantine history⁷. Relations between emperor and church were always a much more pressing constitutional issue. Never more so than in the mid-eleventh century, where events were for a time dominated by the figure of the Patriarch Michael Keroularios (1043-58). He was accused of

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ I. and P. Zepos, *Jus Graecoromanum* (Athens, 1931), IV, 143.

⁷ G.T. Bratianu, 'Empire et "Démocratie" à Byzance', *BZ*, 37 (1937), 86-111.

usurping imperial authority; he was also charged with being democratically inclined (*demokratikos*)⁸. This was an extraordinary accusation, but it indicates that democracy was an issue; that the relationship of public and imperial authority was the object of debate. It reflected the strains that existed in the mid-eleventh century within the structure of the state.

These strains can be seen as the product of a complicated process of adaptation and change, which, at its simplest, turned into a struggle for control of the machinery of state⁹. If, theoretically, the state is responsible for the requirements of the community at large, it is also the main source of power and rewards and therefore a prize to be fought for. Most emperors strove to preserve a balance within the state between the common and private interest, but in the course of the eleventh century this became more and more difficult to do, until the state became prey to faction. Michael Psellos explains what was happening: "Therefore two things preserve the supremacy of the Romans: they are the system of honours and wealth, and, in addition, a third factor: Their wise supervision and care in their distribution"¹⁰. He saw that these strengths were being sapped; there was no sense of proportion in the way honours, gifts, and pensions were being granted out. It was undermining the financial soundness of the state and loosening the cohesion of the elite, as the rules for entry into its ranks relaxed. Psellos displayed his usual perspicacity, when he singled out wealth and the system of honours as the twin pillars of the Byzantine state. A state does not function very effectively without a well-defined elite. The system of honours defines that elite and binds it to the ideal that it is supposed to serve. Until after the death of Basil II in 1025 the Byzantine elite had been fairly narrow. It consisted of two clearly defined groups: a bureaucracy and an officer class. Although it would be unrealistic to deny the importance of birth for entry into either, it was

⁸ Michael Psellos to Michael Keroularios: K.N. Sathas, *Mesaiônîkê Biblothêkê* (Venice / Paris, 1872-94), V, 512, l.6.

⁹ See M.J. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204* (London, 1984), 34-58.

¹⁰ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 29, ed. E. Renauld, I, 132, ll. 6-10 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers* (Penguin Classics), 170].

not an absolute criterion. Ability and education were rather more important.

Wealth is the lifeblood of any state. In the end, the health of a state depends on whether it is able to balance its budget. After the dispensing of justice, the collection and dispersal of money and goods is the hall-mark of a state. The importance of the fiscal system to the Byzantine state has recently been underlined by Michael Hendy. He shows that its coinage was exclusively geared to the needs of the state. "The perceived needs of the state dictated not only where and when coin was produced, but even what kind of coin was produced. The state issued its precious-metal coinage to serve as a medium of revenue and expenditure"¹¹.

It was the fiscal system more than anything that held the Byzantine Empire together during the seventh and eighth centuries. A devolved system of military government grew up in the provinces. The central government only retained direct control over the fiscal and financial organization. Otherwise, the state retreated into Constantinople. Here were housed the law courts and a series of administrative bureaux (*sekreta*), which dealt mainly, but not exclusively, with fiscal and financial matters. But even in the capital power might be delegated. Much of the organization of day-to-day life was in the hands of the guilds, which are described as self-governing bodies, after the manner of the *polis*¹². It was a system of government that suited the requirements of the Byzantine Empire during the period when it was on the defensive. Problems began to appear once the Empire went on the offensive from the middle of the ninth century. It was then that the central government started to interfere increasingly in the life of the provinces. This was done in the first instance to control the growing power of the great families of Anatolia. The instrument that was developed to this end was the agrarian legislation of the tenth century¹³. This was initiated by Romanos Lekapenos (920-

¹¹ M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy c. 300-1450* (Cambridge, 1985), 663.

¹² *Basilicorum Libri LX*, ed. H.J. Scheltema and N. van der Wal, I (Groningen, 1955), VIII, 2, 101.

44) and was ostensibly designed to protect the property of the peasantry from the great landowners. The cynical would say that this was done not so much out of any interest in the well-being of the peasantry, more to further the control of the state over the land and the peasantry¹⁴. The legislation was nevertheless presented as an act of imperial philanthropy, protecting the poor against the strong, the interests of the commonwealth against private gain. This imperial rhetoric was echoed in the letters of the Logothete of the Drome Symeon, one of the ministers responsible for implementing this legislation. He talks about "our brothers the poor"¹⁵. He closes one letter with the appeal: "Save my poor ones from those who do not shrink from doing them harm and wrong"¹⁶. There seems to be no good reason to doubt the genuineness of these sentiments. There can be little doubt either that the defence of the poor against the powerful, the pursuit of the common good¹⁷, provided the bureaucracy in Constantinople with a justification for the power they wielded as agents of the state. Nor was it just a question of the exercise of power. They had an interest in ensuring that the peasantry did not escape the clutches of the state, because their salaries and other perks came out of the taxation drawn into Constantinople. The bureaucracy identified the interests of the state with its own interests.

This did not go unchallenged by the armies of the themes. Their leaders reacted by seizing control of the state with the usurpation of Nicephorus Phokas in 963. They objected to the way that soldiers "who put loyal service to the holy emperors and the freedom and honour of christians above their own lives were beaten by nasty little tax-collectors, who bring no benefit to the commonwealth. Rather do they oppress the poor and accumulate

¹³ See A. Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his World* (London, 1973), 145-76; P. Lemerle, *The Agrarian History of Byzantium from the Origins to the Twelfth Century. The Sources and Problems* (Galway, 1979).

¹⁴ E.g. G. Ostrogorskij, *Quelques problèmes d'histoire de la paysannerie byzantine* (Brussels, 1956), 11-18.

¹⁵ J. Darrouzès, *Epistoliers byzantins du Xe siècle* (Paris, 1960), p.125 (= II, no.37).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 146, ll. 11-12 (=II, no.82).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 116 (= II, no.25).

for themselves from injustice and the blood of the poor many talents of gold"¹⁸. Nicephorus Phokas, whose sentiments these were, tried to take this further by getting the patriarch of the day to sanction the notion, no doubt current, that those soldiers dying in battle against the Muslims should be accorded the status of martyrs¹⁹. The intention was to underline that it was the military who were the true protectors of the commonwealth and of the poor. It provided some justification of the militarization of the Byzantine state that was carried through under Nicephorus Phokas. There were two main elements: Phokas raised the value of a military estate from four to twelve pounds of gold. This completed the evolution of the *stratiotes* from part time to professional soldier, with a social status which can be equated with that of the 'knight' in western Europe. Units of the *tagmata* — the regiments of the standing army — were stationed in the provinces under the command of a duke or a katepan. In addition, the peasantry were organized to support the much expanded military establishment. It all meant that the military element which had been on the fringes of the state was now brought firmly within it²⁰.

It intensified competition between the civil and military establishments for control of the state and strained the state's finances. It sets the scene for the reign of Basil II (976-1025). The early years of his reign saw two great rebellions in Asia Minor as the military families sought to recover control of the state. Basil II victorious. He was able to dominate both the military and the civilian establishments, but he made few changes to the basic structure of the state inherited from the soldier-emperors. His major innovation is instructive: he set up the bureau of the *epi ton oikeiakon*. Its purpose was to bring more land and peasants under the direct exploitation of the state²¹. He was interested in strengthening the

¹⁸ Nicephorus Phokas, *De Velitatione Bellica*, apud Leo Diaconus, *Historia* (Bonn, 1828), 239, 1.20-240, 1.5.

¹⁹ V. Grumel, *Les Regestes des actes du patriarcat de Constantinople*, II (Paris, 1936), no.790.

²⁰ A.P. Kazhdan, *Derevnja i gorod v Vizantii IX-X vv* (Moscow, 1960), 153-62.

direct control exercised by the state over basic resources. He wanted to guard against the danger of the state being taken over from within. To this end, he imposed a peculiarly harsh regime. He must be credited with using his iron will to hold the state together. The strains apparent were contained, but coldly appraised Basil II's achievements were those of a salvager. He held on to Asia Minor in the face of aristocratic resentment, but most of the impetus for further expansion eastwards was lost. Only in Armenia did he negotiate further concessions of territory, but the Armenian lands were in a state of disintegration. In Europe he was able to recover the territories, which had been lost to the Bulgarians early in his reign, largely due to his own incompetence and inexperience. This took him thirty years' hard campaigning, which is scarcely impressive. It was almost a conspiracy. The Bulgarian war was useful to him: it provided an outlet for the energies and ambitions of the military aristocracy and a justification for his harsh policies. It helped preserve the cohesion of the state around the emperor. Basil II was fortunate in that conditions outside the Empire remained propitious. How would he have fared if he had to face a formidable foe, such as the Turks? It may be that it was the absence of such an enemy that lent to Byzantium under Basil II the impression of great strength.

His immediate successors' lack of success suggests that this was indeed the case. They tried to take up the momentum of expansion that had been lost under Basil II. Their efforts in Syria and Sicily brought next to nothing in the way of concrete gains. Even Basil II's main achievement, The recovery of the Bulgarian lands, was threatened by a rebellion which affected much of the Balkans in 1040-1041. One of the causes was the attempt made by the chief minister of the day to convert taxes paid in kind into a money payment, contrary to Basil II's undertaking to the Bulgarians. This suggests that the financial position of the Byzantine state was beginning to deteriorate. The origins of its financial difficulties can be traced back to the end of Basil II's reign, when he remitted two

²¹ N. Oikonomidès, 'L'évolution de l'organisation administrative de l'Empire byzantin au XI^e siècle (1025-1118)', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 136-37.

years' taxation. The reason given for this measure was his pity for the poor, which would be in line with imperial rhetoric. It seems rather to have been an admission that his fiscal policies had been too harsh. The finances of the state proved too precarious to stand the burden thus imposed. Constantine VIII had to rescind his brother's measure and collected five years' taxation within the space of three years²². The discontent this produced exploded in a series of rebellions centred on continental Greece.

With financial difficulties, rebellions, and a general lack of military success came disillusionment with the system of government inherited from Basil II. It can be detected in the rather sour comments that Michael Psellos reserves in his *Chronographia* for Basil II's style of government²³. A series of events between 1040 and 1043 underlined the malaise of the Byzantine state: there was the Bulgarian rebellion; the overthrow of Michael V by the Constantinopolitan mob; the rising of the Byzantine general George Maniakes. They each underlined different weaknesses. The Bulgarian rebellion, as we have seen, highlighted the financial difficulties of the Empire. The overthrow of Michael V indicated that the citizens of Constantinople were a political force with which Byzantine emperors would have to reckon, while Maniakes' rebellion emphasized the dangers of concentrating too much power in the hands of a general. Constantine IX Monomachos (1042-1055) was the emperor who had to face up to the implications of these events. He would preside over an attempt to give the Empire a new direction and purpose and to extricate it from Basil II's legacy. In many ways, he was trying to get back to the ideal that was expressed by a Byzantine spokesman at the court of Nicephorus Phokas, when he spoke disparagingly of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, as "a mild man who tried to win the friendship of the whole world by peaceful means"²⁴.

²² John Scylitzes, *Synopsis Historiarum* (ed. H. Thurn) (Berlin / New York, 1973) (= CFHB v), 373, ll.4-11.

²³ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, I, 29-31, ed. E. Renauld, I, 18-19 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 43-45].

²⁴ J. Becker, *Die Werke Liudprands von Cremona* (Hannover / Leipzig, 1915), 205-6.

He renounced the offensive foreign policy that had lingered on from Basil II's reign, the only exception being in Armenia, where he annexed Ani in 1045. In the frontier regions he tried to cut back on direct administration and to work through the local ascendencies. This is apparent from the way he made Argyros — the head of the most powerful Lombard family of Bari — viceroy of the Byzantine territories in southern Italy²⁵. Even in the Armenian lands the old families clearly retained much of their power. Gregory Magistros from the great Armenian family of Pahlavi was made duke of Mesopotamia by Constantine Monomachos²⁶. A more radical solution was attempted in the old Bulgarian lands, where the Petcheneks were brought in as military colonists²⁷.

This taken in conjunction with Monomachos's disbanding of the army of the Iberian theme²⁸ has always been seen as a deliberate disparagement of the military establishment and was so considered in many quarters at the time. The settlement of the Petcheneks was a major cause of the rebellion of the western armies in 1047 under Leo Tornikios²⁹. Financial considerations were not likely to have been uppermost in Monomachos's mind. He was a by-word for his generosity and indulgence in the early part of his reign. It was more likely that Monomachos was trying to rationalize the cumbersome military organization that he had inherited. The assumption, at least for Anatolia, seems to have been that a small professional army stationed well back from the frontiers in bases such as Theodosioupolis and Melitene would be just as effective and far more economical than the old system, where the competence of thematic and tagmatic troops often overlapped. The peaceful con-

25 V. von Falkenhausen, *Untersuchungen über die byzantinische Herrschaft in Süditalien vom 9. bis ins 11. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1967), 58-59, 93-94, 187-90.

26 Khr. M. Bartikian, *To Byzantion eis tas armenikaspegas* (*Byzantina keimena kai meletai* 18) (Thessaloniki, 1981), 88-92.

27 P. Diaconu, *Les Pétchenèques au Bas-Danube* (Bucarest, 1971), 50-78.

28 Michael Attaleiates, *Historia* (Bonn, 1853), 44-45; Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, ed. B. Wassiliewsky and V. Jernstedt (St Petersburg, 1896), 18, ll. 12-24.

29 J. Lefort, 'Rhétorique et politique: trois discours de Jean Mauropous en 1047', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 276-77.

ditions existing in the mid-1040s also suggested that the huge military establishment built up since the middle of the tenth century could safely be slimmed down. This comes out very clearly in the chrysobull Constantine Monomachos issued in 1047, establishing the post of *nomophylax*: "Thanks to the Lord of Heaven, Whose long arm and strong hand bring wars to an end, Who opposes the proud and exalts the meek, external wars and rebellions have been brought to an end; enemies are at peace and our subjects reconciled. The affairs of the Romans now enjoy the greatest tranquillity. There is nothing distracting our attention. So with the blessing of God we turn our whole purpose towards the reform of our polity"³⁰.

The chief measure was to be the setting up of a law school. The lack of a proper system of legal education was endangering the standard of justice. A law school would help to counter "those who do not hesitate to use blatant sophistry to pervert the course of justice"³¹. "Total casuistry" is how Dieter Simon characterizes the administration of the law in the court of the hippodrome in the early eleventh century³². In the Basilics the Byzantine state possessed a perfectly adequate law code, but no effective system of legal education to complement it, equivalent to the training that had been available under Justinian at the law school at Beirut³³. The aim was to provide one. This measure reflected the primacy of law in the proper functioning of the state. It also indicated that higher education was a responsibility of the state. Since the seventh century Byzantine emperors had taken but a fitful interest in education³⁴. Constantine Monomachos, however, not only created the position of *nomophylax* for John Xiphilinos, who headed the law school. He also made Michael Psellos consul of the philosophers, a post which entailed supervision of the private schools

³⁰ I. and P. Zepos, *Jus*, I, 621, para. 6.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 625, ll. 15-16.

³² D. Simon, *Rechtsfindung am byzantinischen Reichsgericht* (Frankfurt, 1973), 17.

³³ I. and P. Zepos, *Jus*, I, 627, ll. 9-11. Cf. W. Wolska-Conus, 'L'école de droit et l'enseignement du droit à Byzance au XI^e siècle', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 1 (1979), 1-107, esp. 1-11, 13-53.

³⁴ See P. Lemerle, *Le premier humanisme byzantin* (Paris, 1971), 74ff.

of Constantinople³⁵. The aim was to ensure a ready supply of trained administrators and judges.

They were, in other words, measures that pointed to the strengthening of the bureaucratic element within the state. The same was true of Monomachos's creation of the office of *epi ton kriseon*. According to Michael Attaleiates, who was then just at the start of his career in the Byzantine administration, its holder headed a new *sekreton*: that of the *idiotikai dikai*. He amplifies this by adding that "the judges of the provinces both drew up what they had done in writing and deposited there copies of their registers, in order to clear them of suspicion"³⁶. The intention was clearly to make the provincial judges responsible to a ministry in Constantinople. It completed the haphazard development of provincial administration since the turn of the tenth century, which had seen the judge gradually replacing the *strategos* as the effective governor of the theme. It was the culmination of the demilitarisation of the theme system. The thematic troops were largely pensioned off; and the themes became units of an essentially civilian administration³⁷.

Monomachos's reforms only had a limited success. They left a legacy of bitterness and failed to provide the state with any new sense of purpose or direction. The emperor was soon forced to backtrack. The group of men most closely associated with his schemes found themselves out of favour. John Mavropous who was perhaps the architect and certainly the advocate of Monomachos's reforms was packed off to darkest Pontos as bishop of Euchaita. In the face of the hostility that the creation of the law school provoked Xiphilinos preferred to retire gracefully to Bithynian Olympos, whence he would later descend to become patriarch. Only Michael Psellos clung on, but his influence with

³⁵ W. Wolska-Conus, 'Les écoles de Psellos et Xiphilin sous Constantin IX Monomaque', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 223-43, esp. 231-43. Cf. P. Lemerle, *Cinq études sur le XI^e siècle byzantin* (Paris, 1977), 203-12.

³⁶ Michael Attaleiates, 22, ll. 1-3.

³⁷ H. Glykatzis-Ahrweiler, 'Recherches sur l'administration de l'Empire byzantin aux IX^e-XI^e siècles', *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique*, 84 (1960), 21-24 [= H. Ahrweiler, *Études sur les structures administratives et sociales de Byzance* (London, 1971), no. VIII].

the emperor was in decline. The reforms had gone wrong for a number of reasons. They were predicated on a state of continuing peace both at home and beyond the frontiers of the Empire. The settlement of the Petcheneks was badly mismanaged and pressure from the Turks was mounting along the eastern frontier³⁸. The financial position of the Empire deteriorated. Michael Attaleiates records that in the last two years of his reign Monomachos adopted a brutal fiscal policy. The one specific measure cited was directed against the church. The emperor set up a commission to investigate the *siteresia* — allowances from the state — enjoyed by churches and monasteries. He died before its work could be carried out. It was clearly designed to cut back on state expenditure³⁹. His financial difficulties have also been revealed by numismatists, who have shown how he was forced to carry out a controlled debasement⁴⁰.

The bitterness generated by Monomachos's reforms is rather harder to explain than their relative lack of success. They were concentrated on the field of education. This looks, at first sight, innocuous enough. They may have affronted entrenched interests in the gild of notaries, but this should not have been too serious. It was much more that these reforms seemed to be a cover for the ambitions of a clique of bureaucrats. They and their plans seemed all the more dangerous for the meritocratic ideal, which they revived. The claim made by their spokesman John Mavropous that first place in the state belonged to the intellectual rather than the soldier⁴¹ must have revived antagonisms that were beginning to fade. Michael Psellos tried to associate Constantine Monomachos in such pretensions. Looking back on his early career he said of the emperor: "He did not advance office holders and judges because of high birth nor did he fill the senate and various magistracies only from the first families, but also from other

³⁸ M.J. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204*, 44-45.

³⁹ Michael Attaleiates, 50-51.

⁴⁰ P. Grierson, 'The debasement of the bezant in the eleventh century', *BZ*, 47 (1954), 379-84; C. Morrisson, 'La dévaluation de la monnaie byzantine au XI^e siècle', *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 3-30.

⁴¹ J. Lefort in *Travaux et Mémoires*, 6 (1976), 285.

sections of society, should they appear well-qualified and more suitable than others, for he believed it absurd that as far as the senate was concerned it should be an essential law and an unchangeable rule to observe succession by family and that only somebody revered for his lineage should have access to the palace, even if his mental faculties were marred and he could do no more than breathe, not able to belch forth anything except his family's great name"⁴².

Whether Monomachos approved of the meritocratic sentiments that were wished upon him is another matter. He belonged to an old aristocratic family. He was connected in one way or another with the Argyros, Tornikios, and Skleros families⁴³. He was part of that aristocratic ascendancy which emerged after the death of Basil II⁴⁴. It transcended the old divisions between civil and military. Its members were as likely to hold high office in Constantinople as military command; they were as likely to have their main interests in the capital as in the provinces. Many came from old Anatolian families, such as the Argyros and Skleros, but others, such as the Comneni, owed their ascent to Basil II. These were the families which would compete for the imperial office after the death of Constantine VIII, brother of Basil II. The one prominent family which does not, at first sight, appear to fit is the Paphlagonian, which had no claims to an aristocratic origin⁴⁵. They are usually treated as representatives of the commercial wealth of Constantinople⁴⁶. The architect of their fortunes, however, was no business man, but one of Basil II's ablest ministers, John the Orphanotrophos. The Paphlagonians turn out to be one of Basil II's new families, but after the event. They were perhaps not so very different from the Comneni, who also came from Paphlagonia and owed their original promotion to their connection

⁴² Sathas, *Mesaiônikê Bibliothêkê*, IV, 430-31.

⁴³ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 14-15, ed. E. Renauld, I, 124-25 [= Michael Psellos, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 161-63].

⁴⁴ A.P. Kazhdan, *Sotsial'nyj sostav gosподstvujushchego klassa Vizantii XI-XII vv* (Moscow, 1974), 255-58.

⁴⁵ Cf. Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 98-88.

⁴⁶ E.g. M.F. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, 570-73.

with the civil service family of Erotikos⁴⁷. There is indeed a much more concrete connection between the two families. Isaac I Comnenus granted an annual sum of 24 *nomismata* to the monastery of Theotokos Dekapolitissa for a candle to burn in memory above the grave of John the Orphanotrophos⁴⁸.

The aristocracy remained high in Monomachos's favour. Psellos found it worthwhile cultivating their support. He soon dropped his meritocratic pretensions, found himself an aristocratic bride, and claimed for himself aristocratic descent from consuls and patricians⁴⁹. But Monomachos did not rule simply in the aristocratic interest. He tried to preserve a balance between the most important elements within the state. These included the bureaucracy, but he also had to take account of a new force, the guilds of Constantinople⁵⁰. Psellos accuses him of reducing the *cursus honorum* to confusion: "He associated in the senate nearly all the riff-raff of the market place, not just on one or two or possibly a few more, but at a stroke he promoted the whole lot of them to the proudest positions of state"⁵¹.

It may be doubted whether this was done out of respect for Constantinople's growing economic power. It is more likely to have been a reward for the loyalty that the city of Constantinople had shown towards the Empress Zoe, as well as official recognition of the influence exercised within the capital by the guilds. Constantine X Doukas (1059-67) was to take this still further. Michael Psellos complained that he abolished any distinction

⁴⁷ Kazhdan, *op. cit.*, 161.

⁴⁸ I. and P. Zepos, *Jus*, I, 638 (= no.XV). Isaac also gave an annual sum of 24 *nomismata* to Nea Moni on the island of Chios for a candle to burn over the tomb of the monk Theodore, the former *nobelisimos*. It is tempting to identify him with another of Michael IV's brothers, the *nobelisimos* Constantine.

⁴⁹ For Psellos's family background, see Ch. Diehl, *Byzantine Portraits* (New York, 1927), 278.

⁵⁰ See Sp. Vryonis Jr., 'Byzantine *demokratia* and the guilds in the eleventh century', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 17 (1963), 287-314 [= Sp. Vryonis Jr., *Byzantium: its Internal History and Relations with the Muslim World* (London, 1971, no.III)].

⁵¹ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 29, ed. E. Renauld, I, 132, ll. 18-21 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 170-71].

between gildsman and senator⁵². The standing of the gilds was also emphasized in another way: emperors now felt that it was necessary to make an inaugural speech, setting out their aims and ideals, to the assembled gildsmen of the city⁵³. A new element was being brought within the compass of the state. The commercial and professional class of Constantinople had always tried to use their wealth to buy status for themselves by the purchase of dignities. Such pressures had in the past been more or less contained. From the mid-eleventh century the relative weakness of the emperors was to mean a wholesale capitulation. It was not necessarily a bad thing. It was one of the ways the Byzantine state absorbed social, economic, and political changes. It was a process that of necessity imposed great strains on the fabric of the Byzantine state. These were apparent under Constantine Monomachos, but they did not erupt until after the death of Theodora, the last of the Macedonian line.

Her brief reign allowed a group of bureaucrats led by Leo Paraspondylos to seize the reins of power. When the old empress died in 1056, they had an ex-civil servant Michael Stratiotikos hurriedly made emperor. He came from the great Bringas family⁵⁴, but was otherwise a nonentity, one of those "only able to belch forth their family's great name". He had been forced to swear in advance that he would do nothing contrary to the wishes and advice of the ruling clique which was to bring him to power⁵⁵. Such an undertaking was quite unprecedented. It came close to perverting imperial authority. The emperor was no more than a figure-head. Control of the state had passed into the hands of a bureaucratic clique. Michael Psellos who did not belong to it was indignant. It was quite unconstitutional. In his opinion it was not enough for an emperor only to have the support of the civilian element within the state. Imperial authority properly rested on

⁵² *Ibid.*, VII, 15, ed. E. Renauld, II, 145 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 338].

⁵³ E.g. Michael Attaleiates, 70, ll. 15-16. See Sp. Vryonis, *art. cit.*, 309-14.

⁵⁴ P. Grierson, 'The Tombs and Obits of the Byzantine Emperors (337-1042)', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 16 (1962), 60.

⁵⁵ John Scylitzes, 480, ll. 37-40.

three factors: the people, the senate, and the army⁵⁶. The people and the senate were won over by the distribution of imperial largesse, but the army was ignored. This was the cause of a rebellion by the eastern armies headed by Isaac Comnenus, which eventually brought down Michael Stratiotikos's government. Michael Psellos's analysis of this episode lies at the bottom of the usual interpretation of the period as one of a struggle for power between a military and a civilian party⁵⁷. It was far more complicated than this. It does scant justice to the central role played in these events by the Patriarch Michael Keroularios. It plays down the aristocratic character of Isaac Comnenus's rebellion. The leaders came, with one exception, from great aristocratic houses. The exception was Kekavmenos Katakalon, a career soldier of no very distinguished family background. After Isaac Comnenus was safely in power, he was accused of plotting against the new emperor and forced to become a monk⁵⁸. The armies which had brought Isaac the throne were disbanded, their hopes of adequate reward still unfulfilled⁵⁹. The neglect of the legitimate rights of the army was in the end just a pretext for an aristocratic coup.

Michael Psellos's simplistic analysis of these events is easily explained. It has to do with his anachronistic constitutional ideas. The failure of the Macedonian line must have occasioned reflection upon the constitutional steps necessary for the making of an emperor in the absence of any hereditary claimant. Following the antiquarian fashion of the time Psellos applied to Byzantium prescriptions borrowed from the Augustan settlement. The attractions of such a solution are obvious. However distantly Byzantium was the heir to the Empire of Augustus. His constitutional settlement could be made to fit Byzantium without straining credibility. The army could be used as a vehicle for aristocratic

⁵⁶ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 1, ed. E. Renauld, II, 83 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 275].

⁵⁷ Most recently by M.P. Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, 570-82.

⁵⁸ *Michaelis Pselli scripta minora* (ed. E. Kurtz and F. Drexler), II (Milan, 1941), nos. 30, 59, 141.

⁵⁹ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 45, ed. E. Renauld, II, 111 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 303].

ambitions. The people could be represented by the gilds; and Byzantium had its own senate⁶⁰. It is true that it is not easy to establish its composition or function at any given time. Its importance varied, the eleventh century being a time when it was more than usually prominent. It might be described as the Byzantine state in its honorific capacity. In theory, most holders of rank had access to the senate; in practice, it seems to have been the preserve in the eleventh century of the bureaucratic element within the state. These divisions remain artificial, but they were an attractive way of explaining the stresses and strains within the Byzantine state. These had little to do with constitutional schemes; much more with the way the state was adapting to the claims of a hereditary aristocracy, while absorbing the new wealth of Constantinople.

Michael Attaleiates also tried to explain the political turmoil that followed the death of Theodora in constitutional terms, but the line he followed was rather different from that favoured by Psellos. "The division of power among various people and the pretensions of each minister (*paradynasteuontes*)⁶¹ to imperial status (*basilei gauroumenou*) was the cause of much discontent and confusion among both the aristocrats and the populace (*demotikoi*) on account of democracy (*demokratia*), for the former thought only of the well-being of their own party and of those connected to the emperor, whether or not it was of value to the state (*politeia*), or dangerous and unrealistic, while the latter had no thought except to act as vessels (*parergon*) of senseless arrogance and empty conceit⁶²". What does Attaleiates mean by democracy? Is it the division of power or is it the self-seeking of the aristocrats and the mindlessness of the populace? Democracy was a notion that was in normal circumstances anathema to the Byzantines. It was regarded as the antithesis of monarchy. Monarchy was equated

⁶⁰ See A.A. Christofilopoulou, *He synkletos eis to Byzantinon Kratos* (Athens, 1949).

⁶¹ See H.-G. Beck, "Der byzantinische "Ministerpräsident"", *BZ*, 48 (1955), 327-32 [= H.-G. Beck, *Ideen und Realitäten in Byzanz* (London, 1972), no.XIII].

⁶² Michael Attaleiates, 53, ll. 2-11.

with order and harmony; democracy with disorder and chaos. The likelihood is that Attaleiates was using democracy to mean the lack of order produced by the breakdown of effective imperial authority, leading to the unrestrained pursuit of power by the upper classes and mindless violence among the lower. But mindless violence might on occasion be justifiable. Were the people of Constantinople acting constitutionally, when in 1042 they overthrew the Emperor Michael V with their terrible cry of "Dig up the Bones of the Caulker"⁶³? If the people could overthrow an emperor, could they not also transfer imperial authority to another? In 1078 a popular assembly met in St Sophia and, though Michael VII Doukas was still in power, it acclaimed the rebel Nicephorus Botaneiates emperor. Michael Attaleiates was a supporter of Botaneiates, but he is very cool in his appraisal of the actions of this assembly. Its members acted as they did because "they believed themselves to be living in a democracy (*demokratoumenoi*)"⁶⁴. It was much the same charge that was made by Michael Psellos against the Patriarch Michael Psellos: that hating monarchy he was democratically inclined⁶⁵. The occasion for this accusation was the assembly that the patriarch encouraged to meet in St Sophia to depose Michael Stratiotikos and acclaim Isaac Comnenus⁶⁶.

Both Michael Psellos and Michael Attaleiates use the word democracy pejoratively, but there is little doubt that its meaning was shifting to take account of the unprecedented role of popular assemblies. It was, however dimly, a recognition of the way that the structure of the state was changing. It demanded a reevaluation of the relationship of monarchy and democracy. Were they entirely opposed concepts? This was the object of, at least, the indirect interest of John Xiphilinos, nephew of the patriarch of the same

⁶³ John Scylitzes, 418, ll. 28-29. Cf. H.-G. Beck, 'Senat und Volk von Konstantinopel. Probleme der byzantinischen Verfassungsgeschichte', *Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1966, 44-45 [= H.-G. Beck, *Ideen und Realitäten*, no. XII].

⁶⁴ Michael Attaleiates, 256, ll. 15-16.

⁶⁵ Sathas, *Mesaiônikê Bibliothêkê*, V, 512, l.6.

⁶⁶ Michael Attaleiates, 56-58; John Scylitzes, 498-99.

name. During the reign of Michael VII Doukas (1071-78) he produced an epitome of Dio Cassius's *Roman History*. It may well have been Michael Psellos who encouraged him to undertake this task⁶⁷. He showed a particular interest in the Augustan settlement, which was characterized as a mixture of monarchy and democracy. The ideal that was proclaimed was that of imperial authority which checked the worst excesses of democracy and where respect for democratic institutions checked the danger of imperial authority becoming tyrannical: "Being above democratic impudence and tyrannical outrages it will be possible to live in well-ordered freedom and in a secure monarchy, ruled over but without the taint of slavery and yet enjoying democratic rights but without dissensions"⁶⁸. This represented an ideal far removed, it would seem, from the Byzantine reality, for Xiphilinos concluded his summary of the Augustan settlement with these words: "I shall include separately everything that it is necessary to remember today especially since those times are so far distant from our own way of life and polity"⁶⁹. The message was that the Augustan settlement showed that ideally it was possible for monarchy and democracy to co-exist, the one strengthening the other. The *Epitome* of Dio Cassius should not be dismissed as mere nostalgia⁷⁰. At least, one of its prescriptions appears to have been applied. It makes a plea that imperial legislation should be issued in the form of a *senatus consulta*⁷¹. That is exactly the form in which Nicephorus Botaneiates (1078-81) would issue some of his legislation⁷².

But this was perhaps more a reflection of the desperate condition of the Byzantine Empire after Manzikert, when the most bizarre nostrums were tried in the hope of rescuing the Empire. It was the

⁶⁷ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VI, 73, ed. E. Renauld, I, 152-53 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 171].

⁶⁸ Dio Cassius, *Historia Romana*, LVI, 43,4, ed. L. Dindorff / I. Melber, III (Leipzig, 1928), 255, ll. 8-13.

⁶⁹ *Epitomê tês Dionos ... Rhomaikês Historias* (Geneva?, 1568), 72.

⁷⁰ Cf. Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 82.

⁷¹ Dio Cassius, LII, 31, 1-2, ed. Dindorff / Melber, III, 64-65. Cf. F. Millar, *A Study of Cassius Dio* (Oxford, 1964), 102-18.

⁷² Michael Attaleiates, 314, ll. 19-21.

natural consequence of the way the educated Byzantine only understood the present in terms of the past⁷³. There was no vocabulary adequate to analyse Byzantium's social and political structure. Society, at least until the twelfth century, was seen as divided between the powerful and the poor, a division which had been elaborated in late antiquity⁷⁴. As a result, it was only possible for Byzantine historians to hint at the changes which were taking place within the Byzantine state.

A better guide is provided by Isaac Comnenus's reform programme⁷⁵. It was designed to restore financial soundness to the Empire by cutting out the private interests which had begun to infiltrate the structure of the state. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the way that dignities were being privatized. Michael Psellos was able to make up his adopted daughter's dowry with the dignity of *protospatharios* and the pension that went with it, both of which were in his gift. Dignities were almost turning into stocks which could be disposed of privately. Psellos could also offer his prospective son-in-law another 60 nomismata on his pension as a *spatharios*, entry into the bureau of the Antiphonotos, and admission to the number of the judges of the hippodrome⁷⁶. Isaac Comnenus unwisely allowed himself, like so many after him, to be mesmerized by Michael Psellos, whom he made his chief minister and put in charge of the reforms. Michael Psellos had the courtesy to applaud them in principle⁷⁷, but saw all too clearly that they threatened the interests of people like him. He masterminded the coup that would lead to the abdication of Isaac Comnenus and the accession of Constantine X Doukas. Isaac's empress would turn upon Psellos with these bitter words, "Pray

73 Cf. C. Mango, *Byzantine Literature as a distorting mirror* (Inaugural Lecture) (Oxford, 1975).

74 E. Patlagean, *Pauvreté économique et pauvreté sociale à Byzance 4-7e siècles* (Paris, 1977), 11-35.

75 Michael Attaleiates, 60-62; E. Stanesco, 'Les reformes d'Isaac Comnène', *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, 4 (1966), 35-69.

76 R. Guiland, *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines* (Berlin, 1967), I, 84.

77 Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 62, ed. E. Renauld, II, 121 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 313].

heaven we benefit from your advice as much as you hope, philosopher"⁷⁸!

Psellos put himself forward as the philosopher who was the arbiter of the affairs of state. He thought that the temptations and burdens of the imperial office were too considerable for any mortal. This might be alleviated if the emperor could be persuaded to follow the advice of a philosopher, whose intellect and moral fibre could provide the necessary solutions to the problems besetting an emperor⁷⁹. This was a pose, even if temporarily a profitable one. His real power lay elsewhere. His claim to be the philosopher who guided emperors stemmed in part from his office — that of consul of the philosophers. As we have seen, it gave him rights of supervision over the private schools of Constantinople. He used these along with his undoubted abilities as a teacher to build up a network of contacts within the state apparatus which guaranteed him real power⁸⁰. We know from Robert Browning's work on the dossier of a tenth-century Constantinopolitan schoolmaster what a vital place the schoolmaster had in Byzantine political life⁸¹. His power rested on his ability to place his pupils in the system. Normally, the schoolmaster remained outside or on the edge of the state apparatus, but Psellos brought the role of the schoolmaster into the heart of government. What his career reveals so well is that network of informal contacts and reciprocal obligations, which underpinned the machinery of state. But it went further than this. Psellos provided in the ideal of friendship a justification for the system⁸². Lip service might be

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, VII, 81, ed. E. Renauld, II, 132 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 325].

⁷⁹ Cf. Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 100-101.

⁸⁰ G. Weiss, *Oströmische Beamte im Spiegel der Schriften des Michael Psellos* (Misc. Byz. Monacensia, 16) (Munich, 1973), 48-64; J.N. Ljubarskij, *Mihail Psell. Lichnost' i tvorchestvo* (Moscow, 1978), 101-11.

⁸¹ R. Browning, 'The Correspondence of a 10th-century Byzantine scholar', *Byzantion*, 24 (1954), 397-452 [= R. Browning, *Studies in Byzantine History, Literature, and Education* (London, 1977), no. IX].

⁸² Ljubarskij, *op. cit.*, 117-24; F. Tinnefeld, "'Freundschaft" in den Briefen des Michael Psellos', *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 22 (1973), 151-68.

paid to the need for loyalty to the imperial office, but the main stress was on the ties binding individuals. The first responsibility was to friends, followed by obligations to patrons and clients. It would be unrealistic to suppose that to a degree this was not always the case. The difference was that in the eleventh century it was accentuated to the point where it was necessary to provide a justification for the way private interests permeated the state. Psellos made great play with the autonomy of the individual, but this was only another way of stressing the importance of the individual at the expense of the community. The rationale of the state was no longer so much the protection of a common interest, as the mutual self-interest of an elite. An emperor who threatened this had to go. That was the fate of Isaac Comnenus. In his place, Psellos helped to raise up Constantine Doukas, the heir to a great name, but apparently devoid of any dangerous reforming tendencies.

Constantine Doukas had the sense to get rid of Psellos. His reign was not unsuccessful. He managed to preserve a balance between the major elements within the state. He deferred to the guilds and the senate and restored to those deprived of them by Isaac Comnenus their *oikeiai timai*⁸³, by which I understand honours and pensions that could be disposed of privately. There were, of course, financial difficulties. He did not, however, find it necessary to accelerate the debasement initiated by Constantine Monomachos, and was able to keep the coinage at the same fineness⁸⁴. This may be taken as a sign that his financial difficulties were not overwhelming. He did impose surcharges on the provinces⁸⁵. This provoked a rebellion in Thessaly, but it was easily contained⁸⁶. He was forced to economize still further on the armed forces⁸⁷. In 1065 he could only get together a pathetically small force to oppose the Oğuz Turks who had broken through the Danube frontier. There was also increasing pressure from the

⁸³ Michael Attaleiates, 71, ll. 12-15.

⁸⁴ Hendy, *Studies in the Byzantine Monetary Economy*, 509.

⁸⁵ Michael Attaleiates, 77, ll. 10-11.

⁸⁶ Kekavmenos, *Strategikon*, 66-72.

⁸⁷ Michael Attaleiates, 76-77.

Seljuq Turks along the eastern frontier. There was no disguising that there were some major set-backs. The strategy adopted was a static one, to hold the key points in the frontier zone. It was scarcely very glamorous, but the Byzantines were just managing to hold their own.

Though Constantine Doukas's style of government must be judged as largely negative, in one important respect it pointed the way to the future. He looked to his family to provide the strength necessary to control a system of government that had been getting out of hand. He made much of his aristocratic descent and connections⁸⁸. Whereas in the past members of the imperial family had had, at best, a ceremonial role, he gave his brother the Caesar John Doukas real power. Constantine's dynastic concerns were apparent in the will that he drew up on his deathbed. He entrusted the reins of power to his brother to be exercised on behalf of the Doukas family. His Empress Eudocia Makremvolitissa was forced to take an oath to respect these arrangements. She was not to make any of her cousins or relatives ministers⁸⁹. Imperial authority is conceived very much in terms of family interest.

It is no use pretending that the Byzantine state was particularly healthy when Constantine Doukas died in 1067. It was clearly very vulnerable. Military strength had been sacrificed, while the absorption of the gilds within the framework of the state brought no tangible advantages. The cohesion of the state was also weakened by the infiltration on an ever increasing scale of private interests. The financial condition of the Empire was precarious, though it was possible to balance the budget. The main thing is that the Byzantine state did not appear to be in any danger of imminent collapse. There was indeed every possibility that it would preserve its administrative strengths unimpaired and that it would be all the stronger for a wider base. Such hopes rested on

⁸⁸ Michael Psellos, *Chronographia*, VII, 6, ed. E. Renauld, II, 140 [= Michael Psellus, *Fourteen Byzantine Rulers*, 333].

⁸⁹ N. Oikonomidès, 'Le serment de l'impératrice Eudocie (1067). Un épisode de l'histoire dynastique de Byzance', *Revue des Études byzantines*, 21 (1963), 105-08 [= N. Oikonomidès, *Documents et études sur les institutions de Byzance (VIIe-XVe siècles)* (London, 1976), no. III].

firm direction from the centre, but Constantine Doukas died before he had properly founded his family's power in the apparatus of the state. The Caesar John Doukas was faced with agitation that an aggressive military policy and a military man as emperor were needed if the Turks were to be held at bay. Eudocia succumbed all too readily, ignored the inconvenient undertakings she had made to her dead husband, and chose Romanos Diogenes as her husband and emperor. His reign was a disaster. He attempted to put the Empire once again on a military footing by bringing the armies of the theme out of mothballs. The result was pathetic. His search and destroy tactics had even less success against the Turks than Constantine Doukas's masterly inactivity. The Turks were pressing ever further westwards. In 1070 they sacked the great shrine of the Archangel Michael at Chonai in the upper Maeander valley and even pressed on to the shores of the Aegean. Still, Romanos persisted. His reputation and his hold on power in Constantinople depended too much on achieving some spectacular military success. He no doubt calculated that he would be able to use war and success against the Turks as a way of uniting Byzantine society behind him. Manzikert was an unnecessary battle. It was a gamble, and it failed. It opened up all the divisions within the Byzantine state which previous emperors had more or less managed to contain.

It is absolutely clear that the near collapse of the Byzantine state did not precede, but followed the defeat of Manzikert. It was then that the debasement of the coinage got completely out of hand. The distribution of honours reached ludicrous proportions. They were doled out not merely to gildsmen, but to common tradesmen⁹⁰. This was done on such a scale that under Nicephorus Botaneiates the state literally went bankrupt, because it could not pay what it owed in pensions and salaries⁹¹. It was the custom for newly-promoted dignitaries to make gifts to the poor. There was now such a profusion of them that the poor found it too much bother to

⁹⁰ Constantine Manasses, *Breviarium Historiae* (Bonn, 1837), ll. 6701-10.

⁹¹ Nicephorus Bryennius, *Historiarum Libri IV*, ed. P. Gautier (Brussels, 1975) (= CFHB IX), 257-59.

collect their dues⁹². Imperial estates and rights of taxation were being granted out to individuals on a much more lavish scale. Even fortresses were passing into private hands⁹³. Alexius Comnenus's coup in 1081 did not put an end to the disintegration of the Byzantine state. If anything, it became worse⁹⁴. This may even have been deliberate. He came to power as the head of a powerful aristocratic network. His first concern was to establish his family in power. The most important positions of state, including the household offices were reserved for them. He granted them state revenues. He created a special order of titles for them, which placed them at the very top of the court hierarchy. It was ceremonial proof that an aristocratic network had been superimposed upon the Byzantine state. The senate and the guilds were disparaged⁹⁵. Perhaps the historian Zonaras should be allowed the last word: "His chief concern was to alter the old usages of state and their transformation was his most important achievement. He did not administer affairs, as though they were of any common or public concern. He thought of himself, not as a steward, but as a landlord. He considered that the imperial palace was his private dwelling and so designated it. He did not pay due respect to the members of the senate, nor did he provide for them in a fitting manner; rather did he set out to humiliate them. Nor was he completely impartial, treating all as of equal worth. He provided his relatives and some of his attendants with cartloads of public moneys and distributed generous annual allowances to them, so that they abounded in wealth, had retinues that were fit for emperors rather than private citizens; possessed dwellings, in size comparable with cities, in luxury not dissimilar to an imperial palace"⁹⁶.

The Byzantine state had changed out of all recognition from that

92 Michael Attaleiates, 275-76.

93 N. Oikonomidès, 'The Donations of Castles in the last quarter of the 11th century (Dölger, *Regesten*, no.1012)', in *Polychronion* (Heidelberg, 1966), 413-17 [= N. Oikonomidès, *Documents et Études*, no. XIV].

94 J.C. Cheynet, 'Dévaluation des dignités et dévaluation monétaire dans la seconde moitié du XIe siècle', *Byzantion*, 53 (1983), 453-77.

95 M.J. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire 1025-1204*, 114-15.

96 J. Zonaras, *Epitome Historiarum* (Bonn, 1897), III, 766-67.

which had existed on the eve of Manzikert. The germs of future developments can perhaps already be detected, but germs need the right conditions to proliferate. These were provided by the near collapse of the Byzantine state that followed the battle of Manzikert.

THE FRAMEWORK: 2

TWELFTH-CENTURY BYZANTINE AND
TURKISH STATES*

RALPH-JOHANNES LILIE / BERLIN

If one asks who were the most dangerous enemies the Byzantine empire had during the last four centuries of its existence, the answer appears to be straightforward: the Turks, who in 1071 defeated the Byzantines at Mantzikert, a defeat which brought worse consequences for the Byzantines than, for example, the loss of the French and Spanish fleets in the battle of Trafalgar was to bring for Napoleon; the Turks, who in 1176 at Myriokephalon put an end to all Byzantine attempts at a *reconquista* of Asia Minor, and during the subsequent centuries not only took over the remaining Byzantine territories in the coastal regions of Asia Minor but conquered the Balkans as well; the Turks, who eventually in 1453 sacked the impregnable Constantinople and were the terror of South-Eastern Europe until the 18th century.

The history of Greek-Turkish relations thus appears as an endless chain of Turkish attacks and Greek defences – defences that certainly were heroic at times but always unsuccessful, down to the subjection of 'Greece' and her resurrection in the 19th century after four hundred years of servitude: the ever-recurring story of the 'Foul Fiend from the East' and the people of civilization, heroic but doomed to perish¹.

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¹ The background to this paper is provided by the following works: C.Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey. A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history c. 1071-1330*, (trans. from the French by J.Jones-Williams (New York, 1968); *idem*, *Orient et Occident au temps des croisades*, (Paris, 1983); Sp. Vryonis jr., *The Decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century* (Berkeley, 1971); *idem*, "Nomadization and Islamization

This interpretation may seem justified from the point of view of the "Europeans" of the 19th, occasionally even the 20th, century. The Byzantines looked at events differently. The famous words of Lukas Notaras, who is reported to have said a little before the fall of Constantinople in 1453: "It is better to see in the city the turban of the Turk than the hood of the Latin monk"², are not the only testimony for this. The first conquerors of Constantinople had not been the Turks but the Venetians and the knights of the IVth crusade, who captured the Byzantine capital and divided up the Empire in 1203/04. And who knows, if without the IVth crusade the sack of 1453 would ever have taken place? During the 12th century at least the West was more dangerous for Byzantium than were the Seljuk Turks. The Byzantines themselves were well aware of this. I would just remind you of Nicetas Choniates, who wrote: "They (the Latins) have an evil desire for our goods, are always ready to do harm to our people, and constantly devise some evil plan... Thus between us and them lies a huge gulf of enmity, and in our views we have no contact but are diametrically opposed, even if physically we are close to each other and frequently share the same dwelling."³ Of course he was writing this with the conquests of Salonica in 1185 and of Constantinople in 1204 on his mind, but the history of the 12th century confirms his opinion. And even after the defeats of Mantzikert and Myriokephalon no Byzantine ever spoke about the Turks with the hatred and the bitterness that is typical of statements about the Latins before and after 1204.

in Asia Minor," *DOP* 29 (1975), 41-71; R.-J.Lilie, *Byzanz und die Kreuzfahrerstaaten. Studien zur Politik des byzantinischen Reiches gegenüber den Staaten der Kreuzfahrer in Syrien und Palästina bis zum Vierten Kreuzzug (1096-1204)*, (München, 1981); *idem*, *Handel und Politik zwischen dem byzantinischen Reich und den italienischen Kommunen Venedig, Pisa und Genua in der Epoche der Komnenen und der Angeloi* (Amsterdam, 1984); *idem*, "Des Kaisers Macht und Ohnmacht. Zum Zerfall der Zentralgewalt in Byzanz vor dem vierten Kreuzzug," in R.-J.Lilie - P.Speck, *Varia*, (ΠΟΙΚΙΛΑ BYZANTINA 4; Bonn, 1984) 9-120; and last but not least M.Angold, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025-1204. A political history* (London-New York, 1984).

² *Ducæ Historia Turco-Byzantina (1341-1462)*, ed. V.Grecu, (Scriptores Byzantini 1) (Bucarest, 1958), 329.

³ *Nicetae Choniatae Historia*, ed. J.-L. van Dieten (Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae. Series Berolinensis 11/1.2) (Berlin-New York, 1975), 301.

This does not mean that the Seljuks were enemies who were neither dangerous nor aggressive. But we have to distinguish different phases of the development. During the 11th century the Seljuks indeed attacked Byzantium again and again, and after the battle of Mantzikert quickly occupied all of Asia Minor. But the Byzantines themselves contributed to this conquest. The civil war that followed the battle of Mantzikert opened Asia Minor to the Seljuks, and almost drew them to the West in a conquest that was more accidental than planned. In the years that followed Byzantium seemed doomed to perish. So the Seljuks too tried to secure their share in the booty – still, the Norman and Petcheneg attacks in this period were more dangerous. This was a time of civil war and unrest, however, for the Seljuks as well as the Byzantines, and it is not representative of the relationship between the two powers. It was only after the knights of the first crusade had recaptured Nicaea for Byzantium and defeated the Seljuks at Dorylaion that Byzantium took advantage of the favourable situation and launched a counterattack. Within a short period Alexius Comnenus reconquered all of Western Asia Minor for Byzantium. The Seljuks remained in possession of central Anatolia, whereas the Byzantines took over the coastal regions from Pontus to Cilicia.

This was the configuration that was to be characteristic of the history of Asia Minor during the greater part of the 12th century: Byzantium held the fertile coastal regions, especially in Western Asia Minor and south of the Black Sea. The Danişmendids established their state in the northeast. To the west of this lay the sultanate of Iconium. In the east, in the Caucasus, the Georgians were able to maintain their state, as were the Armenians in the south, in the Taurus range. To these factors were added the crusader states in northern Syria: Antioch and – up to the middle of the 12th century – the county of Edessa. This constellation remained more or less stable during the 12th century, even if Edessa was lost in the 1140s and the Danişmendid state was absorbed by the Seljuks of Iconium in the 1170s.

But, most important: not only did this situation not change; but neither Byzantines nor Seljuks made any serious attempt to change it.

Some scholars, like Sp. Vryonis jr. and Claude Cahen, have interpreted the 12th century as the period of struggle for Asia Minor, with the Seljuks attacking, the Byzantines counterattacking, and the

Seljuks eventually winning a decision at Myriokephalon in 1176. Viewed from a higher stand this interpretation may be true, but still, I do not believe that things were like this. On the contrary, the 12th century seems to me to have been a period of peaceful coexistence between the Byzantines and the Seljuks. "Peaceful coexistence", that is, in the medieval, not in the modern sense of the word: a peace that excluded neither continuous border warfare nor even major expeditions. But – and this is the decisive point – both parties accepted the existence of the other side. Neither the Byzantines nor the Seljuks seriously attempted to extinguish the other during the 12th century.

The constant warfare does not argue against this. To a great extent this warfare was brought about by the structure of the Turkish principalities. The backbone of Turkish military power was constituted by the bodies of Türkmen nomads, over whom Seljuk rulers had only very limited control. These nomads did not care about the treaties between the Byzantine emperor and the sultan of Iconium, and the sultan could seldom force them to honour such treaties.

The Türkmens frequently acted quite contrary to the explicit intentions of the sultan, attacking armies that passed through or plundering the adjacent Byzantine territories. The sultans were unable to prevent this, and this inability was not a mere diplomatic disguise. That they were actually incapable of enforcing their intentions may be illustrated by the example of the third crusade. Kılıç Arslan had made a contract with the German emperor Frederick Barbarossa and guaranteed a peaceful passage for the crusader army. This was in accordance with the interests of the Seljuk state. The crusade was not directed against Iconium but against Saladin – who was an enemy of the Seljuqs as Nūr ad-Dīn had been before him. Still Kılıç Arslan did not have sufficient authority to make his subjects respect the treaty. The result was the conquest of Iconium by the Germans⁴. More examples like this could be cited.

The unreliability of the Türkmen nomads constituted an element of insecurity in Byzantine-Seljuk relations and overshadowed the determination of both states to live in peace with each other. This applies

⁴ E.Eickhoff, *Friedrich Barbarossa im Orient. Kreuzzug und Tod Friedrichs I.*, (Istanbuler Mitteilungen 17) (Tübingen, 1977), 76f, 119ff.

especially to the continuous strife in the border regions, which consisted almost exclusively in Türkmen attacks and Byzantine defence or counterattacks. The sultans rarely took part in this and did not as a rule defend the Türkmens against Byzantine counterattacks. But neither Seljuk guile nor Muslim Holy War are involved in this – it is the old antagonism between nomads and a sedentary population.

That the Seljuks had no intention to expel the Byzantines from all of Asia Minor appears clearly after the battle of Myriokephalon. Although the Byzantine army had been defeated, Kılıç Arslan concluded peace and was content with the restitution of the two fortresses of Subleion and Dorylaion. The refusal by the Byzantine emperor to give back Dorylaion led to minor military action but not to a serious war. The sultan was content, if the *status quo* was maintained⁵.

Indeed, there were repeated Türkmen attacks all through the 12th century, but large, general offensives by the sultans themselves were rare. In fact, it was rather the Byzantine emperors who conducted major campaigns. But they too aimed primarily at checking the recurring nomad raids. They did not question the existence of the sultanate or of the Danişmendid principality. Two examples illustrate this very clearly:

In 1158 Manuel Comnenus undertook a major campaign in Northern Syria. The Franks of Antioch accepted his supremacy. Nūr ad-Dīn of Aleppo also pledged to send the emperor auxiliary troops. In addition Manuel had allied himself with the Danişmendid Yağı-Basan and with Şahanshah, Kılıç Arslan's brother. Thus the sultan of Iconium was completely encircled. A final victory over him would have been possible, even likely, during these years. Nevertheless, Manuel refrained from taking the final step in this war. He was content not to eradicate the sultanate of Iconium, in order to re-establish Byzantine dominion over Central Anatolia and even consented to a peace treaty by which the Empire gained virtually nothing in terms of territories. The international situation cannot have been the cause for this. From 1159 the preponderance of the Empire in the crusader states was

⁵ R.-J. Lillie, "Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176). Auswirkungen auf das byzantinische Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert," *REB*, 35 (1977) 257-275.

unquestionable. With the Normans of Sicily and Southern Italy peace had been concluded in 1158, and the antagonism between the Empire and the Germans did not yet dominate Byzantine political thinking. Likewise, in the Balkans there was no serious threat to the empire. Manuel, then, had the time and a situation prevailed that would have allowed a definite resolution of the Anatolian question in favour of the Byzantines and their settling with the Seljuks once and for all.

But he did not do this. He was content with a peace treaty instead. Kılıç Arslan pledged military assistance against the enemies of the Empire and the restitution of a number of cities, Sebasteia in the first place. Also, he was obliged to prevent raids by his subjects into Byzantine territory. This stipulation probably refers to the Türkmens. It is indicative, that this treaty was not only signed by the sultan but confirmed by his military leaders as well. This shows that the emperor was well aware of the sultan's weak position and therefore strove to oblige the Türkmen leaders directly. In a way Kılıç Arslan recognized the emperor's supremacy in 1162, and this was exactly what Manuel had aimed at. He accepted the existence of the sultanate of Iconium at the same time that he established a balance of power in Asia Minor that gave a dominant position to Byzantium without the need to employ any larger number of the Empire's forces.

The campaign that ended with the defeat of Myriokephalon had no different purpose. In addition, it was to a considerable extent caused by the empire's western policy. The Byzantine Empire was completely isolated politically in the West during the 1170s. Germans and Normans were the Empire's enemies, the alliance with Venice did not exist any more. The only means which Byzantium might still use in order to break through this isolation was its position as protecting power of the crusader states in Syria and Palestine, a position threatened already by the growing power of Saladin. In this situation Manuel proposed a crusade and declared publicly that he intended to come to the aid of the crusaders. This resulted in the dispatch of a fleet in 1177, but primarily in preparations for an expedition against Iconium, preparations which were under way since 1175. This campaign was intended to open up again the land route to Palestine. The situation of the Empire would have profited from this considerably. If we may believe Manuel's own words, then, his aim was not to destroy

the sultanate of Iconium, but to reestablish security in Asia Minor, and to open the pilgrim route to the Holy Land again.

The second motive was supplied by the development of the situation in Asia Minor. We have seen that one of the Empire's aims in the 12th century was to establish and maintain a balance of power that gave preponderance to Byzantium. This balance had changed during the 1170s in favour of the Seljuks of Iconium. The possessions of the Danişmendids had been gradually absorbed by Kılıç Arslan, the last Danişmendids had fled to Constantinople. Manuel demanded from Kılıç Arslan the reinstatement of the Danişmendids. The sultan refused, and his refusal led to war. Manuel divided the Byzantine army. With the main force he marched towards Iconium. Another detachment attacked Niksar, which had been held by the Danişmendids before. This shows clearly that the emperor hoped for an insurrection in favour of the Danişmendids in the east while he, by his own attack, kept the Seljuk force occupied and unable to relieve the garrison of Niksar. Obviously he intended to re-establish the previous *status quo* in Asia Minor, which had been so favourable for Byzantium. The defeat at Myriocephalon put an end to this policy and gave preponderance to Kılıç Arslan. This at the same time explains the sultan's restraint. His principal aim was to consolidate his position. If he continued this war, he might endanger all he had achieved so far. So the best option was to wait. Time would work in his favour. A few years later, however, destiny almost realised Manuel's plans all the same, when Kılıç Arslan divided his principality among his sons, thus causing extended civil war and a decline of Seljuk power, which was to recover only in the 13th century. But under the Angeli Byzantium itself had become too weak to take advantage of this opportunity.

On the whole, then, the 12th century was a period of coexistence of Byzantium and the Seljuks, even if there was fighting again and again. No party sought a final decision, neither the Seljuks, nor the Byzantines. The major campaigns served to strengthen one's own position, not to eliminate the adversary; minor expeditions were in many cases the result of the internal weaknesses of the Seljuk state, which was unable to prevent the Türkmens from their habitual raids against the Byzantines.

What was the reason for this coexistence? The answer to this

question lies, not least, in the changes that came about in the structure of the Byzantine Empire in the time of the Comneni and Angeli.

During the middle-Byzantine period Asia Minor had been the nucleus of the Empire, Constantinople its undisputed centre. The first themes had been formed in Asia Minor, the economically most important provinces were situated there. The Empire was inconceivable without Asia Minor. The few provinces in the Balkans practically played no role, plundered and devastated by enemies as they were. Italy and Africa did not count at all. The Empire was Asia Minor and Constantinople. The Byzantines could have abandoned anything without much consequence but not their capital and not Asia Minor. Therefore the struggle against the Arab attacks was indeed a struggle for life. Had the Arabs succeeded in establishing themselves permanently in Asia Minor north of the Taurus, Byzantium would have been done for, as would have been the case if they had been able to gain Constantinople⁶.

During the 11th century, however, the importance of the Balkans increases. After Byzantium had been able to push its frontiers as far as the Danube again, the Byzantine provinces in the Balkans began to recover gradually, and after Mantzikert they take the place that had been held by Asia Minor before. This change was difficult and painful. The weakness of the Empire in the time of Alexius I Comnenus is largely accounted for by this shift from the eastern to the western part of the Empire. But by the beginning of the 12th century this transition had been completed. It was the Balkan provinces now which flourished, and on which the wealth of the Empire was now based. The development of long-distance trade is most indicative of this, in its almost complete lack of interest in Asia Minor and almost exclusive concentration on the Balkan provinces. The Empire's provinces in Asia Minor no longer played any role in this any more. And – apart from Trebizond – Byzantine Asia Minor seems to have been exhausted economically as well. This is no wonder. The Turkish conquest after Mantzikert had left agriculture and the economic structure of the

⁶ R.-J. Lilie, *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber. Studien zur Strukturwandlung des byzantinischen Staates im 7. und 8. Jahrhundert*, (Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia 22) (München, 1976), esp. chapter VII.

peninsula generally completely destroyed. The population had fled to the coastal regions, to the islands or even to Europe, partly it was resettled. But most important of all the Türkmen nomads had occupied the plateau of Central Anatolia, and it proved to be impossible for the Byzantines to drive them out again. This resulted in extremely long borders, which could hardly be controlled effectively. The raids of the nomads constituted an element of insecurity, which impaired, indeed made virtually impossible, any economic recovery. The second crusade highlights this situation, as do the fortifications constructed by Manuel in the Region of Chliara, Pergamon and Adramyttion in the 1160s. Only after this organization did the region recover. Nicetas Choniates praises it as "one of the best measures" of Manuel⁷. We are dealing in this case not with an area on the Byzantine-Turkish border, but on the north western shores of the peninsula, as far removed from enemy territory as possible. This shows dramatically how unsafe the situation in Byzantine Asia Minor actually was.

To put an end to the nomadic raids definitely would have been possible only if the emperors had been able to drive all nomads out of Anatolia completely and repopulate the area. In addition to this they would have had to destroy the sultanate of Iconium and the Danişmendids as well – and even then the outcome would have been doubtful. But I doubt that the Byzantine Empire would have been strong enough – both militarily and economically – to achieve such results, to begin with. In any case, it did not even feel sufficiently strong to venture it. There were more important things to do. For the reshaping of the Empire's structure entailed consequences that could not be ignored. If the Balkans had now become the nucleus of the Empire, this nucleus had accordingly to be secured – as Asia Minor had been before. From Asia Minor there was no threat to the Balkans during the 12th century. The Seljuks no longer had a fleet after Tzachas had been beaten at the end of the 11th century. The Balkan provinces were menaced from the north – by the Hungarians, the Serbs, the Petchenegs, and the Cumans; and from the West – by Normans, Germans,

⁷ *Nicetas Choniates*, ed. van Dieten, 150.

Venetians, Pisans, Genoese; and last, but not least, by the crusades. The Comneni and Angeli, therefore, concentrated totally on warding off these enemies by isolating them, playing them off against each other or by attempting to bring them under the Empire's influence. This is the governing principle of all Byzantine policy in the Balkans, in Italy, and even in the Crusader States. The Seljuks were not an important factor in this and little was to be gained by a war with them. So the emperors were content to establish and maintain a balance of power here, and to defend and secure the borders against raids by the nomads. This was less costly and left a number of options available. The idea of a reconquest of Asia Minor was probably never totally abandoned in Constantinople. But such an enterprise lay in the far distant future; it was not a matter of immediate concern.

Another development within the Byzantine Empire, however, was of even greater importance: during the 12th century a new power structure had emerged, which was distinctly different from the system which had been characteristic of Middle-Byzantium. During the mid-Byzantine period, the Empire had been a centrally-organized state. The emperor, with the centre Constantinople behind him, had been the most powerful factor by far, and the provincial powers played only a subordinate role. The domestic as well as the foreign policy, therefore – aside from a few exceptions – had been shaped exclusively by the central government seated in the capital. The Empire's policy towards its neighbours, then, was homogeneous and consistent, provided that the emperors were so themselves.

This situation changed in the 12th century. It would take too long to analyze the causes which lie at the bottom of this change. It will suffice to point out the conditions which had changed: during the middle-Byzantine period the central government had been strong. One reason for this had been the relative homogeneity of Byzantine society. Another had been the administrative structure of the Empire, the theme system. And not the least important reason for this had been the successful parrying by the central government of all attempts on the part of the provinces to gain power at the centre's expense.

This changed in the 11th century. The theme system had declined, and one of the main reasons was that the structure of Byzantine society had changed. By now, great clans had emerged, which derived their

power from their influence and their wealth in the provinces, and tried to limit the government's control over what they considered "their" provinces. The Byzantine writer Cecaumenus writes about this in considerable detail.

At first, all this happened against the intentions of the central government. But under the Comneni a change is brought about: the Comneni not only stop fighting the provincial aristocracy, but, on the contrary, base their rule on this class, indeed, place themselves at its top. The Byzantine Empire in the 12th century contained strong feudal elements, all of which tended to weaken the central government as opposed to the provincial centres of power. This was the price the emperors had to pay for the support of the provincial aristocracy. The Comneni and Angeli paid this price and attempted to secure the emperor's interests in other ways. One of these was the establishing of personal ties between the emperor and the aristocracy, mainly by marriage. But the emperor also tried to bring his own family to the top and thus create a kind of dynastic power. This resulted in a change in the position of the emperor. The emperor ceases to be the absolute lord, except in theory. He is not any more in a position simply to command, he now has to convince the others as well. Most importantly, in order to secure the support of the aristocracy, he had to respect its position, which means that he loses his influence in the provinces, to the extent at least to which these belong to the aristocracy.

The Gabras clan of Trebizond, provides a good example of this. This family held great possessions in the province of Chaldia in the 11th century already⁸. In the confusion that followed the battle of Mantzikert Theodore Gabras with forces of his own was able to capture Trebizond and establish a principality of his own there. The emperor Alexius I Comnenus tried to bring about a peaceful arrangement with Gabras, and after extended negotiations was able to achieve a marriage between Gregory Gabras, who was held hostage in Constantinople, and his own daughter Mary Comnena. An attempt to break the power of the Gabras family by appointing a governor of his

⁸ A.A.M.Bryer, "A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades, c. 979 - c. 1653, *University of Birmingham Historical Journal*, 12 (1970), 164-187 (reprinted in A.A.M.Bryer, *The Empire of Trebizond and the Pontos* [London, 1980], no. IIIa).

own after Theodore had died, failed after a short time. The Gabras clan remained masters in Trebizond and Chaldia at least until the middle of the 12th century. An attempt by the emperor John II Comnenus, who undertook a campaign to Chaldia and against the Danişmendids, to force Constantine Gabras to recognize the imperial authority seems likewise not to have been crowned with success.

The end of this campaign is indicative of the dilemma in which the emperors found themselves: John was unable to take Niksar, which was held by the Danişmendids, and had to come back because, apparently, the Byzantine aristocracy refused to give their allegiance. This highlights the problems very clearly. The emperors depended on the support of the provinces. The provinces, however, had become more independent, and they took an interest in the successes of the central government only if these successes worked in their own favour, or at least did no damage to them.

In other words: a success of John over the Danişmendids was not necessarily desirable to the Gabras clan of Trebizond, because it would strengthen the emperor's position and might therefore endanger their own independence. This was probably one of the reasons for the failure of John's campaign. The emperors, on the other hand, could hardly be interested in taking strong measures against the Seljuks, if their efforts would benefit others – the Gabras family, for instance, or some other provincial magnate – rather than themselves. In a way this dilemma blocked any Byzantine policy towards the Seljuks and the Danişmendids.

The Comneni were not only the victims of this development, however, but promoted it themselves. John's plan to form a principality for his son Manuel, which was to encompass Antioch, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Attaleia, would have meant the creation of a more or less independent state, over which Constantinople would have had only limited control. To a considerable extent this scheme was motivated by diplomatic considerations. Still it shows that the emperors were willing to recognize and even promote the growing independence of the provinces, provided they themselves profited from this development⁹.

⁹ *Ioannis Cinnami Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio Comnenis gestarum*, ed. A.Meineke, (*Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*) (Bonn, 1836), 23.

The growth in long-distance trade during the 12th century likewise contributed to an increase in the significance of the provinces. For Constantinople was no longer the only centre for such trade. Increasingly it was looking for markets in the Byzantine provinces as well.

This had consequences for developments in Asia Minor. If the emperors throughout the 12th century took a personal part in the events on many occasions, their activities were limited in most cases to North-Western Asia Minor and rarely showed much vigour. For the rest the provinces were more or less left to themselves. But strong as they had become, they still were no match for the Seljuks. They remained on the defensive, even more: they were ready to cooperate with the Seljuks to a limited extent, especially when no help was to be expected from Constantinople.

The Gabrades again provide a good example of this: in the 12th century they almost occupy an intermediate position between Byzantium and the Seljuks, mainly in order to safeguard their independence, from Byzantium as well as from the Turks. But it is also a consequence of the internal development of Byzantium. This may be seen clearly in the events after Manuel's death in 1180, when the separatist tendencies in the provinces increase rapidly and the power of the emperor declines. Many local lords now attempt to come to terms with the Seljuks; they even try to use them in order to maintain or improve their position in relation to the central government. I need only to recall the revolts of Theodore Mankaphas or of Manuel Maurozomes. Local interests here more or less make impossible any consistent policy toward the Seljuks. However, this is but the natural consequence of a development which began at the end of the 11th century. The emperors, on the other hand, could take an interest in the survival of the Turkish powers. The provinces occasionally played off the Turks against the central government, to be sure, but this game could be played by the other side as well. The emperor too could ally himself with the Seljuks or the Danişmendids against his own provinces as the case of Theodore Mankaphas in Philadelphia illustrates again.

The Byzantine Empire appears to be content, then, with the *status quo* in Asia Minor in the 12th century, and attempts to preserve it rather than endanger it by a *reconquista* policy. The same holds true,

by the way, during Manuel's reign, for the Balkan provinces and the crusader states in Syria and Palestine. It is the Empire's policy during this period to force the neighbouring states to recognize the supremacy of Byzantium, and to play them off against each other in a way that is most likely to safeguard the Empire's superiority.

But the Seljuks of Iconium and the Danişmendids likewise had little interest in an aggressive policy and this was so, paradoxically, for almost identical reasons.

The military strength of the Seljuks was based on the Türkmen nomads, who, however, could be controlled to a limited extent only. This resulted in limited security at the borders but at the same time reduced the danger of any major campaign, because the sultans could not be interested in letting the various Türkmen chieftains become still more powerful. The existence of the Byzantine state may indeed have been welcome to the rulers, for to a certain extent it could serve to check the nomads. To put it briefly: control of powerful and unreliable subjects through a foreign enemy. Also Byzantium was not necessarily a threat to the existence of the Seljuk state. More dangerous were the other Muslim powers in the east and in the south. This led to a situation in which the sultans were unable – and probably not even willing – to suppress the raids by the nomads but tried to forestall major attacks, attacks that might lead to reprisals from the side of the emperor. Manuel's expedition against Iconium before the second crusade provides an example for these Byzantine counterattacks, which were caused by a Türkmen attack.

But, outside of this overall policy the local Türkmens and Byzantines in the borderlands were more or less left to themselves. This led to fights but also to coexistence as may be seen in the case of Attaleia. This city paid a tribute to the nomads in the neighbourhood and thus was relatively safe from attacks¹⁰. This arrangement was probably not unique.

To this should be added still another consideration: it may not have

¹⁰ William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum a tempore successorum Mahumeth usque ad annum domini MCCXXXIV*. edita a Venerabili Willermo Tyrensi Archiepiscopo, Recueil des Historiens des Croisades. Historiens occidentaux I. 1-2 (Paris, 1844), XVI. 26, p.750s.

been desirable for the Seljuks to take over the coastlands. The Seljuks and the Danişmendids ruled over nomadic tribes. Their territory was the plateau of Anatolia, which was well suited for nomads, and by now had been abandoned almost completely by the Byzantines. The Greeks, on the other hand, were concentrated in the fertile river valleys in the west and in the coastal regions north of the Pontus range, on the shores of the Black Sea. These were lands that were suited for intensive agriculture. The two parties, nomads and peasants, complemented each other and thus the Greeks were of considerable use to the Seljuks, in addition because they served as a link with the Mediterranean long distance trade. In the 14th century the situation had changed, but the situation in the 12th century must not be equated rashly with that in subsequent centuries.

The difference in religion does not provide an argument against this coexistence. The crusading movement of the 12th century and the Muslim counter-thrust, especially under Nūr ad-Dīn and Saladin, are frequently misinterpreted as symptoms of an increase in tension between Muslims and Christians. For Western Europe and Syria/Palestine this may be true, for Asia Minor it is not. Neither the Byzantines nor the Seljuks were fanatics in religious matters. One of Kılıç Arslan's chancellors, for example, was a Christian; the Byzantines employed Seljuk mercenaries in their army and even allowed a mosque to be maintained in Constantinople. Many more examples could be quoted.

On the whole it is hard to detect any sharp contrast in spite of the many differences. This is true for all aspects: race, culture, and social structure alike. Byzantine aristocratic families could attain the most prominent positions in the Seljuk state, as was the case with the Gabras family. On the other hand the Turkish Axuchs were one of the Empire's most distinguished families in the 12th century. A list of the Byzantines who at some time sought refuge with the Seljuk or Danişmendid courts reads almost like a *Who's Who?* of the high aristocracy of Byzantium. Suffice it to mention the sebastokrator Isaac Comnenus, the emperor John's brother, and his sons John and Andronicus, who later became emperor. On the other hand many Seljuks and Danişmendids found asylum at the court of Constantinople. There is no noticeable difference, at least, in comparison with the

Christian neighbours of Byzantium. The toing and froing of local lords at the end of the 12th century likewise testifies against any sharp contrast. People like Manuel Maurozomes, Theodore Mankaphas, the Pseudoalexii, or the Gabrades¹¹ are conceivable only in an area and in a political climate in which the leading powers were relatively similar.

For the rural population this is valid anyway. Partly the Byzantines were downright relieved when their area was taken over by the Seljuks. The tax burden decreased and so did the danger of Türkmen raids. In addition the sultans tried to make easier the difficult period of transition for these new subjects.

In the realm of ideology, no coexistence was possible, to be sure. But the Byzantines were much too realistic to let ideology have much influence on their actual policy. The same can be said about the Seljuks.

This is not to say that in principle the emperors were no longer interested in retrieving all of Asia Minor, and that the Seljuks would not have thrown the Greeks into the sea, had they been able to do so. But as long as this was impossible, each had to come to terms with the other.

Was, then, Asia Minor in the 12th century the paradise of peaceful coexistence? Certainly not. The antagonism continued. But to a certain extent one had come to an arrangement. Neither party was sufficiently strong to eradicate the other. In addition each side had other, more urgent problems. This did not exclude minor and major conflicts. But things were rarely pushed to extremes, either in the 12th or in the 13th century. The state of affairs was altered only when the Mongol invasion and the establishment of the Il-Khans had brought the sultanate of Iconium to an end.

At the same time the Byzantine Empire had become weaker and weaker as a consequence of endless civil wars and recurring attacks from the Bulgars, the Serbs, and the Latins. But that is a different period, the 14th and 15th centuries. In comparison the 12th century was a time of balance of power, a period of coexistence. Not without

¹¹ J. Hoffmann, *Rudimente von Territorialstaaten im byzantinischen Reich (1071-1210)*, (*Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia* 17) (München, 1974).

problems and quarrels, but without questioning the right of existence of the other party. This is a considerable achievement in the history of the Byzantine Empire and it is perhaps no small achievement in the history of the Muslim Turks either. Certainly it does not provide proof for the belief that the evil always comes from the east. For 12th century Byzantium it came rather from the Christian west.

I. SECURITY AND WARFARE : 1

THE COST OF LATE BYZANTINE WARFARE AND
DEFENSE

MARK C. BARTUSIS / ABERDEEN, S. DAKOTA

A consideration of the costs of warfare and defense during the late Byzantine period (1204-1453) begins with a definition of the word *cost*. From the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between the "costs" of warfare and the "effects" of warfare. Costs, generally speaking, are a type of negative effect. But since negative effects themselves are relative (e.g., what was negative for the Byzantine state was often a positive benefit to the Ottoman state), it is appropriate to limit the discussion to the negative effects of defense and warfare upon the Byzantine state and population. And while it is understood that what was bad for the state may not have been bad for the population, and vice versa, this approach is sufficient to include within the word *cost* the major impact of defense and warfare in the late period, as well as to exclude the vague "effects" of warfare which had no clear positive or negative impact. An example of the latter is the ascendancy of the military class in Byzantine society.

Yet all negative effects of warfare are not "costs". Here it is necessary to distinguish further between the negative effects of warfare and those negative effects which would have resulted whether or not Byzantium was successful in its defensive efforts. So, by "cost of warfare and defense" I shall mean the price Byzantium had to pay for defense even if that defense had been successful; that is, negative effects inherent in Byzantium's military policies regardless of the success at implementing those policies. Thus, the long-distance flight of people from areas conquered by the Turks is not a cost of warfare, though the short-distance flight to cities of peasants whose lands were devastated

by the Turks invited to Europe by Byzantine rulers was.

Most of the negative effects of warfare can be categorized under the rubric of either social costs or economic costs, i.e., the price paid for war and defense by Byzantine society at large and the price paid by the Byzantine economy. This paper will deal with each of these in turn.

The social costs of late Byzantine warfare and defense took two forms. On one hand there was the direct human cost paid by any society which goes to war or must defend itself. Whether victorious or defeated, there will be the dead, the maimed, the wounded, the prisoners and, in the pre-modern era, the enslaved. Soldiers fighting for Byzantium or for a faction in one of the Byzantine civil wars, faced danger not only from the enemy, whoever that may have been, but from the elements¹, from disease², and from hunger³, as well as from the Byzantine population itself. At times civilians were enslaved as a result of imperial policy decisions — one might think of John Kantakouzenos' employment of Omur's Turks⁴ — and occasionally civilians died at the hands of the enemy, a tragedy usually resulting from their refusal to stand clear of conflict⁵. But the direct cost of warfare in terms of human lives was relatively low. Casualties of more than 100 for any single battle are rare. Even a major Byzantine defeat, such as the battle of Pelekanon in 1329, for which Kantakouzenos seems to provide accurate figures, involved no more than perhaps 150 casualties⁶.

Much more significant are those social costs which contribute to the erosion or disintegration of the social bonds which hold society together. These social bonds are the interpersonal ties of

¹ E.g., *Ioannis Cantacuzeni Eximperatoris Historiarum* (Bonn, 1828-32), II, 347-48 [henceforth, Kant.].

² E.g., Kant. II 293.

³ E.g., M. Bartusis, "Brigandage in the Late Byzantine Empire", *Byzantion*, 51 (1981), 400-02.

⁴ Kant. II 384, 391, 404. But cf. Kant. I 171.

⁵ E.g., Kant. II 303-05; *Georgii Pachymeris de Michaelis et Androniko Palaeologis* (Bonn, 1835), II, 629-30 [henceforth, Pachy.].

⁶ Kant. I 347-62 (a total of 129 Byzantine soldiers killed). Cf. the numbers of killed or wounded in other battles or sieges: Kant. I 140, 175, 467; III 126, 129; *Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina Historia* (Bonn, 1829-55), I, 415 [henceforth, Greg.].

dependence between men and the social ties between men and institutions. Without them, civilization is impossible, and as they are eroded — as in late Byzantium — civilization itself disintegrates. Warfare was not the only factor which played a role in the transformations of late Byzantine society, but it did have a very decisive role. Warfare, in this respect, had several characteristics which undermined a variety of societal bonds. All of these proceeded from two fundamental facts about late Byzantine warfare: First, the scene of warfare was always Byzantine territory, or territory which had recently been Byzantine territory, and second, it was impossible for the state to acquire an adequate number of professional soldiers from the native population of the empire. All else proceeds from these two facts.

From the fact that all late Byzantine military activities occurred within Byzantium or within territory that had recently been Byzantine come all the social costs of warfare which arose when armies — both Byzantine and those of enemies — roamed the countryside of Byzantium. With the single exception of certain parts of Anatolia during the first half of the thirteenth century, not a single piece of late Byzantine territory escaped the march of warring troops. And since the number of trained, professional troops was small, it was necessary to supplement the size of the army or alter tactics or both. Throughout the late period the state relied heavily on foreign mercenary troops — usually Latins — or auxiliary troops — notably Turks — as well as untrained civilians — peasants and the urban poor. The insufficient number of trained troops raised the value of each professional soldier to the point where pitched battles were avoided, military commanders preferring less hazardous tactics such as skirmishing, pillaging and treachery to accomplish what could not be done through overt force or through attrition⁷.

The presence of the military in Byzantine territory and the nature of their military activities while in Byzantine territory had numerous detrimental effects. Since their pay was frequently late or

⁷ See Pachy. II 271-72, 624; Greg. I 538; Bartusis, "Brigandage", 398.

simply unpaid⁸, or in those cases when their primary source of pay was plunder, soldiers were often engaged in pillage, both officially sanctioned and at the soldier's own initiative. The act of laying waste hostile territory was the most effective, time-honored means of punishing towns that refused to surrender. Yet, it is during attempts to recover lost territory that the propriety of military plundering becomes questionable, and indeed, becomes a cost of warfare. For example, in 1355 troops under the command of John Kantakouzenos' son Matthew plundered the environs of Philippi, an area which had been held by the Serbs only since 1345. In this instance, as in many others, it is not known whether the commander (here Matthew Kantakouzenos) actually ordered his troops to plunder or whether his troops, probably being no more disciplined than other late Byzantine forces, decided to pillage on their own⁹. Yet either scenario makes the plundering a "cost" of warfare; in the first, the commander, wishing to harm the economic base of the occupied territory or wishing to improve the morale of his troops or seeking a way to pay his troops, orders pillage¹⁰. In the other, the cost of employing ill-disciplined troops manifests itself in unauthorized plunder¹¹. In the end, the cost was borne by those Byzantine peasants living in the land occupied by the Serbs.

The pillage of unpaid or poorly-disciplined soldiers was often duplicated by the irregular bands of peasant or urban troops which often supplemented the regular campaign armies. At times the state actively recruited such supplemental forces, while at other times, such "peasant armies" appeared unbidden, but were nevertheless employed reluctantly to make up for a shortage of trained manpower. In one notable case, that of the peasant army led by the

⁸ E.g., see Pachy. I 54; II 208; Greg. I 138; Kant. I 238; Bartusis, "Brigandage", 396; *Chronicle of the Morea*, ed. J. Schmitt (London, 1904), v. 5100.

⁹ Greg. III 564.

¹⁰ Plundering as a standard procedure: *Chronicle of the Morea*, vv. 3670, 6652; Kant. I 190; II 292, 484; Pseudo-Kodinos, *Traité des offices*, ed. J. Verpeaux (Paris, 1966), 173, 251.

¹¹ Indiscipline within the army: Kant. I 96, 97, 149; II 84-87; III 66; Greg. II 586; Bartusis, "Brigandage", 399. On unsanctioned plunder: Kant. I 134, 140-41, 498; II 381; D. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium* (London, 1972), 134.

pigherd Choirovoskos, the irregular force of farmers quickly degenerated into a pillaging expedition in the vicinity of Thessaloniki¹². It is quite likely that the example of soldiers and quasi-soldiers, acting quite literally like brigands, fostered an atmosphere of lawlessness within the empire, contributing to the endemic brigandage of the late Byzantine era and to a general disregard of the basic rules upon which civilized life is founded¹³. In addition to this, it would seem that the actions of soldiers created an antipathy toward the military most clearly seen in the enmity between garrison and urban population¹⁴ and between natives and foreigners¹⁵, but extending as well to an antipathy toward the state itself, a belief that the state no longer existed.

The pillaging of soldiers and those who followed their example served to uproot a substantial fraction of the population, creating a refugee population which sought shelter in the fortified towns of the empire¹⁶. As the populations of towns were increased by this influx of peasants, new enmities arose which exacerbated the tensions between rich and poor, garrison and people, and the authorities and the populace.

The geographical structure of the late Byzantine empire, lacking defined and defensible borders, brought warfare to all areas and required the provincial urban centers to deal with crises on their own. This, along with the state's inability to respond adequately to crises, furthered the process of political fragmentation, dramatically manifesting itself in the appearance of independent borderlords on the fringes of the empire¹⁷.

¹² A. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 191-92, and cf. 79-80.

¹³ See Bartusis, "Brigandage".

¹⁴ E.g., Kant. I 272; II 188, 277; Greg. III 178. Cf. Kant. II 578 and Greg. II 634-35.

¹⁵ E.g., from the documents, F. Miklosich-J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca Medii Aevi* (Vienna, 1860-90), V, 80, lines 6-7, and 261, lines 2-4.

¹⁶ Kant. I 179; II 79; III 251-52. A. Laiou-Thomadakis, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire* (Princeton, 1977), 261. Lj. Maksimović, "Charakter der sozial-wirtschaftlichen Struktur der spätbyzantinischen Stadt", *JöB*, 31/1 (1981), 187 and note 216-17.

¹⁷ See M. Bartusis, "Chrelja and Momčilo: Occasional servants of Byzantium

In this way the cost of warfare involved a continuing erosion of the bonds between man and man, man and state, man and the local community, and between the local community and the state.

The economic costs of warfare are somewhat clearer, and, by their very nature, allow more precise estimate of their effects. They naturally divide themselves into two categories: 1) decreased production due to the ravages of war, and 2) decreased production due to the diversion of resources — that is, men, animals and land — to military ends. The first kind of cost is illustrated by a passage from Kantakouzenos' memoirs dealing with the effects of the civil war between the Andronikoi in 1322. We are told that Andronikos III was

... at a loss for the money by which [he] could provide for the mercenaries. For the *demosia* had not been exacted because of the disorder from the war and because the farmers from whom especially the taxes are exacted left their own villages because the soldiers of the older emperor plundered, and because those of the young [emperor] who were sent out as garrisons led away and carried off the property [of the peasants] because of military greed and behaved no better than the enemy¹⁸.

Thus, because of war, 1) taxes are not collected, 2) peasants flee, and 3) soldiers plunder, all with result that overall production decreased.

All of the destruction of the empire's economic base is not a "cost" of defense as I have defined it. The ravages of enemy troops is merely the effect of unsuccessful defense. In any event it is impossible to estimate even approximately the decline in production due to the destruction which was the unfortunate result of the defensive policies implemented by the rulers of Byzantium.

The situation is a bit different in regard to the formal diversion of resources to finance defense and warfare. Here it is almost possible to make quantitative estimates of the cost of warfare and

in Fourteenth Century Macedonia", *BS*, 41 (1980), 201-21.

¹⁸ Kant. I 136-37.

defense because we enter the realm of the Byzantine fiscal system. I say that it is *almost* possible to make estimates because the data needed to make a truly valid estimate still are not quite there. But on the other hand, it certainly is possible to establish an order of magnitude, which has a value in its own right. Here I should like to formulate the questions we might ask, suggest how we might go about answering them, and finally — since it would be anticlimactic to go that far without suggesting answers — to estimate in a general way the economic costs of warfare and defense.

I have settled on three questions which are worth asking, two deal with the cost of war on what could be called the macro-economic level, and one with the micro-economic level. The first asks the traditional question: How much money did the imperial government spend on defense? The second is closely related, but addresses a broader issue: What percentage of the empire's economic resources were consumed by the military? And finally, the third asks a very specific question: What quantity of resources was required to field a single soldier?

Though data are extremely meager, it is possible to calculate roughly the state revenues which first passed through the treasury before being directed toward military ends, that is, toward mercenaries and the fleet. The treaty of Epivatei in 1322, which concluded one phase of the civil war between Andronikos II and Andronikos III, stipulated that Andronikos III was to receive a personal pension of 36,000 *hyperpyra* yearly¹⁹. Four years and four months later Kantakouzenos reports that this money had not been delivered to Andronikos and that by Kantakouzenos' own calculation the money Andronikos II owed his grandson for the pension and for mercenary pay amounted to 350,000 *hyperpyra*²⁰. Dividing 350,000 by $4 \frac{1}{3}$, we get an annual income for

¹⁹ Kant. I 167.

²⁰ Kant. I 237. F. Dölger, *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches* (Munich, 1924-65), no. 2672, points out that at the end of 1326 (the period about which Kantakouzenos was writing) five years and four months had passed since the treaty of Epivatai. But since Kantakouzenos writes that the figure 350,000 was produced "by my calculation", it was probably based on the four-year / four-month period, and possibly was only calculated as he wrote his memoirs. Therefore, this is the time-span I utilize here.

Andronikos III of around 81,000 *hyperpyra*. Subtracting the pension of 36,000 *hyperpyra*, we are left with about 45,000 *hyperpyra* for the expense of the mercenaries. Since Andronikos II would have spent at least this amount on mercenaries, and probably a bit more for the small fleet, the total military outlays from the treasury in the 1320's was something on the order of 100,000 to 150,000 *hyperpyra*.

The magnitude of this figure is reasonable when we compare it to the sum of 50,000 *hyperpyra* which Kantakouzenos states was the sum necessary to pay the mercenaries of the army and the garrisons of Thessaly in 1321, and to the sum of 100,000 *hyperpyra* which Apokavkos was given in 1340 with which he was to refurbish the fleet and to hire mercenaries²¹. Both of these sums represented extraordinary expenses resulting from special circumstances²².

As for the empire's total annual revenues, there is only one figure given in the sources. Gregoras states that around 1320, Andronikos II, through tax increases and great diligence, raised state revenues to the level of one million *hyperpyra*²³. Given that ordinary state income was probably considerably less than this, my figure of 100,000 to 150,000 *hyperpyra* represents something like a quarter or perhaps as much as a half of the money normally available to the treasury. The figure of one million *hyperpyra* also illustrates the difficulties the treasury faced in financing the Catalans who received, according to A. Laiou's calculations, nearly one million *hyperpyra* over a two-year period, far exceeding the normal revenues directed toward the military and necessitating the extraordinary measures Andronikos II undertook to pay them²⁴.

However, this figure of 100,000 to 150,000 *hyperpyra* yearly does not represent total military expenditures, because it only con-

²¹ Kant. I 87, 540.

²² Cf. the figures and analysis of V. Smetanin, "Rashody Vizantii na armiju i flot (1282-1453 gg.)", *Antičnaja drevnost' i srednie veka* (Sverdlovsk), 12 (1975), 117-25.

²³ Greg. I 317.

²⁴ Laiou, *Constantinople*, 186, note 108.

siders the expense of mercenaries and, to some extent, the fleet, and it neglects to include the incomes of soldiers which never passed through the imperial treasury. Any attempt to evaluate levels of military expenditures must also consider the cost of financing those soldiers and paramilitary personnel who received most or all of their incomes directly from the land.

From an economic point of view, it is convenient to categorize professional soldiers in late Byzantium into three basic groups: *pronoïars*, settled soldiers and mercenaries. These categories are distinguished by the type of pay the soldiers received, and while numerous cases can be cited in which certain soldiers blurred the distinctions implied by these categories, such a typology is useful for our purposes here. Thus, a *pronoïar*-soldier received remuneration from the central government in the form of a *pronoïa*, that is, an imperial grant of fiscal rights and/or rights of usufruct over a defined set of economic instruments which were normally owned or enjoyed by the state. The settled soldier derived his livelihood from a grant of arable land bestowed by the imperial government. It is my view that individual settled soldiers, if they existed at all, were very rare, and that, typically, settled soldiers existed in colonies based either on ethnicity (such as the Cumans settled in Anatolia by John Vatatzes in the 1240s²⁵) or on military function (such as the rowers called *prosalentai* settled near the coasts by Michael VIII in various regions of the empire²⁶). And finally, the mercenary's pay usually was in the form of gold. Only in the case of the mercenaries did military expenses pass through the imperial treasury. And therefore, to get a more realistic view of the economic costs of warfare, one must consider the expense of providing for those soldiers whose incomes were not fiscalized on a yearly basis.

²⁵ Greg. I 37. M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile* (London, 1975), 105.

²⁶ Pachy, I 164, 209, 309; II 237-38, 240. P. Lemerle *et al.*, *Actes de Lavra*, II (Paris, 1977), no. 73, lines 9-10; no. 105, lines 18-20; III (Paris, 1979), no. 136, line 29. L. Petit, *Actes de Xenophon, VizVrem*, 10 (1903), suppl. 1 (rpt. Hakkert: Amsterdam, 1964), no. 11, lines 298-302.

Now, in order to estimate the resources tied up in the military, one should multiply the number of each kind of soldier by the average monetized agricultural return from the corresponding landholding of each kind of soldier. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide such figures, so they must either be approximated through calculation or estimated. The probability of error is great at the start and will necessarily increase through computation, and so I should emphasize that no one need *accept* the resulting figures. They are only a best estimate, based on my study of the late Byzantine military, and I offer them only to illustrate a method for analyzing such worthwhile questions.

We first consider *pronoiar*-soldiers. From three lay *praktika* from the 1320s issued for *pronoiar*-soldiers in the *theme* of Thessaloniki, we see that the average quantity of arable land within each *praktikon* (held either by the soldier or his *paroikoi*) was 3004 *modioi*, and the average quantity of vineyards was 13 *modioi*²⁷. After these figures are corrected to account for original measuring error, we multiply them by standard coefficients, and see that such a quantity of arable land and vineyards generally yielded an agricultural income of about 320 *hyperpyra* per year²⁸. If there were 500 *pronoiar*-soldiers (a reasonable estimate), this

²⁷ For Manuel Berilas, 4630 *modioi* of *gê* (including 2500 *modioi* of second- and third-rate land, which is treated here as 1850 *mod.* of mixed quality) and 1.5 *mod.* of vines; P. Schreiner, "Zwei unedierte Praktika aus der zweiten Hälfte des 14. Jh.", *JöB*, 19 (1970), 37-39, with revisions by N. Oikonomidès, "Notes sur un *praktikon* de pronoiaire", *TM*, 5 (1973), 335-46. For Michael Saventzes, 2287 *mod. gê* and 13.33 *mod.* vines, and for Nikolaos Maroules, 2745 *mod. gê* and 23.5 *mod.* vines; unpub. 1321 *praktika* from Xenophon's archives. I thank Denise Papachryssanthou for her kindness in providing me with transcripts of these documents.

²⁸ Here I follow the procedure offered by N. Svoronos in P. Lemerle *et al.*, *Actes de Lavra*, IV (Paris, 1982), 168-71. For cereal cultivation, the official area is reduced by 30%, and then the resulting land area is divided by 2 (for biennial production), and multiplied by 0.28 (= rate of production [3.5 *mod.* of grain/*mod.* of land] x price of grain [0.08 *hyperpyron/mod.* of land]). For vines, the area is also reduced by 30%, and then multiplied by 2.8 *hyp./mod.* of vineyards. It must be emphasized that the figure of 320 *hyp.* does not represent the *pronoiar's* personal income from his *pronoia* (which must be calculated on an entirely different basis), but the agricultural productivity of all the land comprising the economic unit of the *pronoia*. From this land, both *pronoiar* and *paroikoi* derived a livelihood.

would mean *pronoiar*-soldiers tied up 160,000 *hyperpyra* of the empire's agricultural production yearly.

As for settled soldiers, their holdings were much smaller and very similar, and at times identical, to those of *paroikoi*. Using typical figures for above-average *paroikos* landholdings, I estimate the typical holding of a settled soldier produced 16 *hyperpyra* of agricultural income per year²⁹. If there were 1000 settled soldiers, this would amount to 16,000 *hyperpyra* per year.

To this we should add an appropriate figure to account for the expense of the paramilitary, professional guards who served in the cities, towns and fortified towers across the entire empire. These guards generally had the status of peasants and received, from both public and private sources, either small quantities of land (like settled soldiers) or tax-exemption on the small landholdings they already held for the service they did. Thus, if there were perhaps 3000 of these guards in the empire, they would tie up about 48,000 *hyperpyra* of yearly economic production.

So, adding 150,000 *hyperpyra* for the mercenary and fleet budget, 160,000 for the resources devoted to *pronoiers*, and 64,000 for settled soldiers and guards, gives a total of 374,000 *hyperpyra* for the total quantity of the empire's resources diverted yearly to the military³⁰.

If 374,000 was devoted to the military, how much was produced yearly in all? In the 1320s the empire contained about 30,000,000 *modioi* of arable land in areas where there was at least a fair chance that it could be safely cultivated and taxed³¹. Assuming about 1% of this land was planted with vines and

²⁹ I.e., 50 *mod. gē* ($50/2 \times 0.28 = 7$ *hyp.*) and 3 *mod.* of vines ($3 \times 2.8 = 8.4$ *hyp.*).

³⁰ This figure does not include the cost of building and maintaining fortifications. Since fortifications were built or repaired as necessity demanded and resources permitted, it does not appear that this was a regular expenditure of imperial and local authorities. This alone would not prevent us from calculating an average yearly expense for fortifications, but other factors make this impossible: While, at times, we are given a good idea of how many projects a particular emperor undertook (see., e.g., Kant. I 541-42), it is difficult to determine 1) the extent of building or repair on any particular fortification, given the hyperbole of the sources, and 2) the extent of local and private fortification-building during any period.

vegetable gardens, the total yearly return on this quantity of land was about 5,000,000 *hyperpyra*³². Therefore, the figure of 374,000 *hyperpyra* for total military expenditures represents about 7% of the empire's total agricultural production³³, and if we take into consideration a relatively small factor for urban non-agricultural production, we can estimate that the military in the first half of the fourteenth century consumed something like 5% of the total resources of the empire.

Now 5% does not seem like a very great percentage, certainly not for a modern industrialized state. Yet, in late Byzantine society, where nearly all of the inhabitants of the empire lived at or only marginally above the level of subsistence, 5% of total production was a very high percentage of disposable production (production beyond the minimum nutritional requirements of the population). While it would be desirable to determine this fraction of production, further travel along this line is not possible without appealing to totally imaginary figures.

The last economic topic for consideration is the cost of warfare in terms of the number of people who, through their labor, were needed to support a single soldier. For the settled soldier and professional guard, the answer is simple. To employ the services of a settled soldier or guard, only the labor resources of the soldier's household were needed, perhaps 5 or 6 people, including the soldier, his wife, a few children and perhaps a servant or hired man. For the *pronoïar*-soldier, the situation is more interesting. From our three lay *praktika* for *pronoïar*-soldiers, we see that,

³¹ I include the areas of modern Greek Macedonia (35,000 km²), Greek and Turkish Thrace (8600 and 25,000 km²) and Lemnos (460 km²), and add a few thousand km² to account for the less-securely held regions located in present-day southern Bulgaria, Yugoslav Macedonia and southern Albania. About 40% (30,000 km²) of this land was arable.

³² I.e., 300,000 *mod.* of vines and gardens yield (300,000 x 2.8 =) 840,000 *hyp.*, and 29,700,000 *mod. gē* yield (29,700,000/2 x 0.28 =) 4,158,000 *hyp.* The return on vineyards and gardens was not identical, but similar.

³³ Naturally, my calculations do not consider the return from non-draft animals or immovable agricultural capital (mills, fisheries, etc.). I have assumed that there was proportionality between crop production and total production on lands devoted to the military, and between crop production and total rural production in the empire as a whole.

on the average, each of these *pronoiar*-soldiers held 42 *paroikoi*³⁴. To this we add five people for the soldier's own family, a few servants (military and domestic) plus their families, plus a few households of *eleftheroi*, totalling perhaps 65 persons, 65 persons who comprised the economic unit of the military *pronoia*. Thus, as a very concrete cost of warfare, we can say with a fair degree of accuracy, that for every *pronoiar*-soldier put in the field, there were about 65 members of the population who either devoted nearly all their efforts to supporting the soldier, or, on the other hand, were supported by the soldier.

Throughout history warfare has often been a unifying force in society. During the period of Ottoman expansion, during the reign of Justinian, no less than during the Napoleonic era, offensive war improved morale and assuaged social discontent through the redirection of latent hostilities outward toward a foreign foe. Defensive war as well, with its inherent legitimization as defense of the homeland, can unite a people and partially offset the misery of war, so long as an end to the conflict is in sight and the defenders, through their actions, can maintain the moral high-ground. But in late Byzantium neither of these scenarios was realized. The social and economic costs of warfare in late Byzantium were determined by the nature of that warfare, by the twin facts that warfare was localized within the empire or in areas which had recently been part of the empire, and that the state's inability to acquire enough trained soldiers from the empire's native population led to the employment of troops who had no affinity with or responsibility toward the empire's indigenous residents. The defensive aspect of late Byzantine warfare, the circumstances which tended to keep warfare inside the shrinking borders of the empire, was the more decisive of the two. If warfare could have been taken beyond the empire's borders, if most of the empire's territory could have been kept free from the devastation of warring troops, the social and economic costs of war could have been reduced dramatically. But this was, of

³⁴ Berilas: 37, Saventzes: 29, and Maroules: 60.

course, impossible. The rulers of late Byzantium had inherited an international situation which left them with hostile neighbors on all sides, neighbors who were fully aware of the internal weaknesses of Byzantium, and who were, due to the social dynamics within their own societies, driven to foreign conquest³⁵. Byzantium had to accept, as a fact of life, that any attempt to revitalize the empire's security would have to begin with successful warfare within its borders.

Perhaps the social costs of such warfare could have been lessened if the entire population had taken a more active, communal role in their society's defense. The Byzantines themselves were not unaware that there were simply too many foreigners in their armies. Well-known is Theodore II Laskaris' dream of an all-Greek army³⁶. Intellectuals, as well, recognized the virtue of a native defense of the empire, and I would like to conclude with a look at the advice offered by Gemistos Plethon and Thomas Magistros.

Gemistos Plethon complained that the military weakness of the Morean army resulted from the bulk of the population being both tax-paying farmers and part-time soldiers³⁷. Such soldiers could not be properly equipped and invariably wished to return to the fields. Gemistos correctly understood that Morean campaign armies were composed in large measure, as in Byzantium proper, of peasants recruited on a campaign by campaign basis. His solution was to divide the population into two groups, regular permanent soldiers and taxpayers. The soldiers would neither farm nor pay taxes, and the taxpaying farmers (or "helots") would not fight. Every infantryman would have one helot assigned to him, and every cavalryman, two. Gemistos' debt to Plato and ancient Sparta has long been noted, but this should not obscure the fact that he is suggesting, probably quite unconsciously, a system of

³⁵ See, e.g., G. Ostrogorsky, "Etienne Dušan et la noblesse serbe dans la lutte contre Byzance", *Byzantion*, 22 (1952), 157.

³⁶ *Theodori Ducae Lascari Epistulae*, ed. N. Festa (Florence, 1898), 58, no. 44.

³⁷ Sp. Lampros, *Παλαιολογία καὶ Πελοποννησιακά* (Athens, 1912-30), III, 251-57.

petty *pronoïars* as the solution to the Morea's military ills.

Now Thomas Magistros offers opposite counsel³⁸. He writes that every citizen should be trained in arms, regardless of his occupation, and the resulting citizen's militia should always be ready to supplement the state's army. Conversely, professional soldiers of lower status should be well-versed in some trade or craft. Perhaps we can attribute this divergence of approach to the century and a half separating the two men, to Thomas' observation of the rampaging Catalan Company, and to Gemistos' knowledge of the disorganization of ill-trained peasant armies.

While both plans could have reduced the social and economic costs of warfare by decreasing the empire's reliance on foreign soldiers and by assigning to the population at large a morale-building role in the empire's defense, neither plan had a future. Gemistos' required a complete re-ordering of society on a scale which has only been attempted in the present century. Thomas' proposal, however, raises an important question: Why didn't the imperial government foster the development of peasant militias? After all, in western Europe during the fourteenth century peasant armies armed with pikes and an occasional bow were proving an effective fighting force, if in sheer numbers alone. Was such an idea simply too costly, time-consuming and impractical? Did the rulers of Byzantium think peasants were incapable of becoming real soldiers? Or did the late Byzantine military aristocracy distrust or fear the idea of trained peasant militias? Such questions are fundamental to an understanding of late Byzantine society and deserve further study.

38 A. Mai, *Scriptorum Veterum Nova Collectio* (Rome, 1825-38), III, 180.

I. SECURITY AND WARFARE : 2

THE COSTS OF OTTOMAN WARFARE AND DEFENCE

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What are we to understand by the concept of the costs of war in a pre-modern society? Any consideration on the part of an aggressor that hostilities, once begun, could prove excessively costly, has never lent itself to the rational appraisal of the balance sheet, even in the era of capitalist accounting: states do not refrain from going to war because they calculate that the costs would outweigh the benefits. Looking back at the Ottoman Empire then, our analysis of cost must necessarily employ anachronistic terminology. In the introductory part of this paper I suggest a periodisation for early Ottoman history which is based on the magnitude of the financial costs of war, as they relate to the character of warfare in each of the periods distinguished¹. In the second section I will look at financial cost with the eye of an accountant, albeit a rather unsophisticated one, and the remaining two sections will be treated according to the modern concepts of economic cost and social cost.

We have little information about the financial organisation of the earliest Ottoman times. The equipping of the nomadic mounted archers who constituted the fighting force in the days of the sultans Osman and Orhan was not a drain on whatever centrally-held resources there may have been in the embryo state. Rather, the equipping of such a light cavalryman was an external cost, borne by the individual himself, fighting in anticipation of booty.

¹ The period 1560-1660 has been dubbed one of "military revolution" in Europe by Michael Roberts, *The Military Revolution, 1560-1660* (Belfast, 1956), whose discussion of a qualitative shift in the nature of warfare at this period was subsequently modified by Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution', 1560-1660: a Myth?", *Journal of Modern History*, 48 (1976). Debate along similar lines has not yet arisen in the Ottoman context, and I here offer an analysis based on one important indicator of qualitative military change.

The subsequent organisation of nomads into *ocaks*, groups of men who took it in turns to campaign, with their expenses being furnished by those whose turn it was to stay at home, perpetuated the system of self-financing troops. So too did the alienation of lands to march lords whose rights of revenue collection enabled them to put numbers of troops into the field. The vassal status imposed on some of the early Balkan allies of the Ottomans was another means of keeping to a minimum those outlays on warfare which the central power was obliged to make. In addition to the payment of tribute, vassals were required to provide troops for the Ottoman army, the costs of equipping them being borne by the vassal state.

On the scale of the financial costs of war, then, warfare in the earliest period of Ottoman history was cheap. A significant change comes with the bureaucratisation of the state in the second half of the fourteenth century. The harbinger of change was the creation of the *yaya* infantry, a measure taken in recognition that the expansion of the state could not rely solely on mounted archers. The gradual creation of a centrally-paid standing army, which, in the fifteenth century, began to use field guns and firearms, was to be a new and permanent burden for the treasury. The production and use of such equipment called for a style of organisation and a specialisation in skills which only the central power was able to underwrite.

This second period of warfare, characterised by a growing standing army in an expanding state, prevailed into the sixteenth century. Internal dynastic troubles apart, there had of course been earlier reverses in the expansion of Ottoman power, and the change in status of annexed territory from vassalage to direct administration cannot be overlooked as indicative of the uncertain control which the central government could exercise. Given a strong and united opposition, one may speculate that the borders could have been contained earlier. Such a time was that which culminated in the failure of the Christian armies at Varna in 1444.

However, it was not until the sixteenth century that the Ottoman Empire was forced to adopt a defensive posture, and we come

here to our third period of warfare. The option to limit expenditure on military activity, to call a halt to hostilities, is only available to a power that is in a clearly dominant position. A state on the defensive has not the chance to set such a limit, but must search for new ways of stretching the resources at its disposal in order to meet the threat which it faces. In the Hapsburgs, the Ottomans encountered an adversary with whom a more or less stable border was gradually established. This alteration in the power relations between the Empire and the *dar ül-harb* should not be read as confirmation that the Ottoman army was unequal to the task of sustaining inexorable expansion. The fact that the garrisoning of the fortresses in Hungary cost more than could be extracted from the country in taxation should not be seen as an indicator of over-extension, since a marginalist approach to the costs of war is irrelevant to a situation where the maximisation of financial returns was not a consideration. Rather, politics dictated that Hungary should become a buffer zone between the two Empires, that the Ottomans should fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the indigenous kingdom. The stable border between the two Empires was symptomatic of the military reality that a new age of warfare had arrived.

In the sixteenth century, the deployment of large numbers of troops on permanent duty in the garrisons of the border, and a fundamental change in the techniques of combat, from open battles to siege warfare, resulted in escalating costs. Ever greater strain was placed on those resources which had formerly been sufficient to meet military demand.

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The late Byzantine Empire was a defensive not an offensive body: it is therefore to the defensive Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century that we will look, and particularly to the land warfare on its western edges.

1. *The financial costs of warfare*

We have considered the costs of warfare and defence in general terms, as relating to the nature of combat in different periods. Now, I will look at the administration of war finance in the sixteenth century. Accounts for various aspects of military activity do exist, but the organisation of the Ottoman accounting system, the impossibility of being certain that like is being compared with like, and the relative paucity of relevant material for the sixteenth century preclude any reliable totalling of the resources devoted to war. The existence of numerical data does not guarantee quantitative results.

The first point to stress is that in the Ottoman Empire, fighting should not be regarded as an aberration from an otherwise peaceful existence. It was an activity so frequently engaged in that it is unrealistic to expect to be able to isolate those outlays which did and did not contribute to its pursuit. Therefore we should not expect to gain any insights into the proportion of the Empire's resources devoted to warfare and defence by the simple comparison of a treasury account from a war year with that from a peace year. With a standing army, whose salaries consumed a high proportion of the annual cash income of the Empire, there was no relief from the burden of paying the troops when peace prevailed for a year or two. Money was permanently tied up in the production of equipment, and its manufacture did not cease on the conclusion of a peace treaty. Fortresses had to be kept in a constant state of readiness. The extra expenditure incurred in the course of military action was thus proportionately small, and was connected with the transport of food and equipment, increased production of military equipment, and money to pay the extra troops recruited in the course of the campaign.

It is fortunate that the difference between a situation of war and one of peace was of rather little financial importance, for the available accounts do not allow any reliable comparisons along these lines. The financial organisation of the sixteenth century

Ottoman Empire may be summarised thus: the tax revenues of the 'core' provinces of Rumeli and Anatolia were collected directly by the central treasury. Income generated in the many other provinces was spent locally, on defence for instance, and the balance on the account was remitted to Istanbul. Where this balance was negative, as in the province of Buda in the second half of the sixteenth century, the central treasury subsidised the costs of border defence. So, in these two basic elements of financial administration, the central treasury and the provincial treasury, we have two types of account recording military expenditures. The major burden of both was salaries.

But the salaries of many military personnel were 'hidden', in that they were never recorded as being paid from the central or provincial treasuries. For instance, much tax-farm income was never paid into the central treasury, but allocated either permanently, or on a one-off basis, to specific local uses. These included troops salaries again, but also the rebuilding of fortifications, or the purchase of certain items of military equipment. Similarly, another 'hidden' source of military expenditure was the assignment of *timar* revenues to the support of garrison troops.

A different sort of problem arises in trying to quantify the military or quasi-military services performed by certain groups of *reaya* (primarily, agricultural producers) in return for tax exemptions. Are the taxes from which they are exempted equivalent in value to their service?

The aforementioned outlays are mostly outlays on manpower. In addition, separate accounts record the costs of military equipment made in the imperial gun-foundry, the shipyards, and the armoury. For formally-declared campaigns, there are special registers which record the details of the amounts of equipment sent from Istanbul to the front. The day-by-day running costs of campaign are recorded in yet another type of register, that of the campaign treasury. These running costs, which included expenditure on the smaller items of equipment for which need arose during the course of a campaign, as well as on transport and salaries of course, were

funded by a subvention from the central treasury and by tax revenues which were paid directly into the campaign treasury rather than into the central treasury. A minimum figure for the extra financial burden of fighting a war may perhaps be arrived at by adding the total of the heavy equipment costs to the running costs given in the campaign treasury accounts. But in reality, other than strictly campaign-related expenditures are included in the campaign treasury accounts: a contemporary distinction between war and peace was not made, and the accounting system does not lend itself to such analysis.

The value of lands alienated under the *timar* system should not be excluded from any calculation of the total of resources directed to war. The greatest number of troops, the provincial *sipahi* cavalymen, were funded from taxes levied on the agricultural produce of the land. These troops were given the rights of collection of state taxes on the *timar* estates alienated to them, in return for which they had an obligation to serve on campaign. However, we are very ignorant of the dynamic processes which took place within the *timar* system, and therefore unable to determine the financial value of this vital element of military expenditure.

A provincial *sipahi* did not necessarily cost less to maintain than a soldier of the standing army, and indeed, a gun was cheaper than a horse, but there was a critical difference between their costs in practical terms. In their nostalgia for a return to an ideal, imagined past, the bureaucrats of the end of the sixteenth century pointed to the greater costs incurred by the growing numbers of standing troops in porportion to *sipahi* troops as the crucial factor in the apparent deterioration in the health of the Empire. Although their prescriptions for reform were impractical and prompted by vested interest, so that they failed to admit that a standing army with muskets was militarily more efficient than a cavalry one in the sixteenth century, they hinted at an important truth. The essential crisis of the second half of the sixteenth century was a shortage of cash, in large part aggravated by the permanent garrisoning of the numerous border fortresses.

2. *The economic costs of war*

The accountant's notion of cost, then, is the total of the outlays on war and defence. 'Economic cost', by contrast, implies a calculation of the opportunity cost of diverting to military purposes resources which would otherwise have been put to non-military ends. In the Ottoman Empire, structured for the pursuit of war, with the officially designated military classes being supported by the primarily agricultural activity of the peasants, there was no room in the administrative system for rational choice between competing ends, and the concept is thus meaningless.

Instead, an alternative approach will be adopted, in which economic cost is treated as economic effect, and the present brief discussion of the economic effects of war will take as its starting point the Sombart-Nef controversy. The title of Nef's book *War and Human Progress* seems rather outdated thirty-five years later². Instead, we ask simply whether it can be said that the activity of war acted as a stimulus to the economy in the two sectors into which military demand penetrated so deeply, agriculture and the production of military equipment.

In the Ottoman Empire there was a system of close governmental control over production and marketing to ensure that internal demand, especially that for military provisions and equipment, was met. The *kanunnames*, regulations stipulating the conditions of taxation of each group of *reaya* in the Empire, show wide regional variations owing to past customary practice and to current production potential. The periodic surveys which provided the basis for any changes in the *kanunnames* illustrate the intimate knowledge of local conditions which were available to those

² The substance of the debate concerning the contribution of warfare to industrial development, as exemplified in the different opinions of Werner Sombart, *Krieg und Kapitalismus* (Munich, 1913) and J.U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), is summarised in ed. J.M. Winter, *War and Economic Development* (CUP, 1975) 1-7. An important essay concerning the Europe contemporary with the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire discussed in this paper is that of Ingomar Bog, "Krieg und Wirtschaft im 16. Jahrhundert" in *Krieg, Militärausgaben und wirtschaftlicher Wandel*, ed. O. Pickl (Graz, 1980).

running the military enterprise. Commodities with a military value, from grain to cotton yarn, to lead, copper and sulphur, were subject to export bans at times in the sixteenth century. Grain was freely traded westward until the mid-sixties of the century, but a subsequent squeeze on supplies, perhaps for reasons of population pressure, prompted controls whose intention it was to ensure sufficient supply for the domestic population. In that the rural areas and small towns were able to supply themselves from their environs, it was the demands of the military, and the competing demands of the large towns which were of major concern.

At the time of campaign, orders were sent to the cadis on the military road that they arrange the preparation of grain and other supplies sufficient for the numbers of soldiers passing along the route. For most of the sixteenth century this could be effected by means of an in-kind levy on peasant producers, for which no compensation was made. Alternatively, specified amounts of food were purchased at the current price, but at a current price which was kept deliberately low, so that the supplies required by the army should not be subject to inflationary pressures brought about by shortages caused by profiteering. In the border area itself, much of the grain needed was purchased on the free market.

The provision of that other dietary staple of the Balkans, mutton, was the responsibility of individuals designated as *celepkeşan* (sheep drovers), who were chosen from among the wealthier members of the rural and small town population to provide sheep to the army. They performed a similar function in the supplying of meat to Istanbul. The government determined the price at which it would purchase the sheep from the drovers. Thus, the government used the capital accumulated by these individuals to ease its own cashflow difficulties. Problems in the provisioning of the troops, seem to have arisen surprisingly rarely, except in particularly awkward weather or transport conditions, and so it can be said that, despite the contraband trade in grain which is so frequently referred to at the end of the century, the policy of government control achieved its aim.

Priority was similarly given to the manufacture of military

equipment in this command economy. The sector which was of greatest strategic importance was the mining of the raw ores needed for the production of cannon, hand guns, gunpowder and gun carriages, as well as a mass of less sophisticated tools, axes, shovels, nails, and the like. Production took place on site during campaigns, and in the mines themselves, such as that at Samakov in Bulgaria, as well as in the imperial foundries already referred to. As in the case of the provision of mutton to feed the troops, the financing of the extraction of the raw material to make the weapons used by them was another opportunity for the government to mobilise the wealth of individuals. Where the government was not itself in direct control of the mining operations, they could be farmed out on a contract basis.

While *kanunnames* ordering the activities of the agricultural community are naturally most numerous, mining operations had their own sets of regulation. The special status of labourer was passed from father to son, and shown in his exemption from extraordinary burdens of the kind which we have seen agricultural producers being obliged to perform in time of war. Within the wide borders of the Ottoman Empire could be found most of the mineral resources needed for the predominantly military uses to which they were put. The restrictive practices adopted in the case of grain export were only necessary for the raw material of military hardware in time of real or anticipated shortage.

The protectionist mentality which guided Ottoman trade policy in this period can be seen to have ensured that military demands were satisfactorily met. But the enforcement of the measures taken to meet this military demand did not create conditions in which there was any tangible economic spin-off in non-military directions. Nor indeed is it apparent that there were any palpable advances within the agricultural or industrial sectors themselves, which can be said to have resulted from the opportunities offered by the huge amount of resources invested in production for military use. Whatever population pressure there may have been, it was apparently not so great as to bring under cultivation marginal land

in an Empire which had never been an importer of grain. In the pre-capitalist sixteenth century, the effects of military demand as a stimulus to economic development were seen only at the simplest level, such as in the operation of mines which would otherwise have been uneconomic.

Outside the aegis of government, institutions did not exist at this time for the mobilisation of the capital which had been accumulated by individuals. Some profit could certainly be made as a *celebkeşan* or as an investor in a mining operation, but there was no mechanism by which it could be translated into anything deserving the description 'economic development'. It was the Ottoman state which took up idle funds and channelled them back into military production, but as cash resources, rather than with the intention of using them for investment to stimulate future technical advance. In the same spirit was use made of the personal fortunes amassed by those in the upper reaches of the military hierarchy: such borrowings constituted up to 10% of the running costs of the campaigns at the end of the sixteenth century. It was the raw materials which the Ottoman Empire had to offer which attracted the merchants of Europe in a later period, not its manufactured goods, and there is no sense in which the activity of war brought advantages of the kind which it is thought by some to have engendered at other times and in other places.

3. The social costs of war

The separation of the social from the economic and political is necessarily arbitrary, and the rationale adopted here owes nothing to an economist's definition of social cost, but sees the impact of war on society as the obverse of the increasing financial costs which the state had to meet. Two of the pressures of sixteenth-century warfare which had a substantial effect on society are first, the consequences of the widening of the bases of military recruitment, and secondly, the heavier tax burden at the individual level which resulted from the state's growing need for cash.

In the area which some military historians would term the theatre

of war, there was loss and casualty to those who found themselves involuntarily caught up in its currents. Displacement of populations, and the destruction of their means of livelihood were its inevitable concomitants. As an aside, we may note that the profitable export of Hungarian cattle to the west, shows no signs of having declined in volume in the sixteenth century. The fact that such a primitive form of agricultural activity thrived is, however, seen by Hungarian historians as a negative consequence of the Turkish presence in a country whose chances to emerge from medieval feudalism were thereby arrested.

Unconnected with conditions on the ground, that is, the ravages in the border area, and the relative tranquility away from the combat zone, the increasing impact of war on society led to certain structural changes in the society as a whole. It is in this more defensive period of the sixteenth century that the strains imposed by the constantly high level of military spending brought a governmental response in which may perhaps be seen the seeds of later social change.

The non-*askeri* (non-military) classes had always had a role to play in the success of military undertakings. As we have seen in the case of the miners such participation could be formally regulated. The universal military needs for the transport of provisions and equipment and the repair of fortresses, roads and bridges, also relied to a very great extent on the informal hiring of the services of the *reaya* as a vital supplement to the official corps performing such tasks. Despite the fact that the functional dichotomy between *askeri* and *reaya* was more fluid in practice than is often supposed, and that the notion of the exclusivity of the *askeri* class was largely a propaganda exercise on the part of a foundering bureaucratic élite, chronicle and archival sources of the late sixteenth century attest to a situation in which the demand for manpower to garrison the borders, and simply to fight on many fronts, was of unprecedented proportions. It has recently been cited as a major cause of the internal social unrest of the early seventeenth century, the *Celali* revolts, and of the subsequent

fragmentation of the centralised society which had existed until the sixteenth century. In essence, this hypothesis of Inalcık's proposes that the numbers of armed men demobilised after campaign turned to brigandage, and sold their services to the highest bidder, thus creating local power bases which could act in opposition to the established power³. This seems plausible in general outline, but awaits more detailed research to clarify the connection between cause and effect.

Coming to the second point, of all the measures taken to produce the ever greater amounts of cash needed in warfare, one of the easiest options as far as the central authorities were concerned was to increase the rural tax burden. The Ottoman Empire had ample agricultural capacity, and the strengthened application of the irregular wartime taxes in kind, to feed the increasing number of military mouths, could have been achieved with rather little upset. During the course of the sixteenth century, two trends became apparent, however. On the one hand extraordinary wartime taxes were increasingly demanded in cash, and on the other, they were gradually regularised.

The importance of in-cash rather than in-kind contributions in this defensive period of the stable border is a further symptom that a new age had arrived. The taxation arrangements which had been satisfactory in earlier days, when the Balkan Empire was smaller in area, were unsuited to an Empire with a western border so far from the areas of greatest agricultural productivity. The distance to be covered in transporting grain from Thrace to Belgrade would have meant intolerably high costs, and in military terms any delay could be fatal. Apart from the problems of ensuring security from bandit attack, a food convoy which had to travel several hundred miles was out of the question. A far more realistic option was that extraordinary taxes should be transferred toward the border in the form of cash, and would then be spent on supplies nearer to the area of operation of the army. The *reaya* had the greatest difficulty in meeting their obligations, since the local market was not big

³ Halil Inalcık "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700" *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980) 283-337.

enough to absorb the extra agricultural produce they were obliged to sell in order to raise the cash needed. Efficient military administration in a time of money shortage was achieved at the expense of the very producers whom the government had formerly been at pains to protect.

II CONTACTS AND INHERITANCE : 1

A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY TURKISH APOLOGY FOR
ISLAM: THE *GURBETNAME-I SULTAN CEM**

BARBARA FLEMMING / LEIDEN

Background

Turkish perceptions of Western Christianity in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have been studied in a general way. It has long been held that as a rule Muslims did not see Christianity as a religious threat to Islam and that they showed little interest in and curiosity about what went on in Christian Europe, taking little trouble to inform themselves even about the languages spoken there¹. It is true that the Ottoman government, the Porte, did have access to first-hand material; it made use of the knowledge of seamen, and employed secret agents, some of whose depositions have been preserved². But as far as the Turkish public was concerned, its potential sources of information on the "House of War", *darülharb* were chronicles and heroic poems on military exploits, the *gazavatnames*³. Their writers combined direct and

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¹ B. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York, London 1982), 82, 142, 182. For European indifference on matters Islamic see C. Göllner, *Turcica III. Die Türkenfrage in der öffentlichen Meinung Europas im 16. Jahrhundert* (Bucarest, Baden-Baden, 1978), 201, 214.

² One example is the report of the famous seaman Barak (died in 1499), subject of a magistral study by V.L. Ménage, "The mission of an Ottoman secret agent in France in 1486", *JRAS* (1965), 112-132. Further material about Turkish Map-making and geographical knowledge in Lewis, *Discovery*, 152f.

³ See for example I. Mélikoff, *Le Destân d'Umûr Pacha* (Paris, 1954): A.S. Levend, *Gazavât-nâmeler ve Mihaloğlu Ali Bey' in Gazavât-nâmesi* (Ankara, 1956); I. Mélikoff, *La Geste de Melik Dânişmend* (Paris, 1960); H. Inalcık and M. Oğuz, *Gazavât-i Sultân Murâd b. Mehmed Hân* (Ankara, 1978).

hearsay evidence with older authorities, and for special subjects such as the history of Constantinople and the Hagia Sophia they derived their knowledge from Greek chronicles and legends which had been translated, with inevitable distortions⁴. One of the few detailed accounts of Western lands is the remarkable itinerary of Prince Cem (1459-1495) who was dragged through France and Italy as a hostage of Christian powers. It is included in the biography of the Prince, the *Vakîât-i Sultan Cem*, written by one of his close companions⁵.

Within the Ottoman Empire large numbers of Christians, alongside Jews, continued to practise their religion as *zimmi*s, protected taxpayers or "scriptural infidels". The Turks knew of the old division of Near Eastern Christianity into Greek Orthodox, Jacobite (Monophysite) and Nestorian Christians. Their Christian subjects were organized in three religious communities, *millet*: the Greek Orthodox, by far the great majority; the Armenian, Monophysite, *millet* which included besides Armenians all subjects of the Sultan not otherwise classified⁶, and the Jews⁷. Catholicism was the most foreign of them all; in the 15th century it was the religion of all the Franks, the enemies of Islam. When the *millets* were formed, almost its only adherents within the Empire were

⁴ K. Süssheim (F. Taeschner), "Aya Sofya", *EP*, I (1960), 776-77; B. Lewis, "The Use by Muslim Historians of non-Muslim Sources", in B. Lewis and P.M. Holt, *Historians of the Middle East* (London 1962), 184-85. For the attitudes of neighbouring peoples see S. Franklin, "Byzantine and Kievan Russia", *Byzantion*, 53 (1983), and E.M. Jeffreys, "The Attitude of Byzantine Chroniclers toward Ancient History", *Byzantion*, 49 (1979), 199-238.

⁵ Published by Mehmed Arif as a supplement to *Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası*, parts 22-25 (Istanbul, 1330 / 1911-1912). The work was used by the historian Sa'deddin, so that its contents were indirectly available to European historians; cf. Ménage, "Ottoman agent", 119. For a perceptive critique of the *Vakîât*, cf. N. Vatin, "À propos de l'exotisme dans les *Vâkı'at-i Sultân Cem*: le regard porté sur l'Europe occidentale à la fin du XVe siècle par un Turc Ottoman", *JA*, 272 (1984), 237-248.

⁶ H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West. A study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, I, II (London, New York, Toronto, 1957), 221. For historiography on the Orthodox church in the early Ottoman Empire see M. Philippides, "Patriarchal Chronicles of the Sixteenth Century", *GRBS*, 25 (1984), 87-94.

⁷ B. Braude and B. Lewis, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire. The Functioning of a plural society* (New York, London, 1982).

foreigners such as the Genoese citizens of Galata⁸.

In the early period of the Empire, when Islam had been preached in a rather broadminded way and in a familiar guise, absorption of christians by conversion had been rapid. But as Ottoman orthodoxy strengthened its grip on its flock and the *millets* were more tightly organized, conversions were actively prevented by the *millet* leaders and soon all but ceased⁹. In the villages of the early Empire, Muslims and Christians, sharing the status of "taxpaying subjects", *reaya*, were often on good terms with each other. In the towns, however, there were marked divisions between the communities. Intercourse between Muslims and infidels had more to do with practical matters, such as the payment of the "poll tax", *cizye*, than with religious differences.

If a religious debate did take place, the protagonists operated on familiar ground. Islam had from the start been engaged in debate with Jewish and Christian critics, and in the Koran itself Muḥammad is enjoined to "argue" or "dispute" with the unbelievers (Sūra 3:61)¹⁰. The Turks, too, had their share of religious debates, going back to the times of the Seldjuks, the Anatolian emirates, and the early Ottomans. Well-known examples are the discussions between an elderly *müderri*s and Manuel II in Ankara, and between Mehmed II, the Conqueror (d.1481), and Gennadius II Scholarius whom he had installed as patriarch¹¹. Polemic literature was, it is true, aimed at the religious adversary,

⁸ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 245.

⁹ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 256-258.

¹⁰ J. Brugman, *Godsdienstgesprekken tussen Christenen en Moslims in de vroege Islam* (Leiden, 1970), 45; for the oldest disputes see *ibid.*, 46-51, and S. Vryonis, Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1971), 422f.

¹¹ E. Trapp (ed.), *Manuel II. Palaiologos. Dialoge mit einem "Perser"* (Vienna, 1966); A. Papadakis, "Gennadius II and Mehmet the Conqueror", *Byzantion*, 42 (1972), 88-106; A. Decei, "Patrik II. Gennadios Skolaris' un Fatih Sultan Mehmet için yazdığı ortodoks itikad-namesinin Türkçe metni", *Fatih ve İstanbul*, I (İstanbul, 1953), 98-116; Vryonis, *Decline*, 423-436; Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, 199-215; B. Flemming, "Turkische discussies omtrent het christendom", in *Historische betrekkingen tussen Moslims en Christenen*, ed. S. van Koningsveld (Nijmegen, 1982), 116, 118, 123.

but in practice it was meant to strengthen one's own flock¹². The average Muslim Turk knew no more about intricate theological concepts of his own religion than did the average *zimmi* about the subtle distinctions of Christian theology.

In the sixteenth century centres of Christianity in South-Eastern Europe were overrun by the Turks. Ranging far beyond the limits of Greek Orthodoxy, the victorious Muslims encountered, alongside Jews, a Christian population which was composed of Catholics, the foreign religion par excellence, and Protestants belonging to various denominations, Calvinist, Lutheran, or Unitarian. The spread of Islam northwards into Hungary during the high tide of Turkish conquests¹³ caused anxiety to the churches, who tried to hold in and contain this current. The readiness of Christians to participate in public debates arranged by the Ottomans can be seen in this light¹⁴. One of the best known was the debate held on Whitsunday May 1547 in the church of the Franciscans in Nagyvárad (Grosswardein, Oradea Mare); the protagonists being a Turkish scholar named Derviş Çelebi, as organizer of the debate, and a Turkish-speaking Catholic humanist, Bartholomeus Georgievič, who later had his account of the debate printed in Cracow¹⁵.

This renewed energy in Ottoman-Christian religious polemic may be correlated with the situation of heightened tension in the

¹² Brugman, *Godsdienstgesprekken*, 61. Cf. the Turkish sermon reported by a Christian prisoner in the 1450's; the preacher pointed out the errors of the Unbelievers concerning the death of Jesus: "the *kaury* say that Jesus was... crucified. You must not believe that". B. Stolz (transl.), S. Soucek (commentary), *Konstantin Mihailović, Memoirs of a Janissary* (Ann Arbor, 1975), 18-19, 202.

¹³ P.F. Sugar, *Sutheastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804* (Seattle, London, 1977), 50, with earlier literature.

¹⁴ Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, is the best comprehensive study. See M.E.H.N. Mout, "Calvinoturcisme in de zeventiende eeuw", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, 91 (1978), 593-595; idem, "Turken in het nieuws. Beeldvorming en publieke opinie in de zestiende-eeuwse Nederlanden", *TvG*, 97 (1984), 362-381.

¹⁵ Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, 208, with reference to his own *Turcica. Die europäischen Türkendrucke des XVI. Jahrhunderts* (Bucharest, Leipzig, Baden-Baden, 1961-1968), Nr. 879. On Georgievič's contribution to turkology see G. Hazai, "Zum balkanischen Hintergrund der osmanisch-türkischen Transkriptionstexte von Bartholomaeus Georgievits", *Studia Slavica Hung.*, 20 (1974), 71-106.

two camps. Strictly Sunni *ulema*, their numbers vastly strengthened through the recent Ottoman conquests in the Near East, closed ranks against heterodoxy in general and the threat of the heterodox Shī'a of the *Kızılbaş* in particular¹⁶, while a sense of crisis pervaded the "Frankish" camp in the wake of the Reformation¹⁷.

The Gurbetname

Proclaiming their faith against the adherents of what they considered an earlier and incomplete form of God's revelation, Turkish debaters found it useful to refer to Christian beliefs, and needed information which indeed existed in an ancient body of literature, mostly Arabic¹⁸. But not everyone had access to such books and could read Arabic. Especially in their new provinces in Europe, in strongholds in an alien land with a fluid frontier zone¹⁹, many a Muslim Turk must have felt the need for some exegetical equipment ready for use in his own language. It is surely no accident that such an equipment was provided by an unnamed sixteenth-century Turk within the framework of his "Book of Exile of Prince Cem" *Gurbetname-i Sultan Cem*. This book begins with a biography of the well-known Ottoman prince who lived for twelve years in Europe, becoming, during the last years of his life, an instrument of Christian rulers for their political plans. Their diplomatic activity around his person and the Ottoman counter-measures as revealed by the Turkish archives have been the object of profound historical research up to the present day²⁰.

16 H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600* (London, 1973), 182-185, with earlier literature. For demographic developments Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 232.

17 Göllner, *Türkenfrage*, 173-186; Mout, "Calvinoturcisme", 582-585.

18 Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*, 136, 175, 182, 184.

19 Cf. Gy. Káldy-Nagy, "Mādjār. The Ottoman Period", *Et²*, V (1984), 1023.

20 The classical study is L. Thuasne, *Djem-Sultan. Fils de Mohammed II, frère de Bayezid II (1459-1495). Etude sur la question d'Orient à la fin du XVe siècle* (Paris, 1892). Recent treatments are by K.M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), II, The Fifteenth Century*, (Philadelphia, 1978), especially the chapter entitled "Innocent VIII, Jem Sultan, and the Crusade (1484-1490)"; and H. İnalcık, "A Case Study in Renaissance diplomacy. The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan", *Journal of Turkish*

The *Gurbetname* has been known since 1911 when Mehmed Arif mentioned it in the introduction to his edition of the *Vakiât-i Sultan Cem* cited above. In 1927 F. Babinger suggested that its author might be Cem's trusted follower Haydar Çelebi²¹. In 1954 I.H. Danişmend printed the text from a manuscript, now in Paris, in a modern Turkish transcription²². H. Inalcık in 1979 again drew attention to it; within the scope of his enquiry, the *Gurbetname* was a "modified version" and in many ways "simply a copy" of the *Vakiât-i Sultan Cem* into which the author inserted, "quite awkwardly" a long controversy on Islam and Christianity²³. This controversy will be dealt with here, and it will be shown that the unnamed author of the *Gurbetname* had a purpose of his own. Using the travels of the Prince as an introduction to a long debate between Prince Cem and Pope Innocent VIII, he wrote in fact a Turkish apology for Islam which deserves to be studied as such. "It was my wish", the author said, "to write a brief and clear record²⁴ of the adventures of Prince Cem whom God has taken into his mercy and whose sins are forgiven — may his grave be pleasant and may he make Paradise his dwelling — and of the words²⁵ which he exchanged with the Pope of Rome²⁶ on the subject of religion, in order that the reader be overcome by compassion and remember him with blessings and delight his soul. If eloquence is absent here this is not for want of rhetorical figures; rather, it is due to the fear that (an embellished text) might not be

Studies, 3 (1979), 209-230; Vatin, "Exotisme" (cf. note 5).

21 See note 5; F. Babinger, *Die Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927), 32, mentions a manuscript in the Halis Efendi library, which is now in the Library of the University of Istanbul; cf. H. Inalcık, "Djem", *ET*, II (1965), 535.

22 I.H. Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme-i Sultan Cem", *Fâtih ve İstanbul*, II, 3/6, (Istanbul, 1954), 211-270. The call number of the Paris manuscript is Suppl. Turc 1434. For information about this manuscript I am grateful to J. Schmidt, Den Haag. My special thanks are due to Professor Adnan Erzi, Ankara, who gave me his own handwritten copy of the Paris manuscript in 1980.

23 Inalcık, "Case Study", 209.

24 *müsvedde* "rough copy, draft".

25 *kelimat*.

26 *Rim-Papa*. The title of the Pope is not followed by any formula such as "God speed his soul to Hell" etc., cf. Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*, 148.

useful because, being illiterate, the greater part of the folks of the Ottoman dominions might not understand our purpose. And its brevity is occasioned by the fear that, should I transgress the boundaries of actual fact, there might be a lack of acceptance...²⁷".

These *kelimat* or "words" — we might also use the term *meclis-i kelam* "discussion"²⁸, being consciously aimed at ordinary people, are written in the straightforward Turkish which we know from other popular works from the early sixteenth century. The writer adapts his theme to the understanding of his readers or listeners, embroidering it with stories to keep alive their interest. The popular appeal is also served by the approving and admiring remarks with which the Pope invites the Prince to speak and comments on his utterances.

"The Pope saw that the late Prince was a commander of the word and a profoundly learned man. He began to question him on his knowledge and said, 'We hear that you confirm our religion; is that so?' Watch now how the late Prince answered and refuted him. He said, 'Yes, we affirm the religion of Jesus — peace be upon him — but not your religion which was invented by those 318 monks gathered in Nicea²⁹. If you will listen and not be offended, shall I make an explicit declaration?' The Pope said, 'God forbid that I should be offended by you! You are my son, say what you wish'³⁰. "When (the late Prince) had said this, the Pope showed himself very much inclined and obliged and said, 'It is certainly my wish. Could there be a more beautiful and praiseworthy discussion? I wish that our whole life would pass in scholarly discussions!³¹.

The Prince, too, treated the Pope with politeness; Christians in the *Gurbetname* are not referred to as "infidels", but the Koranic term "Nazarenes", *Naṣārā*, is used. The author quotes from a number of Muslim and Christian sources, named (for example,

²⁷ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 213.

²⁸ Used by the author here and there; "argumentation" in Islamic theology is *hüdjdja*.

²⁹ Council of Nicaea 325 A.D.

³⁰ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 228.

³¹ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 231.

Abū Yazīd al-Balkhī) and unnamed. It is certain that the *Gurbetname* was from the beginning a composite work. In addition, the text seems to have suffered from some revision, especially at the junction between the historical biography of Cem and the religious debate³².

The Prince had entered Rome on 13 March, 1489, huge crowds gathering to see him ride through the city³³. The *Gurbetname* follows the *Vakîât* in describing how Cem was received by Innocent VIII — named *Visenso* as in the *Vakîât* but not identified by name in the debate³⁴, and how the Pope gave him honours. It relates, still from the same source, Cem's proud refusal to genuflect before the Pope and his scornful rejection of the belief that the Pope could remit sins³⁵. Cem did have a series of encounters with the Pope, but the disputation which now follows in the *Gurbetname* does not resemble them. There is no indication of the surroundings in which the debate took place. While this may cast doubts on the author's claim to autopsy, it is not inconceivable that he did belong to Cem's retainers — he alludes to his remaining in Rome to settle some important matters for the Prince when he left for Naples, where he died on 22 February 1495³⁶ — and that he set out, in his old age, to picture the son of the Conqueror emerging, from his dealings with the Christian enemy, as an impressive spokesman of Islam. A prophecy that Sultan Süleyman (1520-1566) would conquer Rome³⁷ allows us to date the work before 1566, perhaps in the

³² Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 212 and 249.

³³ Setton, *Papacy* II, 407.

³⁴ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 222.

³⁵ Cf. Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*. 178, with reference to the *Vakîât*; Vatin, "Exotisme", 243.

³⁶ Setton, *Papacy* II, 481-482. The Sultan's purpose had always been the elimination of his brother; cf. Inalcık, "Case Study", 213. See also B. Flemming, "Zwei türkische Herren von Avlona", *Der Islam*, 45 (1969), 310-316; H. Reindl, *Männer um Bayezid. Eine prosopographische Studie über die Epoche Sultan Bāyezīds II. (1481-1512)* (Berlin, 1983), 303-308.

³⁷ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 227-228; Inalcık, "Case Study", 218. For actual Turkish plans to invade Italy in about 1480 see Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*, 32. According to the *Gurbetname*, a Venetian scholar had written in a history book that after 920/beg. 26 February 1514 an Ottoman called Süleyman would become

thirties or forties of the sixteenth century³⁸.

The dialogue between Cem and the Pope

The Islamic apology of the *Gurbetname* unfolds gradually over the course of an unspecified number of encounters with the Pope, and it is often really a monologue delivered by Cem. The Pope opened the debate with the words quoted above; "do you confirm our religion?".

Five gospels

Cem, going far back in his answer, acknowledges five gospels, of which only one, the genuine *İncil* was authentic revelation³⁹; the other four gospels by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John being the work of those four men. He conceded that there were blessed sayings of the prophet Jesus in them, but he deplored the process of *tahrif*, corrupting and falsifying the sacred text, especially through the confusion of tongues caused by translating it into countless languages. By contrast, nobody in the whole world was capable of translating the book of Islam, the Koran, and of altering or corrupting a single line of it⁴⁰.

Cem proceeded to tell a story about Salmān the Persian, a companion of the Prophet, from the time when he was still a Zoroastrian and fireworshipper. While hunting on a mountain, Salmān met an old ascetic monk who converted him to Christianity and told him about the Authentic Gospel which foretold the coming of the Prophet Muḥammed. In line with a tendency in the *Gurbet-*

Sultan, that he would make great conquests in Hungary as elsewhere, and that he would finally fit out a great fleet and would conquer Rome. For signs and portents read by the Venetians, this time in relation to the fall of Rome to the French on 31 December 1494, see Setton, *Papacy* II, 473.

³⁸ After the siege of Vienna; for a Turkish prophecy connected with that event see B. Flemming, "Der Ḍāmi' ül-meknünāt. Eine Quelle aus der Zeit Sultan Süleymans", in *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Vorderen Orients*, eds. H.R. Roemer and A. Noth (Festschrift für Bertold Spuler) (Leiden, 1981), 79-92.

³⁹ Cf. Koran, 5 : 46.

⁴⁰ This is an extension of the meaning of the technical term *i'djāz*, which originally referred to the inimitability of the Koran in content and form, applied to "competition" with the Koran, not to altering or translating it; cf. G.E. von Grünebaum, "I'djāz", *EF*, III (1971), 1018-1020.

name to avoid a direct mentioning of names, the monk's name is not given; his appearance is an obvious allusion to the monk Bahīra, an early witness for Islam in Muslim tradition⁴¹. The monk implored Salmān the Persian not to follow the actual corrupted religion of the Christians, because they no longer kept the Mosaic law and the law of the Authentic Gospel, eating pork, rejecting circumcision, changing their orientation in prayer, and deifying Jesus and Mary. All this they did under the influence of a wicked Jewish scholar, whose story Cem had in prospect. But he first changed the subject by suggesting a discussion about the textual promise concerning the prophet of Islam.

The Paraclete

The old monk had read in the Authentic Gospel that Aḥmad, the seal of prophets, would come, and he had found the same announcement in the gospels of John and Mark: The Paraclete, the spirit of God, my father shall send him in my name, and the Paraclete shall teach you everything... And "father" here meant not father but lord, master⁴².

Cem now turned his full attention to the intricate questions raised by the concept of the *faraklītā*, Paraclete. He offered four interpretations. At first he borrowed from *al-Taḥsīn al-Kabīr*, the great commentary of the Koran by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (1149-1209)⁴³. After translating this Arabic classic, Cem displayed the range of his knowledge by offering a supplement, heard from a former monk converted to Islam, which he reproduced in "Greek" with a

⁴¹ He is a heretical monk in Christian polemics; cf. A. Abel, "Bahīra", *EI*², I (1960), 922-923; E. van Donzel, *'Enbāqom. Anqaṣa amin (La porte de la foi). Apologie éthiopienne du christianisme contre l'Islam à partir du Coran* (Leiden, 1969). For Salmān al-Fārisī see G. Levi della Vida, s.v., *EI*.

⁴² The *locus classicus* is Sura 61 : 6, where Muḥammad is announced; cf. R. Paret, *Der Koran. Kommentar und Konkordanz* (Stuttgart, 1979), 476-477. For this *topos* in Muslim polemics, cf. F. Sepmeijer, *Een weerlegging van het Christendom uit de 10e eeuw* (Kampen, 1985), 94, 121, with earlier literature. For "lord, master" cf. J.-M. Gaudeul, "The Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar. 'Umar's Letter re-discovered?", *Islamochristiana*, 10 (1984), 139-140.

⁴³ C.G. Anawati, "Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *EI*², II (1965), 754. Cf. J.-M. Gaudeul and R. Caspar, "Textes de la Tradition musulmane concernant le *taḥrīf* (falsification des Ecritures)", *Islamochristiana*, 6 (1980), 61-104.

Persian translation, which he in turn translated into Turkish. It said: "From the people of Āzer, that is from the sons of the Prophet Abraham, there shall come one worthy of the prophethood... he shall be the son of one 'Abdallāh, and his blessed name shall be Muḥammad... Whosoever shall have faith in him shall be the master of the world and of the hereafter"⁴⁴).

Corruption of religious practice and belief

"The Pope now reminded him, 'We should like to hear that tale from you about the man who did damage to the Christian religion. You were kind enough to promise us this, so if you do not think me over-persistent, please explain it'. Wishing to gain the goodwill of the Pope, the late Prince at once began with his story". It ran as follows.

The Christian community had been persecuted by a learned, but wicked Jew. When he was too old to harrass them, he decided to mislead the Christians and began by pretending that he had been temporarily blinded by Jesus. Again the *Gurbetname* expressly avoids mentioning a name, although there are many indirect references to Paul⁴⁵. This Jew, then, taught the Christians to abandon the Sabbath and to worship on Sunday, and he also encouraged them to drink wine. Moreover, he perverted their belief in the Authentic Gospel, confusing the three leaders of early Christianity. This archdeceiver was completely grounded in philosophy, *ilm-i hikmet*. Interestingly, the author puts the following words into Cem's mouth: "In those times philosophy was different. Nowadays Muslim scholars have intervened in this⁴⁶; our sheykhhs have thoroughly investigated those passages⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 231-232.

⁴⁵ For traditional accusations against Paul, which may reflect hostile criticism of Paul by Christian theologians favourable to Peter, cf. R.A. Nicholson, *The Mathnawī of Jalālu'ddin Rūmī. Commentary* (London, 1936), 36-39), cf. W.M. Watt, "Ash-Shahrastānī over de triniteitsleer", *Historische betrekkingen* (cf. note 11), (1982), 9-10; idem, "ash-Shahrastānī's Account of Christian Doctrine", *Islamochristiana*, 9 (1983) 247-259, esp. 251 f. For later developments cf. M. Ayoub, "Muslim Views of Christianity: Some modern Examples", *Islamochristiana*, 10 (1984), 57, 66-67.

⁴⁶ *karıgı*.

which might be harmful to the faith (*itikad*). Everyone who studies those passages knows this"⁴⁸.

And thus the Jewish scholar misrepresented Jesus to the three Christian leaders, Melkā, Nastūr, and Mar Ya'qūb. They had started out believing that Jesus was the slave of God, his messenger and his word, but this false teacher gave each of them a different creed to follow, and they submitted to him, though grudgingly. When the deceiver vanished — there was conflicting evidence about his death and its whereabouts, one source being the *Mathnawī* by Mevlānā Djalāl al-Dīn Rūmī (d.1273)⁴⁹ — the Christian leaders met and were startled to see that their creeds differed; they began to repudiate and abhor one another, the point at issue being the figure of Jesus.

Melkā, the leader of the Greek Orthodox, believed in Jesus the son of God, his word, brought by Gabriel, conceived miraculously by Mary⁵⁰, born, lived among men, then returned to his father and sat at his right hand. Nestorius spoke of three hypostases; he argued, as the deceiver had told him, that Jesus was the Light of Light, Son of God, had entered Mary as a ray of light, became flesh, was born, lived and returned to his origin. Mar Ya'qūb, as the Jew had told him, believed that God had no son and did not use light as his son; he came himself into Mary, took the form of man and drove away Satan.

With this meagre "Christology" the author of the *Gurbetname* would seem to confirm the saying that Ottomans felt that "Christians of all colours were much alike"⁵¹. The author did display some familiarity with the Nicene Creed, but did not puzzle his

⁴⁷ *yerler*; Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 235-236.

⁴⁸ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 235-236.

⁴⁹ In the *Mathnawī* the deceiver was the vizier of a Jewish king; after contriving his plot against the Christians, he "killed himself in seclusion"; cf. R.A. Nicholson (ed.), *The Mathnawī of Jalālu'ddīn Rūmī* (London, 1925), 41 verse 662; R.A. Nicholson (transl.), *The Mathnawī of Jalālu'ddīn Rūmī*, I-II (London, 1926), 38; idem, vol. VII, *Commentary* (London, 1936), 36-39. For the explanation given by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (cf. above) of how the Christians came to err, cf. J. Jomier, "Unité de Dieu, Chrétiens et Coran selon Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī", *Islamochristiana*, 6 (1980), 170-171.

⁵⁰ For Muslim doctrines regarding Mary, cf. Koran 3 : 33 f.; 3 : 47, 66 : 12.

⁵¹ Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society*, 233.

readers with the Orthodox tenet that Jesus had two natures, one divine and one human, but only one person. As for the Nestorians and Jacobites, regarded as heretical by the Orthodox and thrown together, despite their disparity, in one *millet*, the author took little notice of them. Their distinguishing tenets⁵² were reduced to the level of vague stereotypes and reminiscences⁵³. It was enough to explain the seeds of disagreement between the Christians.

Early Christian history

After this survey of early Christianity Cem proposed to set forth the life-story of Jesus and the history of the early Christian empires. This body of information, taken from Muslim and (so it seems) Byzantine sources, would require a different scale of treatment than can be given here.

A dialogue within the dialogue

After another lacuna in the manuscript we find Cem taking up an old story as testimony to the truth of Islam:

"Our purpose in recording this story is to prove the weakness of the Christian religion; neither by reason nor by tradition⁵⁴ can its sayings be accepted as even resembling the divine word"⁵⁵.

Cem reproduced a polemic in which a learned Muslim, an Arab sheykh, refuted first a Christian called Beshîr, then a monk called in to help Beshîr, and finally the greatest monk at the emperor's court in Constantinople. The learned Muslim was a prisoner of the emperor; the Christians hoped to convert him; surrounded by great crowds he addressed the monks; they plotted to put him to death; finally, he recited the call to prayer in their great church and was set free by the emperor, a just man, who let him go back to his own country. It is easy to find features of Cem's life in this story; one is tempted to suspect that the author was inspired by this older debate.

⁵² Cf. Sepmeijer, *Weerlegging*, 37-42, 109-111.

⁵³ E.g., "light of light", taking up a conventional theme from Platonism.

⁵⁴ *ne aklen ve ne naklen*.

⁵⁵ Danişmend, "Gurbet-nâme", 247.

When we consider the civility and even amiability of Cem's encounters with the Pope, it is surprising to observe the acrimony with which this Muslim sheykh attacked his enemies. Jesus was a prophet, not the son of God, and he could list weak points in the Christian doctrines to prove it. Either Jesus endured bodily suffering as a helpless man: then how could they call him God? Or his sufferings happened with his divine consent: then why did they curse the Jews? They said that Jesus was God or the son of God because he performed miracles: they should look in the Torah and the Histories of the Prophets, *Ḳıssaṣ ül-Enbiyā'*, at the other prophets who had the power to work miracles — some also went up to heaven — and they should draw the conclusion that Jesus was a prophet like the others⁵⁶. Jesus was created by God, without an earthly father: so was Adam who had no father and no mother, either. They had better worship Adam! Jesus was in need of cleansing: John the Baptist⁵⁷ cleansed and baptized him. How could they say that Jesus was holy, and John the Baptist was not! The monks were liars: they claimed powers to purify the water of baptism, knowing that, being sinners, they did not have these powers. Their divine redeemer had humiliated himself to a sojourn of nine months in a woman's womb⁵⁸: and here their greatest monk disdained intercourse with women. As for prostrating one self in front of the greatest monk: this was blasphemy, man ought to prostrate himself only before God.

After this, the Pope was mortified; the following question represented his last stand: "My son, did not the Messiah say: there will not come a prophet after me?" The late Prince replied, 'Yes, this saying is true; but it refers to the prophets of the children of Israel⁵⁹; there is no doubt about this, just as the pride of the two worlds, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā — may God commend and salute him — is the seal of the prophets". Here ends the disputation,

⁵⁶ For the theme "Other prophets performed miracles" cf. Gaudeul, "Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar", 146-147.

⁵⁷ Yaḥyā. For the creation of Adam cf. Gaudeul, "Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar", 146.

⁵⁸ Cf. Gaudeul, "Correspondence between Leo and 'Umar", 144-145.

⁵⁹ Koran, Sūra 3 : 49.

meclis-i kelam, in which, just as in later debates, the Prince had not yielded on a single point. The *Gurbetname* now proceeds to tell its own story of the death of the Prince⁶⁰.

This study, too, has almost reached its end. It has set out to trace the polemical equipment to which a sixteenth-century Turk might have had recourse in order to refute a Christian who took up the challenge, suggesting that the *Gurbetname* was indeed written for such a purpose. To be sure, it does seem a curious shortcoming that his author had so little to say about the contemporary Latin Church. Events in Rome, ostensibly witnessed by him, did not stimulate him to report more about Catholic beliefs and practices than the outrageous claim, copied from the *Vakıât*, of the Pope to forgive sins. The *Gurbetname's* mental world was Islamic, Turkish-speaking, with a knowledge of Persian and some Arabic, and, as far as Christianity was concerned, it was reasonable familiar with a Greek Orthodox Church whose theology was rooted in a remote age before the schism which split the "Melkites" into West and East⁶¹. This tradition had tended to shield the Turkish-speaking Muslims from information about, for example, the dispute about images, the filioque-clause, or the primacy of Rome⁶². Seen from this vantage-point, the Latin Christians in the West were dissenters from the Great Church, not to speak of the emerging Protestants.

Further questions, such as the relationship between the *Gurbetname* and later Ottoman Turkish writings on this theme^{62a} go beyond this short survey. For example, the memoirs of Turkish

⁶⁰ Inalcık, "Case Study", 217.

⁶¹ Lewis, *Muslim Discovery*, 176. For the attitude of the Latins towards the Byzantines cf. R.W. Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (Harmondsworth, 1970), 82.

⁶² B. Lewis noted that even Katib Çelebi's list of Popes stopped in 1535; *Muslim Discovery*, 179.

^{62a} When the Ottoman scholar Talikizade (died c. 1599) composed his *Şemailname*, examples of the qualities distinguishing individual Ottomans, he became fascinated by Cem in Rome, embroidering its description and introducing additional dialogues. These are discussed in J. Buri-Gütermann, "Ein Türke in Italien. Aus einer unbekannten Handschrift der Nationalbibliothek Wien", *ZDMG*, 124 (1974), 59-72. The Vienna manuscript has since been described in C. Woodhead, *Ta'likizâde's Şehnâme-i hümayûn* (Berlin, 1983), 12.

prisoners returning from Christian lands in the seventeenth century might help us to understand their thoughts over Christianity such as they witnessed it⁶³. The learned Katib Çelebi (died 1657), who used Western books, gave his scholarly description of Christian doctrines a less polemical edge than is to be expected from his defiant Koranic opening⁶⁴. The great traveller Evliya Çelebi (died 1682) was much closer to the popular approach of the *Gurbetname*. When he was in Antioch he visited Mount Nakūra, where stood the sanctuary of Shem'un Şafā, who in Muslim lore represents the apostle Peter. According to him, Shem'un lived and died there, together with Ḥabīb en-Nedjdjār, "the Carpenter", an unnamed believer referred to in the Koran. In their sanctuary the Authentic Gospel, *ṣaḥīḥ Indjil*, was preserved, written by Shem'un on a gazelle skin. Evliya pored over it and took from it the verse, *āyet*, which was also recorded in Salmān the Persian's story: that Muḥammad was the man about whom the Authentic Gospel says: "He shall be a prophet from the house of Āzer, he shall be without falsehood, he shall be born in Mecca... his name shall be Aḥmed... and his followers shall own the earth"⁶⁵.

This old prophecy runs through Muslim religious polemics of the nineteenth and twentieth century⁶⁶. Quite recently the confident, combative spirit of the *Gurbetname* reappeared in a "Handbook for the (Muslim in) Exile", *Gurbetçinin El Kitabı*⁶⁷. This book, and similar publications, provide an indication of the

63 Autobiographical accounts of former prisoners-of-war are I. Parmaksızoğlu, "Bir Türk kadısının esaret hatıraları", *Tarih Dergisi*, 5 (1953), 77 ff., and F. Kreutel, *Die Autobiographie des Dolmetschers 'Osman Ağa aus Temeschwar. Der Text des Londoner Autographen in normalisierter Rechtschreibung* (Cambridge-Hertford, 1980).

64 Flemming, "Turkese discussies", 120.

65 Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname* III (Istanbul, 1928), 103; cf. the modernized version by Z. Danışman (Istanbul, 1972), 4, 298-300. On Ḥabīb an-Nadjdjār see *EP* s.v.

66 Cf. the survey by Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri I* (Istanbul 1333 / 1914-15), 247-48.

67 E. Sanay, *Gurbetçinin El Kitabı* (Ankara 1984), 74-80, quoting the prophecy concerning Muḥammad from the *Seyahatname*. The Handbook is publication nr. 238 of the Directorate of Religious Affairs of the Turkish Republic. For a recent international debate, the Dialogue arranged by Mu'ammār al-Kadhdhāfi in Tripolis, Libya, in February 1976, see *Islamochristiana*, II

extent to which these polemics will take on the colour of the age in which they are written. Any history of Turkish Islam must take into account this development of religious apology.

(Rome, 1976) and V (Rome, 1979) 291 f. on the book by A.A. Aydın, *İslam-Hıristiyan Diyalogu ve İslamın Zaferi* ("The dialogue between Islam and Christianity and the victory of Islam") (Ankara, 1977).

III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 1

NOMADS OR BANDITS? THE PASTORALIST / SEDENTARIST INTERFACE IN ANATOLIA

KEITH HOPWOOD / LAMPETER

Doukas gives us the pretext for the outbreak of war in 1453 which led to the fall of Constantinople:

"As the Turks approached the fortress of Epivetai, the horses and pack-animals were set loose to graze on the crops of the Romans and they proceeded to ravage the grain and all other kinds of green vegetables"¹.

This led to a skirmish and Turkish retaliation:

"This was the beginning of the conflict which led to the destruction of the Romans"².

Such destructive pasturing is used by semi-momadic and nomadic societies to precipitate a feud³ either among themselves or with sedentarist groups. Another form of provocation is the razzia, or rustling raid. Indeed, the title 'Ghazi', adopted by many of the Turkish emirs, is derived from 'ghazw' which describes an expedition of such a nature which, in nomadic societies was "a means of redistributing economic resources in a region where the balance could easily be upset by natural calamities"⁴ and provide the leaders of such enterprises with charisma and booty. Such actions were recognised as legitimate, if provocative, by pastoral societies.

¹ Doukas XXXIV. 10. Translation by H.J. Magoulias, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks by Doukas* (Detroit, 1975), 197-98.

² *ibid.*

³ J.K. Campbell, *Honour, Family and Patronage* (Oxford 1964), 209-10 on the Sarakatsani of Northern Greece in the 1950s; J. Black-Michaud, *Cohesive Force : Feud in the Mediterranean and Middle East* (Oxford, 1975), 62.

⁴ L.E. Sweet, "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: a Mechanism of Ecological Adaptation", *American Anthropologist*, 67 no. 5, pt. 1 (1965), 1132-50.

Sedentarists saw these activities in a very different light. In Roman Asia Minor, destructive pasturing of livestock was classed as 'banditry' (ληστεία)⁵ and in a predominantly sedentarist society was to be severely punished. The Later Roman Empire and the Byzantine state found themselves surrounded by bandit societies whose mode of production was essentially pastoralist and who obtained the non-animal products they needed by means of raiding⁶. The society which was seen as the bandit-society *par excellence* by our period was that of the *Türkmen* groups. Their *razzias* are frequently described not as plundering expeditions or as acts of war, but as 'banditry'⁷.

Banditry, not warfare. The traditions of Mediterranean agrarian communities were completely opposed to the nomadic economies. As Theodore Metochites points out, the nomads "did not draw themselves up against him (s.c. Alexander the Great) as he pursued, nor did they attack, but easily ran away as was their custom"⁸ unlike "the rest of Asia's blessed and happy races who lived in cities and ploughlands and who usually drew themselves up and fought battles against those who attacked them"⁹. John Cinnamus extends the description into an insulting reply of a Byzantine leader to a Seljuk Sultan:

"You fled continuously, like runaway slaves, shifting from one place to another and heretofore not remaining to oppose us face to face"¹⁰.

Such fighting was not according to the rules laid down by the agrarian civilizations of the Mediterranean Basin which were im-

⁵ *Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua*, IV, 297.

⁶ For a cursory analysis of this evidence, I refer you to my own paper, 'Turkmens, bandits and Nomads: Problems and Perceptions', *Papers of the VIth Symposium of the Comité International des Études Pré-Ottomanes et Ottomanes*, Cambridge, July 1984 (To be published by Isis Press, Istanbul, 1986).

⁷ E.g. Cinnamus, I. 60; Nicetas Choniates, 162; 550; Pachymeres, I. 26; II. 402; IV. 16.

⁸ *Peri Scythion* 728-29 in T. Kiessling's edition (Leipzig 1821). All translations from Metochites are my own.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ II. 58-59. Translation by C.M. Brand, *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by John Kinnamos* (New York, 1976), 52.

posed on the peoples they came into contact with. Livy, for example, could describe guerilla or irregular warfare only in terms of banditry (*latrocinium*)¹¹. An incident from one campaign is pertinent to our study. A military tribune was condemned by the consul for disobeying orders even though by doing so he won the battle for the Romans. The consul defended his actions by saying that if such activity goes unpunished "*latrocinii modo caeca et fortuita pro sollemni et sacrata militia sit*"¹². This distinction between legitimate warfare and irregular (and therefore illegitimate) warfare was further promulgated by Ulpian and Pomponius and adopted in Justinian's Digest "*Hostes sunt, quibus bellum publice Populus Romanus decrevit, vel ipsi Populo Romano, ceteri latrunculi vel praedones appellantur*"¹³.

Metochites' attempts to analyse the economic basis of nomadism should neither be dismissed nor overestimated¹⁴. Metochites has used (and even plagiarized) classical sources from Herodotus to Priscus in his description¹⁵ which seems to represent the consensus of Byzantine opinion on nomads¹⁶. Yet his assessment of their mode of production based on this pre-processed data is worth quoting. For him, nomads "live a communal way of life according to nature, but, as I said, it appears a bestial one and they themselves appear to lack experience of all kinds of human activity and literature, nor do they live in cities, as nearly all other men do, nor do they make their lives more secure by fortifying fortresses of any kind whatsoever, nor do they have houses to contain them, nor do they know the skill of crafts, nor of commerce, nor do they take pains over agriculture or gardening ... but they live by chance, casually, and they do not obtain their means of life by settling down and hard preparation"¹⁷. 'Feckless', 'idle' and 'without forethought' are terms employed of nomads throughout

11 E.g. II. 48.5; VI. 31.6.

12 VIII. 34. 11.

13 *Digest*, 49. 15. 24; cf. 50. 16. 118.

14 For dismissal cf. Sp. Vryonis Jr., "Byzantine attitudes to Islam during the Late Middle Ages", *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 12 (1971), 284.

15 For an examination of this question, I refer to my essay cited in note 6.

16 Cf. Pachymeres V. 4 on the Mongols.

17 730.

the Peri Scythion. Such a picture of nomadic *inertia* is typical of agrarian societies looking at opposed systems of existence: the skills needed for the nomadic way of life are not of interest and so are not observed. In fact, nomadism can be seen as a deviant mode of life: "nomads regularly make a defiant parade of all those attributes which they know are most calculated to annoy their sedentarist neighbours". My source for that last quotation is neither Herodotus nor Theodore Metochites, but I.M. Lewis, whose *Nomadism: an Anthropological View* was published by the F.A.O. in 1971¹⁸. He goes on to claim that "the nomad's capricious movements severely curtail his commitment to the state, which is, by definition, sedentary and of fixed geographic location".

According to this well-established train of thought, nomads are perverse, flaunting their difference from the normative sedentarist populations, moving about at their whim to baffle state officials who are trying their best to make sense out of nomadic chaos.

Perhaps this view needs no further burying¹⁹, but I trust I may labour the point for a moment. The sedentarist orientation of Lewis' first statement is compounded by his unawareness of the constraints on a nomad's life revealed by his second point. Again this epitomizes the sedentarist stereotype of nomadic communities. Much recent anthropological work with nomadic societies has elucidated to a certain extent the socio-economic basis of nomadic life: the need to move to locate and exploit (but not over-exploit)

18 Quoted by Abbas Mohammed, "The Nomadic and the Sedentary: Polar Complimentaries — not Polar Opposites" in Cynthia Nelson (ed.) *The Desert and the Sown* (Berkeley, 1978).

19 For an extreme rebuttal, perhaps too extreme in its stress on the complementary nature of nomad and sedentarist modes of production, see the article by Abbas Mohammed referred to in note 18. While Mohammed is right to show the possibilities for a complementary relationship between nomadic and pastoralist societies, I am unconvinced that it is a universal feature of such contacts and that "mutual hostility between nomads and their sedentary neighbours becomes a myth" (op. cit., 111). The nomad / sedentarist collaboration at Sufi Village in the Sudan was fostered by the cultivation of the cotton crop, and the use of nomads as seasonal labour at harvest time. The extra labour intensity of this process fosters closer links than, say, harvest of cereal crops may have done.

pasture, the need to balance age- and sex-composition of herds, the need to prepare for and prevent natural disasters from decimating the herd; all these and many other factors make the nomad's life as difficult as that of the sedentarist²⁰.

We must not despise nomads as idle, but they may still be fundamentally opposed to the sedentarist in terms of mode of production. Such a view sees nomads and sedentarists as polar opposites: sedentarists have wealth in land, nomads in cattle, sedentarists by definition remain sedentary, nomads derive their means of life from movement. All this is true, yet it is an oversimplification.

Firstly, there is the 'non-autarky' of nomads²¹. Despite much early ethnography to the contrary, it now seems as though no society has ever been nourished by animal products alone. Nomadic societies must either have a portion that spends at least part of its time in farming, or enter into some relationship with neighbouring sedentarists. Naturally the latter aspect will figure prominently in this paper.

Secondly, there is the factor that nomad / sedentary is not an opposition, but a spectrum, along which lie many intervening categories²² of which, for our purposes, the most important is that of the semi-nomad, or transhumant²³. This category is in itself divisible into many sub-categories²⁴, but it is perhaps best to define it as comprising pastoralists who migrate between fixed summer and/or winter pastures. In Anatolia this usually implies mountain summer pasture (*yayla*) and lowland winter pasture (*kişla*). Segments of such communities may indulge in arable farming²⁵. Semi-nomadism has been seen as a step towards

²⁰ Cf. for example, G. Dahl and A. Hjort, *Having Herds* (Stockholm 1976); A.M. Khazanov *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge 1984).

²¹ For this term see A.M. Khazanov, op. cit., 3ff.

²² Ibid, ch. 1.

²³ X. de Planhol, *De la plaine pamphylienne aux lacs pisidiens* (Paris, 1958), 207-21, for an explanation of this term.

²⁴ Unlike R.P. Lindner *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia* (Bloomington 1983), I do not believe that this invalidates the use of this term.

²⁵ For a detailed analysis of such activities in Southern Turkey, I refer to X. de Planhol op. cit., n. 23.

sedentarization. This need not be the case; semi-nomadism is a stable lifestyle of its own and one which could even be a transitional stage from sedentarism to nomadism. The possibilities of semi-nomadism will also appear in this analysis of nomad-sedentarist relations in Anatolia.

It is well known that after the battle of Mantzikert in 1071 Asia Minor was opened up to the incursions of Türkmen nomads and that the impact of the Mongols on the Seljuk state in the late 13th and early 14th centuries led to a further influx of nomads into Asia Minor²⁶. It is impossible to obtain accurate figures for the numbers of the Türkmens, yet it is clear from numbers quoted in the sources that contemporaries were astonished at the magnitude of the numbers involved: 100,000 in the regions of the Upper Maeander at the time of Barbarossa's March, 200,000 in the thirteenth century near Laodiceia²⁷.

Influxes of this kind of order of magnitude had an instant destructive and disorganizing effect. To deal with the latter first, the Byzantine peasantry dispersed to caves, mountain tops or cities, leaving the land to the incursing nomads²⁸. In terms of the geography of Hellenic Asia Minor, this meant the abandonment of areas beyond the immediate *chōra* of the cities. This land would have been 'marginal' land: 'marginal' in the sense that it would support equally well either a pastoral or agrarian economy. As Lattimore points out, the mode of utilization of such marginal land depends upon the nature of the dominant regional power²⁹: here in Asia Minor the power-balance by sheer weight of numbers shifted significantly in favour of the pastoralist.

²⁶ For a survey of these events see C. Cahen *Pre-Ottoman Turkey* (London 1968).

²⁷ For the figures, I am indebted to Sp. Vryonis Jr. "Nomadization and Islamization in Asia Minor", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 29 (1975), 50. One must stress, however, that these are perceptions of number held by a threatened society, not accurate statistical records. I am very grateful to Klaus Belke for pointing out to me the unreliability of these figures.

²⁸ Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, III. 229; Nicetas Choniates, 194-95; Theodore Scutariotes, 268.

²⁹ O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (London, New York 1940), 162.

The destructive effects of the nomadic incursions are most obvious in the records of the sacking of cities. This evidence has been conveniently tabulated by Sp. Vryonis³⁰. This destruction of administrative centres was in many cases only temporary, as many of these cities revived under the Seljuks of Rum and their successor emirates. These states, basing themselves on Persian administrative practice, set up agrarian based economies centred upon the cities. The Great Seljuks had distanced themselves from the Türkmén: "The Saldjūqs announced 'we are Türkmén, we are your brothers, but they were of no benefit either to the *il* or the people'"³¹ claimed the nomads, while an Arab outsider, Al-Idrisi, wrote: "Their princes are bellicose, far-sighted, firm and just, and are distinguished by superb qualities: the people are wild, coarse and ignorant"³².

The Türkmén were gradually moved to the border country, the *uc*. In this area they moved among the Byzantine inhabitants they had displaced earlier. It is to the dislocated Byzantine population that I now wish to turn.

'Dislocation' is a blanket term. Even in a period of such upheavals, a sizeable proportion of peasants, benefitting from inaccessibility, proximity to cities, or sheer good luck, would remain relatively undisturbed for considerable periods. Others, as has been seen, took to the mountains. Here they would be forced by environmental conditions to become semi-nomads.

Lattimore's observation that "a complex of techniques, like that necessary to pastoral nomadism, cannot either be evolved locally or acquired by borrowing until the society supposed to be affected has already arrived at a level that permits it to take advantage of the new techniques and 'convert' itself"³³. It is vital to our understanding of the complex of processes involved under the umbrella term 'nomadization' to examine briefly the traditions of

³⁰ Sp. Vryonis Jr., *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor* (Berkeley, 1971), 166-67.

³¹ Abu-l-Gazi, *The Pedigree of the Turkmen*, quoted in A.M. Khazanov, op. cit., 267.

³² Quoted in Khazanov, op. cit., 266.

³³ O. Lattimore, op. cit. 162.

pastoralism in the Byzantine economy.

There had always been transhumant pastoralism in Anatolia. Herodotus³⁴ records that when the Persians reached Xanthos in the sixth century B.C. many of the men were away: presumably in the mountains with the sheep³⁵. We have already seen how in Roman times the slave-shepherds, separated from the polis-based communities, made their presence felt by the illegal pasturing of animals. The sheer amount of sheep and goats we hear of on the Anatolian plateau in the Roman period³⁶ suggests the continuing importance of stock-raising. Despite this, the *Geoponica* would seem to suggest that Byzantine farming was almost entirely agrarian. Of the two books devoted to stock-raising, Book 17 deals with cattle (a form of livestock with which it is almost impossible to migrate) and only Book 18 deals with sheep and goats³⁷. The writer (Florentinus) assumes that even these animals were kept indoors in winter. Perhaps Florentinus is describing an ideal situation, certainly he is expressing a sedentarist ideology, for it seems highly unlikely that such a practice was at all widespread in Anatolia. Environmental constraints such as the rainfall pattern and the scarceness of winter fodder would preclude such a practice, which would have been extremely wasteful of labour if attempted³⁸. Given the large number of references to sheep and goat products³⁹, and the continuity of the tradition in areas like the Upper Meander Valley, it seems likely that such large quantities of livestock were kept throughout our period and would have to be raised by a system of transhumance.

Byzantine herd-husbandmen and transhumants would have increased in number within the borderland as more and more land

³⁴ I. 176. 3.

³⁵ A situation which still prevails in Anatolia: often only the headman and some women remain in residence.

³⁶ E.g. Strabo XII. 6. 1 (= 568 C).

³⁷ It is interesting to note how the Byzantine sources' neglect of stock-raising has coloured modern approaches, P. Lemerle's *Agrarian History of Byzantium* (Galway, 1979) has no reference whatsoever to any form of animal husbandry.

³⁸ A.M. Khazanov op. cit., ch. 1.

³⁹ E.g. Pliny NH XXIX. 33; VIII. 190; 201; Columella Praef. 26; Martial XIV. 140.

was made available for pastoralism. In the early disruptive phases of this movement even city territories could have been turned over to pasture. Cinnamus' description of the site of Dorylaeum (well on the way to becoming Eskişehir) occupied by 2,000 Türkmen nomads is indicative of this phase⁴⁰.

We must now consider the relationship between nomads, semi-nomads and sedentarists within the zone of the *uc*: in fact the interface between nomads and sedentarists. To the west lay the lands of Romania, to the east those of the Seljuk sultanate of Rum, both agrarian economies.

First of all, the fragility of the nomadic economy must be stressed. Nomadic groups in time of war can be ruined by the destruction or seizure of their flocks. Time and again we hear of Byzantine armies 'driving off' their loot, implying that the loot consists almost entirely of animals⁴¹ and Cinnamus proclaims as a rule that it is through this form of plunder that the Turks can be most damaged⁴².

All this implies that the Turks were entirely dependent upon animal products. This seems not to have been the case. There is reference in the Book of Dede Korkut to the consumption of *yufka* and bread among the Oğuz⁴³ and Professor Faruk Sümer has even suggested that the Turks who entered Anatolia were partly farmers "onların önemli bir bölümü tam göçebe, bir bölümü yarı göçebe, bir bölümü de şehir ve köylerde oturak hayatı yaşıyordu"⁴⁴. Although we need not go so far as that, we can admit that a certain amount of vegetable and crop production in *yaylas* must have taken place.

Such production could have been supplemented by further agricultural produce obtained from the Byzantines. Nomadic societies can obtain goods by raiding or by some form of peaceable relationship, such as trade or as payment for services

⁴⁰ VII. 2 (295); cf. Nicetas Choniates, 228.

⁴¹ E.g. Cinnamus I. 9; IV. 22.

⁴² IV. 23.

⁴³ X. de Planhol "La signification géographique du Livre de Dede Korkut" *Journal Asiatique* 254 (1966), 229.

⁴⁴ F. Sümer, "Anadolu'ya yalnız göçebe Türkler mi geldi?", *Belleten* 24 (1960), 374.

rendered⁴⁵. During the period of initial contact, it seems likely that raiding was the major means of obtaining supplementary items, but as the peoples remained together in the same area such practices must have decreased in frequency: sedentarists could rustle nomadic flocks. A system of collaboration must ultimately have developed. Pachymeres characterises this frontier zone as one of people "ready to defect"⁴⁶. Indeed the inhabitants of the Lake Beyşehir area in the twelfth century would not allow a Byzantine army access "for by long time and usage they were united in their views with the Turks"⁴⁷. Nicetas Choniates' account is rather more explicit "τοῖς Ἰκονιεύσι Τούρκοις ἐπιμιγνύμενοι, οὐ μόνον τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν ἐντεῦθεν ἐκράτυναν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασιν αὐτῶν ἐν πλείοσι προσεσχίκασιν"⁴⁸. He goes on to suggest that it was the Romans whom they looked upon as enemies. John Comnenus was forced to treat them as enemies and captured their settlements, albeit with heavy losses.

The *uc* zone gained a character of its own, separate from that of the settled states between which it formed a marginal zone. Within this zone we can see Byzantines and Turks sharing common interests: they had to do so if they wished to have a better standard of life than one of mere subsistence.

We must now consider the role of the élites: on the Byzantine side, the large landowners; on the Turkish side, the leaders of the nomadic groups. Professor Bryer has elucidated some connections between the Byzantine and Turkish élites over the period covered by our symposium. He has shown how families such as the Gabrades⁴⁹ and the family of Axouch⁵⁰ work together. Such links

⁴⁵ For a model of such relationships I refer to A.M. Khazanov op. cit., 36. For a detailed analysis of one payment for labour relationship cf. Abbas Mohammed, art. cit., n. 18.

⁴⁶ I. 4.

⁴⁷ Cinnamus I. 10. Translated by C.M. Brand op. cit. n. 10, 26.

⁴⁸ P. 50, ed. Bekker.

⁴⁹ A.A.M. Bryer: "The Gabrades" *University of Birmingham Historical Journal* XII. (1970), 164-87; A.A.M. Bryer "A Byzantine Family: The Gabrades" *Byzantinoslavica*, 36 (1975), 38-45.

⁵⁰ Cinnamus I. 2.

are of fundamental importance, not only as evidence for the increasing intermixture of populations and the creation of a new, Anatolian, élite, but also for the nomad/sedentarist relationship.

When two different groups come into contact, the conditions for social and commercial intercourse are lacking: how to communicate, how to bargain, how to settle differences. It is in such a situation that the function of élite becomes important. "In many societies, the moment transactions cross ethnic boundaries, the élite's role as middlemen becomes indispensable"⁵¹. This role benefits not only the two groups involved, but also the élite middlemen: "the élites of the different groups in such an interaction are playing a game, one of the rules of which is to keep some information from the masses"⁵², their own status is enhanced by their role as middlemen between the two communities, and the 'mystery' of their communication with their peers in the other society is to be kept to themselves, not lost by divulging the techniques involved.

In nomadic groups, such élites are often either sedentary or semi-nomadic, rarely are they themselves committed to a pastoral economy. Consequently they participate to some extent within the sedentarist system and must have some relations with it. As Khazanov points out⁵³ Barth's formulation: "States have a nomad policy, whereas nomads, since the days of the Mongols, can hardly be said to have an 'agrarian policy'" cannot be true. Let us examine the role of one nomad élite for which we do have relatively full sources concerning its relations with its own group and neighbouring sedentarists.

My example will be the relations between Osman and the peoples of Bithynia. Osman is quickly distanced by Neşri from the nomadic Turks (*göçer evli etrak*), yet their mutual dependence is shown in the following incidents. On the death of Ertuğrul it is clearly the nomadic Turks who have the say in the choice of

⁵¹ Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed in Cynthia Nelson (ed.), *The Desert and the Sown* (Berkeley, 1973), 76.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Op. cit., 261.

Ertuğrul's successor: "Some of the nomads wanted to make Ertuğrul's brother (and Osman's uncle) Tundar *beğ*, others Osman"⁵⁴. Osman was clearly the *beğ* of an essentially nomadic people and under Ertuğrul he and his brothers became *hakim* over the nomadic Turks⁵⁵.

His ability to 'arrange things' for his nomadic followers is shown by the anecdote of how he enables his people to pass to summer pastures despite the opposition of the Master of Ine-Göl. It is in his capacity as top-man of the group that he negotiates with the Master of Bilecik for the safe custody of the Turks' *impedimenta* which enabled them to fight off an ambush led by the Master of Ine-Göl.

Neşri gives an explanation of Osman's relations with the Master of Bilecik: "there had been a constant friendship between Osman himself and his (Osman's) father Ertuğrul and the Master of Bilecik"⁵⁶. The élite of the countryside and of the nomads had a mutually beneficial relationship of long-standing. All sides benefited: Osman's people kept their belongings safe, Osman gained in power and the Master of Bilecik was rewarded with a supply of animal products.

Clearly Osman had a 'nomad policy'. That he also had an 'agrarian policy' is demonstrated by his patronage of his own 'infidels' and his creation of a Sunday market in Bilecik for them. The story of the chastisement of a Germiyan Turk for stealing from an infidel is instructive here, as the produce of which the infidel was robbed, a pot, is essentially the product of someone engaged in sedentary activities⁵⁷.

By infiltrating and adapting local power-structures Osman managed to create a niche for himself and his followers within Bithynian society. To the state in Constantinople, Osman's actions were those of 'bandit gangs' (ληστροικῶν συμμορῶν)⁵⁸. The

⁵⁴ Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 31 (ed. Taeschner, Leipzig 1955) (= Cod. Menzel, 25).

⁵⁵ Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 28 (ed. Taeschner) (= Cod. Menzel, 24).

⁵⁶ Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 31 (ed. Taeschner) (= Cod. Menzel, 25).

⁵⁷ Neşri, cod. Manisa 1373, 34-35 (ed. Taeschner) (= Cod. Menzel, 27).

⁵⁸ Pachymeres, *Andronikos* I. 26; cf. IV. 16.

Byzantine infrastructures were being eroded within the *uc* where similarity of lifestyle made strange bedfellows. Köse Mihal, an 'outstanding infidel' was persuaded to join Osman and take part in his activities and advise his actions. The Byzantine masters and Turkish *uc-beğleri* found common cause.

Osman, then, was a patron of the racially mixed, sedentarist and nomad population of the *uc*. Also, as a local man of power, he entered into relationships with the Germiyan Oğulları and possibly the Seljuks of Rum. Perhaps we can see him as a power-broker, who mediates between different societies or levels of societies. In the words of Adams: "his actual control over either sphere depends upon his success in dealing with the other; his controls in one level of articulation provide a basis for his controls in another ... he controls one domain only by virtue of having access to derivative power from a larger domain"⁵⁹.

It is typical of nomad/sedentarist relations that such power is derived not merely from patronage but also from protection or intimidation. Osman's successes must have derived from his employment both of force and of a rough and ready justice applicable to *uc* conditions but understood poorly in Constantinople or Konya⁶⁰ and his relations with outside forces. Professor Lilie in his article within this volume has shown how the Artukhids arose from a similar cultural milieu in Trebizond. Perhaps the concepts outlined in this paper cast more light on the rise of the Turkish *beğliks*, such as that of Karaman who seems to have risen to prominence by leaving his migratory profession of charcoal-burner in the Taurus Mountains and, according to Ibn Bibi "played the bandit on the highway"⁶¹. The Northern Taurus around

⁵⁹ R. Adams, "Brokers and Career Mobility Systems in the Structure of Complex Societies", *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 26 (1970), 320-21.

⁶⁰ Cf. K. Wrightson "Two concepts of order: justices, constables and jurymen in seventeenth century England" in J. Brewer and J. Styles (ed.) *An Ungovernable People: the English and their law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (London 1980), for an introduction to this concept.

⁶¹ Cf. C. Cahen "Quelques textes négligés concernant les Turcomans de Rum au moment de l'invasion mongole" *Byzantion*, 14 (1939), 133-36; C. Cahen "Notes pour l'histoire des Turcomans d'Asie Mineure au XIIIème siècle" *Journal Asiatique*, (1951) 335-54; H.I. Uzunçarşılı *Anadolu Beylikleri* (1984).

Laranda (Karaman) was in 1256 the *uc* between the Seljuks of Rum and the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia. The local man of power was put in a strong position vis-a-vis the Seljuk Sultan in his campaigns in Armenia.

We have come a long way from Mehmed II before Constantino-ple, but I hope that as we have wandered through the sheep-tracks of Anatolia we have been the elasticity inherent in the nomad/sedentarist interface, and laid bare some of the threads that created the complex braid of the *uc*, where, in Paul Wittek's words "La Turquie se turquise"⁶².

⁶² P. Wittek "Le rôle des tribus turques dans l'Empire ottoman", *Mélanges Georges Smets*, (Bruxelles 1952), 676.

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III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 2

THE FRANKISH ARCHIPELAGO

BEN SLOT / DEN HAAG

The history of the Frankish Archipelago, the set of small principalities established on the Cyclades after the Fourth Crusade, is most complicated. To try telling it as a simple short account is courting failure. Not one modern historian has tried to give something of a general account of it. There exist a few studies on some details. Jacoby's book on the laws of Frankish Greece treats the problem of their application in the real situation on the islands¹. My own book on the period of establishment of Ottoman power contains as an introduction some kind of snapshot of the islands under Frankish rule just before the Ottoman conquest². It would not be wise to write a general history of Frankish rule in the Archipelago supported by the scanty sources available just now: as long as the notarial archives of Venetian Crete have not been sifted for incidental documents on the islands, any short excursion by a researcher to Venice may make such a general study hopelessly obsolete. Still, a contribution could be made by introducing a new kind of source and to try to use it in treating the demographic and social aspect of the history of Frankish rule over the islands.

In Istanbul there is in the Başbakanlık Arşivi a tax register, a *tapu defteri*, which may be considered as a kind of domesday book for the six islands which made up the territory of the Duchy of Naxos and the Signorie of Paros and Andros. It gives the full name of each inhabitant of each village with the number of vine-

¹ D. Jacoby, *La féodalité en Grèce médiévale: les Assises de Romanie, sources, application et diffusion* (Paris, 1971) = *Documents et Recherches sur l'économie des pays Byzantins, Islamiques et Slaves et leurs relations historiques au Moyen Age*, X, 271-94.

² B.J. Slot, *Archipelagus turbatus, les Cyclades entre colonisation latine et occupation ottomane c. 1500-1718*, (Leiden-Istanbul, 1982) = *Uitgaven van het Nederlands Historisch Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul*, LI, 35-72.

III. SOCIETIES AND ECONOMIES : 5

BYZANTINE AND OTTOMAN THESSALONIKI

VAS. DIMITRIADES / RETHYMNON

Any student of the history of the Ottoman Empire or the Islamic people generally, is well aware of the Islamic conception of the world divided into two parts, the *darülislam* and the *darülharb* that is the Domain of Islam and the Domain of War. He knows also that the purpose of the Ottoman Empire was to expand the *darülislam* to the charge of the *darülharb*. The question arises how far a country or a town belonging to the *darülharb* could be changed into a real *darülislam* after its occupation by the victorious Ottoman troops?

Let us consider Thessaloniki. This city, this year (1985) celebrates its 2,300th anniversary since it was built by King Cassander of Macedonia in 316 B.C. and was given by him its name in honour of his wife Thessaloniki, sister of Alexander the Great.

The town became eminent soon after its creation and much coveted by all the ensuing states in the Balkans. It became one of the most important Roman towns in the East and the main Byzantine stronghold in the Balkans after Constantinople. Its strong fortifications held back the Slavic invasions during the sixth and seventh centuries, and the Bulgars in the tenth century but the town succumbed to the Saracens in 904 and the Normans in 1185, who sacked it and destroyed its buildings. In 1204 it became for twenty years part of the Frankish kingdom of Baldwin when the Fourth Crusade resulted in the dissolution of the Byzantine Empire. In the following two centuries it was again a Byzantine town, playing an important role at the dynastic struggles of the last emperors. Social strife taking the appearance of inter-ecclesiastical disputes between the Zealots and the Hesychasts in the middle of the fourteenth century, and the impending danger of the Ottoman Turks during the last decades of the same century caused a large part of the inhabitants to abandon the town and seek refuge in safer places.

For the first time Turkish troops appeared under the city walls in 1372. They were certainly raiders, followers of the great marchlord (*uc beği*) Ğazi Evrenos Bey. It is most probable that the four years' siege which resulted in the first surrender of the town to Hayreddin Paşa in 1387, was undertaken by Ğazi Evrenos Bey's troops, having as their base the newly founded town of Yenice-i Vardar.

The town's people, abandoned by their Byzantine princes, came into terms with Hayreddin Paşa. The first Turkish occupation was rather mild; the "ὀρισμός", the act by which the inhabitants kept certain privileges has been lost; however, it should be similar to the act by which the town of Yanena (Ioannina) in Epirus surrendered to Sinan Paşa in 1430

This mild occupation did not last for long; In 1391, according to the Byzantine historian Ducas, Sultan Bayezid I "εἶλε καὶ Θεσσαλονίκην καὶ τα μετὰ τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην χωρία" (he took over both Thessaloniki and the villages beyond Thessaloniki). It is not certain what exactly happened; does this "εἶλε" mean that Thessaloniki in the years between 1387 and 1391 had been able to get rid of the Turkish garrison, and the town was retaken by the Turks for a second time, or Sultan Bayezid I, applying his policy of consolidating the Ottoman state repealed the privileges given to the town by his father's general and introduced to Thessaloniki and its area the *timar*-system? I am rather inclined to believe that the second case happened. There is no indication that the town's population or the Byzantine army were strong enough to throw the Turks off the walls. Moreover a second siege and the ensuing pillage would be events of great significance, same way or other mentioned by both Turkish and Byzantine sources, just as it happens with the following capture of the town in 1430, but apart from this small passage by Ducas, nobody else refers to it. Anyway, in the homilies of Isidoros, the contemporary archbishop of Thessaloniki, there are several indications that churches and monasteries in the the town were confiscated by the Turks, new taxes were imposed among which "παιδομάζωμα", the recruiting of boys for the jannisaries' corps was the heaviest.

Following the battle of Ankara in 1402 Emperor Manuel II, persuaded next year Süleyman Çelebi, one of Bayezid's sons who was in charge of the Ottoman possessions in Europe, to give him back

Thessaloniki and some adjacent places, as well as a few islands in the Aegean sea. During the internal wars for the succession to the throne between Bayezid's sons, the town suffered greatly. Twice, in 1412 and 1416, it was besieged; and it started paying a heavy tribute in 1417. The Evrenos family raided incessantly the country; the town people could not go out of the town. Famine and insecurity obliged most of the people to abandon the town; only 20 to 25 thousands remained in it. Realising his inability to hold the town Andronicus, the Byzantine governor, left it to the Venetians in September 1423. The Venetians' harsh attitude towards the Orthodox Christian population, and their meagre measures against the imminent Turkish danger led more inhabitants to take refuge somewhere else. The town became more and more deserted.

The end came on 29 March 1430. After a short siege of only three days, the Turkish troops led by Sultan Murad II himself and Sinan Paşa, *beylerbeyi* of Rumeli, took the town over; for two days the Turks sacked the town, enslaving or killing the remaining inhabitants. On the third day the Sultan entered and prayed in the Acheiropoietos church, converting it into a mosque.

The town Murad II conquered was in fact an empty shell, a heap of ruins, but full of a tradition of more than seventeen centuries. The few inhabitants who survived the carnage, and those who were given their freedom bought back either by the Sultan himself or George Branković, the *Despot* of Serbia, together with those who came back trusting the promises of the Sultan, were no more than ten hundreds. Murad tried to revive the city, giving the best of the empty houses, the abandoned monasteries and the unused churches to his personnel. He also forced a thousand Turks to move from Yenice and settle down in Thessaloniki. He repaired the walls and the towers of the town which were falling into ruins, and he built a new bath, which still exists in the centre of the town. The Islamisation of the town had begun. How far did it proceed?

According to the Islamic pattern, a town's religious and political centre was the Friday mosque; next to it the *saray*, the principal government building, should be erected and nearby the hamam, the public baths, and the *suk* or *çarşı*, the market of the town, with the *bezesten*, a strong-roofed building with iron doors for storing in the

most valuable merchandise, like silk and velvet fabrics and golden objects.

Could this ideal town pattern be applied on Thessaloniki? The Byzantine town of Thessaloniki, based on the Roman campus, was completely different. The central mosque, the *Cuma camii*, was the church of Acheiropoietos at least until 1524, when Aya Sofia was also converted to a mosque and became the official mosque of the town. Both were far from the town market, the first among Christians and the second among Jews.

A glimpse at the situation prevailing in the town during the first years after the conquest we catch through the narrative of John Anagnostes, who was also a witness to the the siege. He describes also the desolation and the capture of the churches and the monasteries. He refers to the settlement of Turks from Yenice-i Vardar and he says that Turks and Greeks were living " *αναμίξ*" i.e. mixed up, haphazardly in the same quarters. Which were those quarters and where were they?

The answer to those questions is given by a *tahrir defteri*, a survey of the town's population for financial purposes, which took place in 1478. This valuable document was the subject of a recent article by Dr. Heath Lowry. In this *defter* the Turkish settlers were written down in *cemaats*, i.e. in groups. Each of them had as its centre a *mescid*, i.e. a mosque without a minaret, but, and this is important, those *mescids* were located in quarters having still their Byzantine names.

Until recently, these names were known through Greek documents, but we were not certain about their location, and there was a lot of confusion and speculation among scholars. While I was preparing "*The Topography of Thessaloniki during the Ottoman times*", I had already investigated where every mosque in Thessaloniki was put. It was easy now to relocate with enough certainty the Byzantine quarters and draw some more conclusions about the place where some churches, monasteries and gates were.

According to that data it was found that the district of St. Menas extended from the harbour as far as the Gate of Vardar, the west end of Egnatia Street; the Chrysi (Golden) district was located still northwards, where the western gate of St. Demetrius Street was; therefore that gate should be the Golden Gate mentioned by the

Byzantine documents, and not the western gate of Egnatia Street; The *Litea* or *Liti* gate, located until now at the west end of St.Demetrius Street, was very probably the small gate of the north walls, which led to an open place for prayers. The *Omphalos* district, located until now southwards of St.Demetrius Church, where the Roman Forum was, is clearly the area between the *Chrysi* district and the Government House of today. Using archaeological evidence Prof. G.Bakalakis in an article sets that district at the same place. The St.Demetrius district was around the church of the same name. The *Katafigi* district was around and westwards of the *Panaghia Chalkeon* Church. The *Acheiropoietos* district was near the church of the same name. The *Aghia Pelagia* district was correctly located by Dr. Lowry to the east of the harbour and near the sea-walls as far as the present metropolitan church of St.Gregory Palamas. The *Asomaton* district was in the northeastern area of the town, around the *Vlatadon* Monastery. Therefore we must reconsider the opinion accepted until now that the *Rotonda* was the *Asomaton* Church. In the *Hippodrome* district, which as we know was in the south-eastern area of the town, there was a mosque named *Metropole*; that means that the last Byzantine cathedral had been transformed into a mosque before 1478; that church could not be *Aghia Sophia* or the *Rotonda*, since both became mosques later. The *Metropolis* mosque is identified with the large octagonal building belonging to the *Roman Palace*, whose ruins were excavated several years ago. Later on its Turkish name was *Akçe Mescid* and a populous Turkish district existed around it until this century. The *Octagon* was destroyed some time during the *Ottoman* period and a new small mosque bearing the same name was erected over its ruins. The cathedral was probably the church of *Panaghia Odighitria*. A Greek Hospital nearby, probably the previous *Metropolitan* seat, was in use until 1823.

Another district, inhabited solely by Turks, under the name of *Aya Sayakia* or *Aya Sinada*, was near the eastern part of St.Demetrius Street. The mosque of *Koca Kasim Paşa* in that district was probably the *St.Isaac* Monastery. Finally the small district of *Yani Mavrou Kali*, being completely inhabited by Greeks, and therefore without a mosque, has not been identified.

We do not have enough time to stay longer on this interesting

subject. Let us mention only that in nine Byzantine quarters there lived 27 Turkish *cemaats* of 20 to 30 families each, and one more with Turkish only residents but in a Byzantine named quarter. In each of these nine quarters there lived about one hundred Greek families; in addition there was a small, completely Greek quarter, the only one with a person's name. We can assume that most of those mosques were previously churches; it would be most improbable to build so many mosques in such a short time, while there were a lot of empty churches in the town. In all there were 862 Turkish families, about 4,000 persons, apart from the administration and the garrison, and 1275 Greek families, about 6,000 persons.

Jews are not mentioned in this survey. Dr. Lowry suggests that the few Jewish families left in the town after the past adventurous years had been forced by Mehmed II to emigrate to Constantinople after its conquest. He may be right because we find only two *cemaats* of Jews who had come from Germany and Spain in the meantime, mentioned in another survey, which I think was written down sometimes about 1525. The Jews, refugees from Germany and mainly from Spain, who find asylum in Thessaloniki and Istanbul, come in continuous waves since 1492 and change drastically the composition of the population. Jews form more than half of the total number of the inhabitants.

In this second *tahrir defteri* there are ten Greek quarters, with 1678 families, but still under the same names; on the other hand the Turkish quarters are mentioned by their names, no longer belonging to Byzantine ones. Now there are 38 of them with 1650 families. The number of the Jews can not be estimated, because from the Turkish *defter* the pages with most of their names are lacking.

During the years between 1478 and 1525, in spite of this new development in the town, the Turks did not cease turkicising it. A few mosques were built, a caravansaray appeared in the middle of the town, just where a Byzantine building was until then, and close to it a *bezesten*, still existing, was erected. But the most striking element was the islamisation of the most important Byzantine churches, left until then in Christian hands. In 1492 the most sacred church in town, that of St. Demetrius, was turned into a mosque by Kasim Paşa; in 1500 the beautiful church of St. Panteleimon, still existing, was turned into a mosque by *kadi* Ishak Çelebi. In 1510 Yakub Paşa converted to a

mosque the church of Santa Aikaterini. Between 1520-1525 Cezerî Kasım Paşa seized a monastery, whose Katholikon is known today as Agioi Apostoloi, and turned it into another mosque. In 1524 the important church of Aghia Sophia became a mosque by Makbul İbrahim Paşa, the Grand Vizier of Süleyman the Magnificent. Later on, in 1590, Sinan Paşa took over the Roman building of the Rotonda, then a church dedicated to the Angels. Greeks were left with a few small churches, probably belonging to monasteries of Mount Athos, which were successful in obtaining certain privileges by the Turks and their properties in the town had been immune from confiscation. Those churches, low and without bell-towers, were hidden in yards surrounded by houses, so that they would not be in danger from passing Turks.

The map of the town during that time should not differ considerably from the earlier one. Turkish districts were scattered among Greek ones in the flat part of the town, which extends almost as far as today's St. Demetrius street, and was known as "Κόμπος", plain. The only change was the presence of more and more Jews; they began settling down first around the synagogue of Etj-a-Haim, in the Turkish *defters* etj-Haim; that was joined to the sea-side walls and close to a gate leading to the harbour, probably according to the Jews' tradition, and known as the synagogue of Romaniotes, those few Jews who spoke Greek and were living in Thessaloniki before it became Turkish. As Jews were coming continuously in, they were spreading towards the centre of the town, claiming more and more space, until they covered most of the area between Egnatia Street and the sea-walls. Only one later Jewish district was a little further, just at the south side of the ancient Agora. In the same place the *dönme*, the Jews converted to Islam in the middle of the 17th century, used to live, until they left for Turkey in 1923.

In spite of the great number of the Jews and the number of the Turks almost equal to the Greeks, the town still kept its Byzantine character to some extent. The district names, the churches still existing even used as mosques, the market-place, baths, administrative buildings, all had kept their Byzantine types. Still, the names of the Greek inhabitants preserved in the last Turkish survey, were to a great degree Byzantine ones; even more, the part of the *kanunnâme*, the tax-

regulation for the town which is preserved in the same Turkish *defter*, contains the Byzantine names of several taxes.

Another similar survey of the year 1568, TT 723 in the Başbakanlık Arşivi, sent to me recently (1985) by Dr. Michael Kiel, gives a few new names of Greek districts. These indicate that the Greeks have already begun to concentrate at the eastern part of the town, but they are still living in areas, where the church had become a mosque, like Ahiropit, Ayo Dimitri, Chrisi and Aya Sofia. Four of them, by the names Londarino, Aslan Mermeri, Aya Sofia and Kamara bear the indication *cedid*, i.e. new. We can assume that the population was moving from one place to another, forming new districts.

The Moslem districts have augmented to 32, still existing in every part of the town, but the tendency to concentrate more and more at the slopes existing to the northern part of it, known as *bayir*, slope, is obvious. New quarters appear at this part of the town, while the Turkish population in those which are central is diminishing and some of them mentioned in the previous *defters*, do not appear in this one. The Jews have now 26 synagogues, but they are still written down as *cemaat*, groups, not *mahalles*, quarters.

The image of the town must have changed drastically at the beginning of the 17th century. A terrible fire, the biggest enemy of the town, destroyed it almost completely in 1630. Twenty synagogues were then destroyed and a great number of Jews left the town and settled down elsewhere. It is very probable that many Greeks also went away. Several years elapsed before the town started being rebuilt. We do not possess for the time being enough material to know exactly what happened during the rest of the century. Anyway Turkish archives kept in Thessaloniki, and dated from the end of the 17th century, indicate that the town had more or less the shape we find until the last decades of the 19th century. The Turks live in the upper part of the town, the Greeks and the few Bulgars who have moved into the town live in the eastern part of it and a few scattered places, and the Jews keep the rest of it. There is also a Frankish quarter near by the market, where Europeans from every country live.

In spite of the 30 or 50 minarets, which gave to the traveller coming by sea the impression of a Turkish town, a better look revealed that Thessaloniki was rather a conglomeration of various ethnic elements,

each one of them keeping its peculiarities, its habits and its institutions. Each one was living in separate areas, mixing with the others as little as possible, even in the market place. During those last decades of the Turkish occupation, Thessaloniki was an important international trade-centre, a hearth of ethnic struggles, a focus for foreign interests and a starting point of rebellious movements. But under the Turkish *ferace* and the Jewish *cübbe*, the Byzantine town still existed, to be revealed after the Greek army took over the town in 1912, and to be irrevocably destroyed to some extent by the great fire of 1917.

IV. MONASTERIES, TEKES AND THEIR FATES : 1

THE FATE OF BYZANTINE MONASTIC PROPERTIES
UNDER THE OTTOMANS:

EXAMPLES FROM MOUNT ATHOS, LIMNOS & TRABZON

HEATH W. LOWRY / WASHINGTON, D.C.

To the Byzantinist the question of the fate of late-Byzantine monastic properties under the Ottoman Turks is one deserving far more serious study than it has hitherto received. While scholars have long been aware of the fact that various Ottoman Sultans extended tax-exemptions to the monastic communities of Mount Athos¹ and to those of the Matzouka (Maçuka) valley in Trabzon (Trebizond)², the

¹ In the past generation several articles dealing with the status of Mount Athos under the Ottomans have appeared. Arranged chronologically, they include: a) P. Lemerle and P. Wittek, "Recherches sur l'histoire et le status des monastères athonites sous la domination turque," *Archives d'Histoire du Droit Oriental*, 3 (1947), 411-72; b) Elizabeth Zachariadou, "Early Ottoman Documents of the Prodromos Monastery (Serres)," *SOforsch*, 28 (1969); 1-12, and c) "Ottoman Documents from the Archives of Dionysiou (Mount Athos) 1495-1520," *SOforsch*, 30 (1971), 1-36; d) Vančo Boškov, "Jedan originalan nišan Murata I iz 1386. godine u manastiru Svetog Pavla na Svetoj Gori," *Prilozi za Orijentalnu Filologiju*, 27 (1979), 225-46; e) "Ein Nišan des Prinzen Orhan, Sohn Süleyman Çelebis, aus dem Jahre 1412 im Athoskloster Sankt Paulus," *WZKM*, 71 (1979), 127-52; and, f) "Jedno originalno pismo-naredba (biti) Murata II za Svetu Goru," *Hilandarski Zbornik*, 4 (1978), 131-36; and, g) Heath W. Lowry, "A Note On the Population and Status of the Athonite Monasteries Under Ottoman Rule (ca. 1520)," *WZKM*, 73 (1981), 115-35 (hereafter: Lowry, *Monasteries*). On this last article, see the review by N. Beldiceanu, "A propos de deux registres ottomans de recensement des monastères du Mont Athos," *Byzantion*, 52 (1982), 496-99, in which he questions in particular the dating I had advanced for the registers utilized in this paper. For the continuing debate on this matter, see: "Polémique a propos d'un compte rendu paru dans Byzantion LII (1982), pp. 115-135," 55 (1985), *Byzantion*, 403-14.

² See Anthony Bryer, "Late Byzantine Rural Society In Matzouka," in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society*, eds. Anthony Bryer & Heath Lowry (Birmingham and Washington, D.C., 1986) (hereafter: Bryer & Lowry (eds.)),

nature of such exemptions has not as yet been adequately examined. In the present study, via a series of case studies based on the surviving Ottoman *tahrir defteri* from the island of Limnos, supplemented by examples from Chalkidiki and Trabzon, I shall attempt to fill in a few of the missing pieces of this puzzle.³

We will begin our examination with a brief introduction to the Ottoman *tahrir defteri*, the source upon which it is based. This particular tool of Ottoman administration was designed primarily to provide the bureaucracy with accounts of the tax-revenues of an area and their distribution to the fief-holders (timariots) who administered the territory for the state. These *tahrirs* were therefore first and foremost tax-registers.⁴ As such they could not be expected to include information on any type of property exempted from taxation. This limitation suggests *ipso facto* that the Ottoman *tahrir defteri* should be

Continuity), 51-95. For a study on Byzantine monastic holdings in Maçuka, based on the testimony of the extant *tahrir defteri*, see: Heath W. Lowry, "Privilege and Property in Ottoman Maçuka in the Opening Decades of the *Tourkokratia*: 1461-1553," in Bryer & Lowry (eds.), *Continuity*, 97-128; also, N. Beldiceanu, "Biens monastiques d'après un registre ottoman de Trébizonde (1487): Monastères de la Chrysoképhalos et du Pharos," *REB*, 35 (1977), 175-213 (hereafter: Beldiceanu, *Biens monastiques*).

³ The present paper derives from research conducted under the auspices of the joint Dumbarton Oaks-University of Birmingham project devoted to the study of continuity and change in late Byzantine and early Ottoman society. As such, its author bears a debt of gratitude to Professors Giles Constable (Director, Dumbarton Oaks) and Anthony Bryer (Director, Centre for Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham, England) for their unstinting efforts on behalf of this project. One of my collaborators on the project, Dr. John Haldon of the University of Birmingham, has most graciously assisted me in deciphering the texts of several Byzantine monastic documents cited in this study.

⁴ All too often the first generation of scholars utilizing these registers tended to endow this particular source with qualities which they were never intended to possess. Even the father of *defterology*, the late Ömer Lütfi Barkan (without whose work the foundations enabling this and similar studies would not have been laid), used phrases such as "systematic censuses," "uniformly executed," and "the data are genuine statistics", in stressing the value of the *tahrirs* as a demographic tool. See: Ö.L. Barkan, "Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Survey," in *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. Michael Cook (London, 1970), 167. For a detailed analysis of the limitations inherent in the *tahrirs*, due to their being tax-registers rather than cadastral surveys, see: Heath W. Lowry, *Trabzon Şehrinin İslamlaşma ve Türkleşmesi, 1461-1583* (Istanbul, 1981), 141-77 (hereafter: Lowry, *Trabzon*).

of limited value for the study of monastic properties, if indeed, such holdings were granted immunity from taxation by the Ottoman rulers.

However, as I have established in earlier studies on Mount Athos,⁵ and on the Aegean island of Limnos (Lemnos),⁶ the *tahrirs* covering these regions do in fact include references to monastic properties which were being taxed in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Clearly, whatever tax-exemptions were granted to the Athonite monasteries did not include their dependent houses (*metochia*) in either Chalkidiki or the island of Limnos. In other words, while the Athonite foundations enjoyed tax-exemptions covering their properties on the peninsula itself, their outlying holdings were not included in this status. To support this assertion we can cite two factors:

a) A note in a *tahrir* covering the Chalkidiki region setting forth in detail the nature of the partial exemptions enjoyed by the Athonite foundations in the first quarter of the sixteenth century. There we read:

The monks of the monasteries of the aforementioned island of Aynaroz pay the value of their capitation tax [*cizye*] and the tithe [*öşür*] on the produce of their grains and vegetable and fruit gardens by way of a fixed annual rate [*ber vech-i maktu*] of 25,000 *akçes*. After the above-mentioned monks have paid their aforementioned annual fixed sum, they hold royal exemptions from several earlier sultans stating that the agricultural produce, as well as that of the gardens and vineyards on the peninsula of Mount Athos [*aynaroz adası içinde olan...*] are exempt from the tithe [*öşür*] and from extraordinary levies [*avarız-i divaniye*]; and [due to the fact that] our present great ruler, may God glorify his victories, has confirmed these exemptions with a royal letter of exemption, and thereby confirmed the provisions of the earlier Cadastral Survey, these exemptions have been recorded in the present Imperial Cadastral

⁵ Lowry, *Monasteries*, 115-35.

⁶ See the article in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 235-59, entitled: "The Island of Limnos: A Case Study on the Continuity of Byzantine Forms Under Ottoman Rule," and also: Heath W. Lowry, "A Corpus of Extant *Kanunnames* for the Island of Limnos As Contained in the *Tapu-Tahrir Defter* Collection of the *Başbakanlık* Archives," *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, 1 (1980), 41-60 (hereafter: Lowry, *Kanunnames*).

Survey.⁷

For our purposes, the essence of this note is the distinction it makes between those properties actually located on the Athonite peninsula (which enjoyed the tax-exemptions it enumerates), and those outside the confines of the Holy Mountain, which were subjected to the *öşür* or tithe on their agricultural produce;

b) The appearance of taxable properties, identified as belonging to one or another Athonite monastery, in all of the *tahrir defteri* covering the Chalkidiki/Strymon region and the island of Limnos.⁸

Turning from Macedonia to eastern Anatolia we see that the treatment of monastic properties in Trabzon differed to some extent from that of the Athonite foundations. Trabzon in general, and the Matzouka valley in particular, was the site of a great number of late Byzantine monasteries. In Matzouka alone, three foundations in particular stand out: Vazelon, Soumela, and the Peristera.⁹ Not only were they major land-owners at the time of the Ottoman conquest in 1461, they are all known to have maintained the ownership of their properties into the opening decades of the twentieth century.¹⁰ Yet, unlike the Athonite holdings, the study of the extant Trabzon *tahrirs* does not reveal any properties belonging to these Matzoukan monasteries ever appearing in these registers among the lists of tax-revenue producing sources. These late fifteenth and early sixteenth century

⁷ This note is appended to a list of the Athonite monasteries which is found in *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 403 of ca. 1520 on p.1043. A facsimile and transcription of this document appeared in Lowry, *Monasteries*, 134-35

⁸ The following list of registers, all of which are housed in the Istanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives, in the *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* series contain such references: a) Chalkidiki: *TT* 70 of 1519, *TT* 403 of ca. 1520, *TT* 143 of 1527; and, b) Limnos: *TT* 25 of 1489, *TT* 75 of 1519, *TT* 434 of ca. 1525, *TT* 307 of 1557, *TT* 490 of 1567, *TT* 702 of ca. 1595, and *TT* 724 of 1614. For descriptions of these Limnos registers see footnotes 19-24 following.

⁹ See A.Bryer, "Late Byzantine Rural Society in Matzouka," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 87-90; and also A.Bryer, "The Estates of the Empire of Trebizond: Evidence for Their Resources, Products, Agriculture, Ownership and Location," *Archeion Pontou*, 35 (1979), 370-477, and A.Bryer, "The Late Byzantine Monastery in Town and Countryside," *Studies in Church History*, 16 (1979), 219-41.

¹⁰ See A.Bryer, "Late Byzantine Rural Society in Matzouka," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 51-95.

tahrirs, however, contain frequent references to former monastic properties which by order of the Ottoman sultan had been confiscated and turned into *timars* (fiefs).¹¹ As I have established elsewhere,¹² the opening decades of the *Tourkokratia* in Trabzon, saw many of the Trapezuntine monasteries losing their properties and becoming defunct. Those that remained, included the three Matzoukan foundations of Vazelon, Soumela, and the Peristera. Each of these, while losing properties in other regions of the Province of Trabzon, retained their holdings in the Matzouka valley, i.e., those in the neighborhood of the monasteries themselves. These local properties (the equivilant of the Athonite properties on the Holy Mountain itself), were granted tax-exemption by the Ottoman Sultans, and consequently do not appear in the tax-registers (*tahrir deferi*).

While at first glance the Athonite and Matzoukan experiences appear somewhat contradictory, they are in fact quite complementary. In both regions the monasteries were allowed to maintain, with partial or full tax-exemption, those of their holdings in physical proximity to the monasteries themselves. The differences stem from the fact that the Athonite monasteries were allowed to keep a portion of their out-lying *metochia* (although the exact amount is impossible to establish). However, unlike Chalkidiki and the island of Limnos, the Matzoukan monasteries would appear to have had most (if not all) of their out-lying properties confiscated. We must not forget though that the surviving *tahrirs* for Trabzon, *MM* 828 of 1486 and *TT* 52 of 1515, were compiled in the opening decades of Ottoman rule, whereas the only extant register to mention Mount Athos, *TT* 403 of ca.1520, was drawn up almost a full century after Chalkidiki's incorporation into the Ottoman polity.

The now missing fifteenth century *tahrirs* for Chalkidiki compiled during the first decades of Ottoman rule may have contained the same

¹¹ An overall survey of properties confiscated in the Trabzon district of Maçuka (Matzouka) is found in Heath W. Lowry's "Privilege and Property in Ottoman Maçuka in the Opening Decades of the *Tourkokratia*: 1461-1553," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 97-128. Beldiceanu, *Biens Monastiques*, provides an analysis of such properties confiscated from the monasteries of the Pharos and Chrysokephalos.

¹² See: "Privilege and Property in Ottoman Maçuka in the Opening Decades of the *Tourkokratia*: 1461-1553," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 97-128.

examples of 'confiscations' of monastic properties as we see in the Trabzon registers.

Turning from the general to the specific, let us focus on a *metochi* (dependent house) of the Athonite monastery of Pantokrator on the island of Limnos, and trace the change it underwent during the first 125 years of Ottoman rule, and from this analysis attempt to construct a profile of the changing status of monastic properties under the Ottomans.

The island of Limnos is a particularly fertile site for a study of this nature. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries nine Athonite monasteries each held one or more *metochia* on the island.¹³ In addition, the Monastery of Saint John the Theologian on Patmos also held properties on Limnos.¹⁴ From the surviving monastic documents it is possible to piece together a more or less comprehensive profile of these monastic properties on the island in the period preceding the Ottoman conquest in 1479. The picture which emerges is startling. The impression is clear that throughout the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the island's population was declining. Many properties taken over by the monasteries in this period were taken by what may only be termed default. The number of entries beginning: "The monks of the monastery of *x* requested that they be given the abandoned property of *y* on Lemnos," are numerous. As many of these requests were granted, the net result for the monasteries was a several-fold increase in their properties on the island—fields, vineyards, pastures and churches. The scholar who has detailed this process, John Haldon, estimates that by the mid-fifteenth century, the combined holdings of the monasteries on Limnos totaled up to twenty five percent of the island's territory.¹⁵

Noticeably absent from this drive for expansion was the *metochi* of the Athonite monastery of Pantokrator, whose modest holdings on Lemnos are recorded in two late fourteenth century documents. The

¹³ See the study by John Haldon entitled: "Limnos, Monastic Holdings and the Byzantine State, ca. 1261-1453," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 160-215.

¹⁴ F. Miklosich & J. Müller, *Acta et Diplomata Graeca medii Aevi*, 6 vols. (Vienna, 1860-1890), VI, no. cvii.

¹⁵ See the analysis presented by John Haldon in "Limnos, Monastic Holdings and the Byzantine State, ca. 1261-1453," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 160-215.

first, a chrysobull of 1393 issued by the emperor Manuel Palaiologos mentions a Pantokrator property on Limnos in the place known as Ano-Chorion,¹⁶ and the second, a *praktikon* (inventory of possessions) drawn up three years later in 1396, lists the monastery's possessions on Limnos as including: a) A *pyrgos* or fortified tower at Ano-Chorion near the village of Pesperagos; b) a sheep-fold(*mandra*) in the place known as Phakos; and, c) the fields known as Ano-Chorion at Pesperagos.¹⁷ While cognizant of the possibility that other documents (now lost) may have at one time existed certifying other Pantokrator holdings on Limnos, it is more likely the modest holdings outlined above were in fact the full extent of this monastery's properties on the island.

One other Athonite document referring to the Pantokrator *metochi* on Limnos has survived, and it is a relatively late (1500) letter concerning a dispute in which the monks of Pantokrator and Dionysiou were engaged over the ownership of the aforementioned *mandra* (sheep-run) at Phakos. This dispute was settled in favour of the *metochi* of Dionysiou, which accounts for its being preserved in the archives of this Athonite monastery.¹⁸

These documents make it possible to state with certainty that at least from the end of the fourteenth century (1393) through the fifteenth century (1500) the Athonite monastery of Pantokrator had a dependent house (*metochi*) on the island of Limnos. Were we to confine our examination to surviving Byzantine sources our knowledge concerning the Pantokrator *metochi* on Limnos would not continue beyond the year 1500.

However, aided by the fortuitous survival of a number of primary Ottoman sources for the island of Limnos from the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, it is possible to extend our examination. A series of six *mufassal tahrir defteri* (detailed tax-registers) for the island have survived, which allow us to trace the status of Pantokrator's holdings

¹⁶ Published by Franz Dölger in *Aus den Schatzkammern des Heiligen Berges* (Munich, 1948), document 12, pp. 49-52.

¹⁷ Published by Louis Petit, *Actes de l'Athos II.: Actes du Pantocrator*, (Amsterdam, 1964), document 10, pp.31-34 (hereafter: Petit, *Pantocrator*).

¹⁸ Published by Nicolas Oikonomidès, *Actes de Dionysiou*, (Paris, 1968), 187-89 (hereafter: Oikonomides, *Dionysiou*).

on Limnos throughout the first 125 years of the *Tourkokratia*. Dated respectively in the years 1489,¹⁹ 1519,²⁰ ca. 1525²¹ 1557,²² 1567,²³ and 1614,²⁴ these six *tahrirs* provide us with a variety of information on Limnos, including the names of all adult male taxpayers, the names and amounts of the various levies to which they were subject. From entries dealing with the monastic properties on the island we can discern some of the history of Pantokrator's *metochi* during this period. Let us look at them in chronological order and see what kind of pattern emerges:

¹⁹ *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 25 (hereafter: *TT* 25). Housed in the Istanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives this register is a 72 page *mufassal* (detailed) *tahrir* exclusively devoted to the island of Limnos. Prefaced by a *kanunname* (law-code) for the island (p.1), it is dated h.895/1489 (p.3). First utilized in Lowry, *Kanunnames*, it has recently been studied by N.Beldiceanu, "Structures Socio-économiques à Lemnos à la fin du XVe siècle," *Turcica*, 15 (1983), 247-66.

²⁰ *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 75 [hereafter: *TT* 75]. Likewise housed in the *Başbakanlık* Archives, this register is a *mufassal* survey covering the entire Province of Gelibolu of which the island of Limnos was a part. This *tahrir* contains a *kanunname* for Limnos (p.5), and a detailed breakdown of the taxable properties on the island (pp.137-96). It was compiled in h.925/1519 (p.9).

²¹ *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 434 (hereafter: *TT* 434). Housed in the *Başbakanlık* Archives, this register is a detailed (*mufassal*) survey for the Province of Gelibolu, as such it includes a *kanunname* for Limnos (folio 5r-5v) and a detailed tax breakdown for the island (folios 73-124). While undated the *defter's* introduction (folio 11) states that it was compiled during the reign of Süleyman Han the son of Selim Han, i.e., between the years 1520-1566. A close comparison of its contents with those of *TT* 75, the dated *tahrir* of 1519 which proceeds it, and with those of *TT* 307, likewise a dated *tahrir* of 1557, which follows it, enables us to locate *TT* 434 early in the reign of Süleyman. This dating is indicated by virtue of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the names of tax-payers listed in *TT* 75 of 1519 are also seen in *TT* 434. Consequently, I have tentatively dated this register as ca. 1525-1535.

²² *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 307 (hereafter: *TT* 307) is a dated *mufassal* register comprising 113 pages devoted exclusively to the island of Limnos. Compiled in h.965/1557 (p.3), it contains a *kanunname* for the island (pp.1-2).

²³ *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 490 (hereafter: *TT* 490) is a dated *mufassal* (detailed) register of the Province of Gelibolu, of which Limnos was a *nahiye* (county). Compiled in the year 1567 (p.17), it contains the following sections on Limnos: a) a *kanunname* on pp.7-8; and, b) breakdown of taxable properties on pp.92-172.

²⁴ *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri* 724 (hereafter: *TT* 724) is a detailed survey covering the Province of Gelibolu. It includes a *kanunname* for Limnos (pp.2-3) and a breakdown of the island's taxable properties (pp.43-138). It was compiled in h. 1023/1614.

1) In 1489, *TT* 25, has an entry reading: *karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz* (the village of the Tower of Aleksi), which is immediately followed by a note reading: *mezraa-i manastir-i Pandkraatira* (the deserted site of the Monastery of Pantokrator). This entry concludes with the notation: *hasılı cümlede mahsubdır* (its income is included in the total).²⁵ This is followed by a breakdown of the individual levies assessed the inhabitants of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz, together with those levied on the deserted site of the Monastery of Pantokrator. While notable chiefly for their brevity these three phrases tell us a great deal about the *metochi* of Pantokrator as it existed ten years after the final Ottoman occupation of Limnos.

Of primary importance is the linkage of the name of the Monastery with that of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz so we are thus able to pinpoint the *metochi*'s site (See: MAP I. overleaf).

From the data provided by the late fourteenth century monastic documents of 1393 and 1396, we already know that the Pantokrator *metochi* was in the vicinity of the village of Pesperagoz near the sea-shore, and that it contained a *pirgoz* (tower).²⁶ The 1489 *tahrir* now provides us with the name of a *pirgoz*, the tower of Aleksi, allowing us to deduce that the unnamed tower of 1396 and that referred to as the tower of Aleksi in 1489 must be one and the same. Furthermore, the probability exists that the tower's name (*Aleks i Pirgoz*) has, in the interim between 1396 and 1489, replaced that of Ano-Chorion (which does not appear in *TT* 25), as the name of the nearby village.

The fact that the village of Pesperagoz continued to be so called throughout the 433 years of the *Tourkokratia*, and is still identifiable today (see: MAP 1.), places the *metochi* of Pantokrator on the west coast of the Gulf of Mudros. A series of map references allows us to pinpoint its location. Choiseul-Gouffier's 1783 map of the island shows a *couvent* lying immediately north of a village he calls *Pisperao*,²⁷


²⁵ *TT* 25: p.32. See Appendix 1 to this paper.

²⁶ See: Dölger, *Schatzkammern*; 49-52, and, Petit, *Pantocrator*, 31-34.

²⁷ Comte M. de Choiseul-Gouffier, *Voyage Pittoresque de la Grèce*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1783). See: Volume II., Planche 14 for Limnos map.

ISLAND OF LIMNOS: ca.1489

Scale: 1:200,000.



while C.Fredrich's map of 1906 labels the same site as the village of Alexopyrgas.²⁸ This identification is confirmed by the most detailed map ever drawn of Lemnos, the 1943 British intelligence effort, known as Aegean Islands: 1:50,000 (Limnos West), which shows a village of Alexopirgus lying due north of Pesperagou, and just west of a new settlement known as Nea Koutalis (founded in the 1920s by refugees from the island of Koutali in the Sea of Marmara).²⁹

Of particular importance in the *TT* 25 entry is the use of the word *mezraa* (deserted site) in conjunction with the name of the Monastery of Pantokrator, for it suggests that this foundation's *metochi* was unoccupied in 1489. This impression is strengthened by the fact that the other six monastic *metochia* on the island (Ayios Pavlos,³⁰ Dionysiou,³¹ Koutloumous,³² Lavra,³³ Philotheou,³⁴ and, Vatopedi³⁵) are similarly described. It would appear that following the Ottoman re-occupation of the island in 1479, the members of the Athonite dependent houses on Limnos returned to the Holy Mountain.³⁶ That this was a temporary condition is attested to by references in the second extant *tahrir*, that of 1519, which as we shall see confirms that these *metochia* were occupied once again.

The *TT* 25 notation reading: *hasılı cümlede mahsubdur* (its income is included in the total), i.e., the tax revenues from the deserted site of the Monastery of Pantokrator are included together with those from the village of Aleksi Pirgoz, suggests that the peasants of Aleksi Pirgoz

²⁸ C.Fredrich, "Lemnos," *Mitteilungen Des Kaiserlich Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung)*, 31 (1906), 241-56 + Map.

²⁹ See: British Royal Engineers, *Aegean Island: Limnos West* (London, 1943), scale: 1:50,000. This map was drawn by the 46th. Survey Coy. S.A.E.C. in October of 1943, and based upon a Greek map of the same scale of 1931. I have been unable to find any copy of the Greek map which served as a base for *Limnos West*.

³⁰ *TT* 25: pp.40-41.

³¹ *TT* 25: pp.40-41.

³² *TT* 25: p.61.

³³ *TT* 25: p.25.

³⁴ *TT* 25: p.35.

³⁵ *TT* 25: pp.41-42.

³⁶ For a detailed analysis of this process, see: Heath W.Lowry, "The Island of Limnos: A Case Study on the Continuity of Byzantine Forms Under Ottoman Rule," in Bryer & Lowry, *Continuity*, 235-59.

were farming the monastery's lands as well. In all probability they were its *paroikoi* (dependent peasants). *Appendix I.* shows the *TT* 25 entry for Aleksi Pirgoz and Pantokrator, from which we see that in 1489 the village was inhabited by seven households (*hanes*) of peasants, who paid a total of 660 *akçes* (small silver coins) per annum in taxes. While it is impossible to determine with certainty what portion of this figure represents the produce of the *metochi* and how much represents the taxes on the peasant's own holdings, there are indications that the majority of the 660 *akçe* total represented the liabilities of the peasants. For 39% of the 660 *akçe* figure was clearly the sum of the personal taxes paid by the seven adult male tax-payers residing in Aleksi Pirgoz, i.e., their *haraç* (land tax) and *ispence* (poll-tax) totalling 255 *akçes*. The combined taxes on the agricultural produce of the village and the monastery lands represent only 61% of the total or 405 *akçes*.

From these agricultural taxes it is possible to identify the major crops as wheat (*hunta*), barley (*şair*), and beans (*börülce*). In addition there were a total of 10 *dönüms* (1 *dönüm* equals approximately 940 m² or 1/4 of an acre) of vineyards, the produce of which, known as *şira* (new wine) was also taxed.³⁷ Finally, there were eight hogs (*huk*) taxed at the rate of 1 *akçe* per head per year.

³⁷ The closest we have to a contemporary definition of the term *şira* as applied to the product of Christian owned vineyards, is in Bernard Randolph, *The Present State of the Morea, Called Anciently Peloponnesus* (London, 1686). There (p.19), Randolph, who lived in the Morea for several years, describes this product in the following terms:

Though the *Turks* drink no Wine, yet they take New Wine and boyl it up to a Syrrup (which they call *Becmez*, and we call *Cute*,) putting it into small Jarrs, they drink it mingled with Water, for this they account to be no Wine. They call new Wine *Shira*, and old Wine *Shirab*.

Randolph's explanation fits the situation on Limnos as attested by a passage in the *kanunname* prefacing the 1519 taxregister (*TT* 75: p.5) which reads:

Port and customs practices on the island of Limnos: From old wine (*hamr*) which is sold in the villages of the island, for amounts of from 20 *medras* to more than 100 *medras*, 2 *medras* of new wine (*şira*) are collected and taken for the Imperial Treasury.

The Ottomans were taxing the new wine, or the unfermented product of the vine, which, depending upon one's desire could either: a) be boiled into a syrup (*pekmez*, i.e., Randolph's *becmez*); b) mixed with water and used as a grape-juice drink (it is in this form that the term *şira* is used in modern Turkish today); or, c)

From the taxable crops and animals in Aleksî Pirgoz we may postulate the diet of the peasants as primarily consisting of bread, and soup or beans, occasionally flavored with pork (and as will be subsequently discussed, the sheep and its various edible by-products). What sugar was consumed came from the *şira* (new wine or grape syrup). This fifteenth century diet is not unlike that still enjoyed by peasants throughout the eastern Mediterranean basin.

2) In 1519, the second of the extant Limnos *tahrirs* (TT 75) has an entry reading: *manastır-i Pandoketira der kurb-i karye-i Aleksî Pirgoz* (the Monastery of Pantokrator in the vicinity of the village of Aleksî Pirgoz). This is followed by the sentence: *keşişler oturur, eker, ve gelirinin öşrini verirler* (it is occupied by monks who farm and pay the tithe on their produce). Immediately beneath this entry the names of ten monks are listed: Papas Konomos, Papas Tziriniki, Papas Yaso, Papas Kiryanos, Papas Piladiyo, Papas Yakomi, Papas Kiko, Papas Maksimo, Papas Nifaton, and Papas David. These ten individuals, each of whom is identified by the title of monk (*papas*), were the residents of Pantokrator's *metochi* on the island of Limnos.³⁸

What has clearly happened in the interim between the surveys of 1489 and 1519 is that Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos has been reoccupied by its owners. As a result it now appears as a separate entry in the *defter*, i.e., its revenues are no longer shown together with those of the village of Aleksî Pirgoz. In addition, the monks who occupy it, together with their agricultural taxes on the produce of the *metochi*'s lands are also named in the register.

One of the more interesting aspects of the Pantokrator entry in TT 75 is the data it provides vis-à-vis the dependent peasants attached to the monastery. This information comes from the following entry which reads: *reaya-i ki mezkûr manastırda hizmet ederler – haracat verirler hassa-i mir liva* (the peasants in the service of the aforementioned monastery whose *haraç* [land tax] goes to the income of the *mir liva*). It then lists four dependent peasants and the amount of their *haraç*: Dimitri – 32 *akçe*, Nikola – 32 *akçe*, Istimal – 32 *akçe*, and Todor – 32

fermented into old wine (*şarap*, i.e., Randolph's *shirab*) which was called *hamr* in the fifteenth century *tahrirs*.

³⁸ TT 75: 154. See also Appendix II attached to this paper.

akçe. The importance of this passage can not be over-emphasized. These *reaya* in the service of Pantokrator are *paroikoi*, dependent peasants bound to the *metochi*'s land just as their fathers and grandfathers had been in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. In other words, the Monastery of Pantokrator in the early sixteenth century (under Ottoman rule) had managed to preserve one of its most characteristic Byzantine rights apparently with the official recognition of the Ottoman state, since these dependent peasants in the service of the monastery enjoyed a kind of limited tax-exemption. They paid the *haraç* (land-tax), but they did so at the special rate of 32 *akçes* each. Thus they were distinguished from both the monks (who were totally exempt from the *haraç*) and from the other peasants of the island who paid two personal taxes, both the *haraç* and the *ispence*.

Parenthetically, Limnos enjoyed a rather unusual tax system in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While throughout the Ottoman empire peasants in this period generally paid their personal taxes, the *haraç* and *ispence* at the set rate of 25 *akçes* per *hane* (household), on Limnos these levies were paid on a graduated scale in accordance with one's economic status.³⁹ Three tax categories were used: a) *âlâ* (well to do), b) *mutavassıt ül-hal* (of average means), and, c) *edna-i hal* (poor); and each peasant appears in the *tahrirs* with one of these labels. In 1519 (*TT* 75), those classed as 'well-to-do' paid 40 *akçes* in *haraç* and 25 *akçes* as *ispence* (for a total of 65 *akçes* in personal tax per annum), while those 'of average means' paid 35 *akçes* *haraç* and 25 *akçes* *ispence* (for a total personal tax of 60 *akçes* per annum). Finally, the 'poor' were assessed their personal taxes at the rate of 30 *akçes* for the *haraç* and 15 *akçes* for *ispence* (for a total of 45 *akçes* per annum). In contrast to these normal categories of personal taxes which totaled 65, 60, and 45 *akçes* respectively, the dependent peasants attached to the monastery of Pantokrator (or the other *metochia* on the island) were exempted altogether from the *ispence*, and paid their *haraç* at a reduced set rate of 32 *akçes* apiece enjoyed financial advantages over their fellow Limniot peasants whose personal taxes totaled 45, 60, or even 65 *akçes*.

³⁹ This graduated tax system is described in Lowry, *Kanunnames*, 43-45.

A number of new levies appear on monastery crops in 1519 (see: *Appendix II*). They now are paying the *oşür* (tithe) on *bakla* (broad-beans), *nohud* (chick-peas), *kettan* (flax) *resm-i kovan* (tax on bee-hives), *piyaz ve sir* (onions and garlic), and *alef* (straw). Missing from the current levies is the tax on hogs, suggesting that these animals may well have been the property of the villagers of Aleksi Pirgoz whose assessments were lumped together with those of the deserted site of the monastery in *TT* 25. Under the heading: *hasil-i âşar-i manastır-i mezbur* (the income from the tithes of the aforementioned monastery), Pantokrator's annual taxes total 752 *akçes*, a noticeable increase over the 405 *akçes* paid jointly by the monastery and the village of Pantokrator in 1489. As the village of Aleksi Pirgoz is listed in 1519 as paying a total of 1,078 *akçes* in agricultural taxes,⁴⁰ we may deduce that the actual share of Pantokrator's 1489 taxes was approximately 41% of the 405 *akçes* it paid jointly with Aleksi Pirgoz, i.e., 167 *akçes*.⁴¹ Clearly, the increase reflected in the 1519 *tahrir* reflects the fact that in the interim between these two surveys the monks of Pantokrator had reclaimed and resettled their 'deserted' *metochi* on Limnos.

An interesting detail in the 1519 *tahrir*'s entry for the monastery is the name of a monk which appears in this register as Papas Nifaton.⁴² As mentioned earlier, the archives of the monastery of Dionysiou on Mount Athos preserve a letter written in the year 1500 by the Metropolitan of Limnos to the monastic council on the Holy Mountain, concerning a dispute between the *metochia* of Dionysiou and Pantokrator on Limnos over a *mandra* (sheep-fold) of which both

⁴⁰ *TT* 75: p.183.

⁴¹ Recalling that 255 *akçes* of the combined taxes paid by the inhabitants of Aleksi Pirgoz and Pantokrator were the personal taxes paid by the peasants of Aleksi Pirgoz, i.e., their *haraç* and *ispence*, the total agricultural taxes in 1489 came to 405 *akçes*. In 1519 the villagers paid a total of 1,078 *akçes* in agricultural taxes and the monastery paid a total of 752 *akçes* (880 *akçes* less the 128 *akçes* earmarked as the *haraç* of its dependent peasants), marking the combined agricultural taxes of the two sites 1,830 *akçes*. Of this sum the 752 *akçes* paid by Pantokrator accounted for 41% of total. Assuming that the arable land in 1489 and 1519 remained the same, it would appear that Pantokrator's share of the 1489 agricultural taxes should likewise have been 41% of the total levy of 405 *akçes*, or, 167 *akçes*.

⁴² *TT* 75: p.154.

claimed ownership. The Metropolitan, one Ioasaph, writes that the claim of Pantokrator was presented to the Council of Elders by "the most holy among monks, Neophytos, of the holy and sacred *koinovion* of Pantokrator."⁴³ The likelihood is strong that the monk Neophytos is the same individual who appears in our 1519 survey as Nifaton.

3) The third of our surveys, that of ca. 1525 (*TT* 434) shows little variance with the profile we drew from the 1519 *tahrir* which preceded it by a decade. Once again, ten monks are listed by name as the residents of the Monastery of Pantokrator. Comparing the names preserved in 1519 and ca.1525 we see that there has been no turnover in personnel.⁴⁴

Table I.: Monks Attached to Pantokrator's Metochi on Limnos

In 1519 (TT 75) & 1525 (TT 434)

(Listed in order of appearance)

TT 75 (1519)

- 1) Papas Konomos
- 2) Papas Tziriniki
- 3) Papas Yaso
- 4) Papas Kiryanos
- 5) Papas Piladiyo
- 6) Papas Yakomi
- 7) Papas Kiko
- 8) Papas Maksimo
- 9) Papas Nifaton
- 10) Papas David

TT 434 (1525)

- 1) Papas Konimo
- 2) Papas Tzirniki
- 3) Papas Yaso
- 4) Papas Kiryanos
- 5) Papas Piladiyo
- 6) Papas Yakomi
- 7) Papas Niko
- 8) Papas Maksimo
- 9) Papas Niyafakdoro
- 10) Papas David

Aside from minor variations in the spelling of the names, all ten of the monks identified in 1519 are traceable in the ca.1525 *tahrir* as well.

A comparison of the tithes (*öşür*) paid by the monks on their agricultural produce with that which they were assessed in *TT* 75,

⁴³ Oikonomides, *Dionysiou*, 187-89.

⁴⁴ *TT* 434: Folio 81r.

does however establish that we have indeed two separate surveys (compare *Appendix II* with *Appendix III*). Specifically, the rate per *kile* of *şâir* (barley) has increased from 4 to 5 *akçes*; the monastery's assessment on *kettan* (flax) has grown from 10 to 14 *akçes* per annum; and the miscellaneous levies (*bad-i hava*) have been increased from 55 to 90 *akçes*. The net result of all these changes was that the monks of Pantokrator who had paid a total of 752 *akçes* in agricultural tithes and taxes in 1519 (the scribe's total in *TT* 75 was 880 *akçes*, because he included the *haraç* of the four dependent peasants [i.e., $32 \times 4 = 128 + 752 = 880$] in his figures), were paying a total of 840 *akçes* in ca. 1525.⁴⁵

Another significant change between the 1519 and ca. 1525 *tahrirs* is the latter's failure to mention the category of dependent peasants attached to the monastery. The *paroikoi* who were listed in *TT* 75 are noticeably missing from *TT* 434 and each of the ensuing registers as well. The obvious implication of the omission is that this traditional Byzantine monastic privilege has come to an end. From this time forward peasants who may still have worked monastic properties were simply listed as residents of the villages they occupied, with none of the partial tax-exemptions which were seen in 1519.

4) A generation later in 1557 (*TT* 307) the *tahrir* entry for Pantokrator reads: *manastır-i Pandokrator nam-i diğer Aleksi Pirgoz* (the monastery of Pantokrator which is also known as Aleksi Pirgoz).⁴⁶ In so doing it confirms our earlier identification as to the site of the Pantokrator *metochi*.

Unlike the earlier *tahrirs*, *TT* 307 1557 fails to provide us with a breakdown of the individual agricultural taxes the monastery was assessed. Instead (see: *Appendix IV*) it is listed simply with the notation that it pays *öşr-ağnam* (tithe on sheep) of 516 *akçes* and *resm-i ağıl* (tax on sheep-folds) of 50 *akçes*, i.e., levies related to animal husbandry totalling 566 *akçes*. While we may postulate the existence of sheep among the monastery's holdings throughout the period under study (due to the monastic document of 1500 which dealt

⁴⁵ *TT* 434: folio 82v. As may be seen from *Appendix III* the scribe who compiled this register has incorrectly totaled the individual tax-revenues, i.e., he had arrived a total of 750 *akçes* when the component parts of his tax list actually total: 840 *akçes*.

⁴⁶ *TT* 307: p.84. See also *Appendix IV* of this paper.

with a dispute over the ownership of a *mandra* or sheep-fold [Turkish: *ağıl*]), were it not for this reference to specific taxes in the 1557 register any study relying exclusively on the *tahrir* entries for Pantokrator would overlook the sheep and its by-products among the monastery's income producing assets. What is strange is not the fact that five of the six extant *defters* fail to mention the sheep, but rather that TT 307 of 1557 does. For, in general, the taxes on sheep were not part of the revenues of the local timariots, and therefore do not appear in the *tahrir defteri*.

Given the fact that the *kanunname* (law code) prefacing this register clearly states that the island's taxes on both sheep and sheep-folds are alienated for the *Hassa-i Humayun* (Imperial Privy Purse), it is difficult to account for the Pantokrator levies being listed at all.

However, given the fact that the *kanunname* states that the sheep on Limnos are taxed at the rate of 1 *akçe* each per annum, we may state that in 1557 the Monastery of Pantokrator's property included 556 sheep and two sheep-folds (taxed at 25 *akçes* each). Clearly, the sheep and its by-products were an important part of the monastery's economic life.

Further, the 1557 register does not list the names of monks who reside at the monastery, nor even mention a number. This omission is carried by each of the succeeding registers as well. The last listing of the monks resident in the *metochi* of Pantokrator on Limnos is that preserved in the ca. 1525 *tahrir* (TT 434).

The only clue the *defter* provides as to the reason for these changes in the manner in which Pantokrator (and the island's other monasteries) is listed, comes from a notation in TT 307 to the effect that the income provided by the monasteries, together with that of fourteen of the island's villages is now going to an official known as the *kapudan paşa*, the Admiral of the Ottoman fleet,⁴⁷ i.e., it no longer is going to provide a portion of the income of one of the island's timariots (fief-holders), as had been the case in the earlier *tahrirs*.

5) In 1567, the monastery's taxes totalling 650 *akçes* per annum⁴⁸

⁴⁷ TT 307: top of p.84.

⁴⁸ TT 490: p.168. As may be seen from the facsimile of this entry provided in Appendix V of the present study, the scribe compiling this register lists the total taxes of Pantokrator as 750 *akçes*, when his figures should total 650 *akçes*.

were earmarked for the: *hassa-i hazret-i Ali Paşa mir-i miran-i cezair* (His Excellency Ali Paşa the Governor of the Province of Algiers).⁴⁹ Once again the scribe who compiled this register made a mistake in his addition and lists the monastery's annual levy as 750 *akçes*.

In the decade separating *TT 490* from its predecessor, *TT 434*, Pantokrator's taxes have increased from 516 *akçes* to 650 *akçes*, 81 *akçes* of the 134 *akçe* increase is accounted for by two new taxes which appear for the first time in 1567. These are an assessment of 36 *akçes* for *resm-i asyab* (a tax on a mill), and 45 *akçes* listed as *öşr-i bostan* (a tithe on the produce of a vegetable garden [see: *Appendix V*]). The tax on the mill is of interest as it suggests that the monks of Pantokrator may have constructed this income producing structure in the interim between the 1557 and 1567 surveys.

6) The final *tahrir* entry for the Monastery of Pantokrator, that dated 1614 (*TT 724*), is the most problematical of the six entries (See: *Appendix VI*). While supposedly compiled almost half a century after that of 1567 it is an exact copy of the earlier *defter*.⁵⁰ The scribe has even copied his predecessor's error and listed the total tax assessment as 750 *akçes* while the figures he presents total only 650 *akçes*.

A close comparison of the contents of *TT 490* of 1567 with *TT 724* of 1614, establishes that the latter survey is in fact a copy of the earlier one throughout. To make matters even more puzzling, there is a seventh *mufasssal tahriri* covering Limnos which was drawn up between the year 1595 and 1603 (dateable by virtue of its containing the *tuğra* of Sultan Mehmed III who ruled between these years).⁵¹ This register, which is missing its final twenty pages, including the section presum-

⁴⁹ *TT 490*: p.146. The Ali Paşa referred to here also served (under Selim II) as *kapudan paşa*. For his identity, see: İsmail Hami Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, II [2nd. ed.] (Istanbul, 1971), 403-9.

⁵⁰ *TT 724*: p.117.

⁵¹ Housed in the Istanbul *Başbakanlık* Archives, where it is catalogued as: *Tapu-Tahrir Defteri 702*, this undated survey is a *mufasssal* (detailed) register covering the Province of Gelibolu. By virtue of its being prefaced by the *tuğra* of Sultan Mehmed III (1595-1603) (p.11), I have tentatively dated it as ca. 1595. On pp.7-8 it contains a Limnos *kanunname*, and a breakdown of a portion of its villages and their tax-revenues are found on pp.52-102. By comparing it with *TT 490* of 1567 (of which it is an exact copy), it is apparent that *TT 702* is missing approximately twenty pages of the section dealing with Limnos.

ably including the monastery of Pantokrator (hence its exclusion from the current survey), is likewise a copy in all respects of *TT* 490 of 1567. In other words, the registers of ca.1595 (*TT* 702) and of 1614 (*TT* 724) are merely copies of the 1567 survey (*TT* 490). This is most likely explainable by the fact that the Ottoman bureaucracy in the second half of the sixteenth century, simply was not functioning at the level it had maintained in the previous century. Indeed, the Limnos *tahrirs* serve as a typical illustration or case in point. By the end of the sixteenth century it would appear that the *tahrir heyetis* (tax commissioners) assigned the task of assessing the tax levies for the province of Gelibolu (of which the island of Limnos was a part), chose to shirk their responsibility of making an assessment in person and opted instead to simply re-copy the earlier register of 1567 and assign it a new date. If this interpretation is correct, even though the practice of compiling *tahrirs* continued into the opening decades of the seventeenth century, what would appear to be a one-hundred-twenty-five year profile of the status of Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos (1489-1614), is in fact only useful for a seventy-eight year span (1489-1567).

Nonetheless, aided by our case study of the status of Pantokrator as a typical *metochi* of the Athonite monasteries on the island in this period, we may project the following profile of the fate of the island's monastic properties during the first eighty-eight years of the *Tourkokratia*, i.e., from the date of its conquest in 1479 to 1567 when *TT* 490 was compiled:

a) Clearly the Athonite monasteries maintained some portion of their properties on the island of Limnos throughout this period. A total of eleven different Athonite *metochia* are mentioned in one or another of the Limnos *tahrirs*;

b) In 1479, at the time of the signing of the Ottoman-Venetian Treaty which brought an end to sixteen years of warfare between the Republic and the Porte, monks of the Athonite monasteries abandoned their properties on the island of Limnos, leaving the island with the departing Venetians. This fact accounts for the 'deserted' status of their holdings in the 1489 *tahrir*;

c) In their absence, the Athonite *metochia* on Limnos were looked after, and farmed, by their *paroikoi* (dependent peasants) who remained on the island. This explains the fact that the 1489 register lists

the agricultural taxes on these monastic properties together with those of their adjoining villages;

d) By 1519 the Athonite monasteries have both reclaimed and resettled their *metochia* on Limnos. The appearance in this register of a total of twenty-four monks listed by name, and references as well to others unnamed, indicates that this resettlement was well under way in 1519. The existence of the Metropolitan's letter of 1500 dealing with a dispute between the monk's of Dionysiou and Pantokrator on Limnos, shows that this reoccupation must have occurred prior to the year 1500;

e) The distinction in 1519 of a number of peasants (*paroikoi*) listed as being in the service of one or another of the Athonite *metochia* on Limnos, allows us to deduce that the monasteries had indeed returned to the *status quo ante bellum*;

f) The nature of agricultural crops upon which the monasteries were assessed taxes, and their close similarity to those paid by the peasants on Limnos, suggests that the diet and general standard of living maintained by the monks must not have differed much from that of the island's non-monastic inhabitants;

g) The disappearance in 1525 of the entries for dependent peasants (*paroikoi*) attached to the *metochia*, would seem to indicate that the Ottoman bureaucracy had decided that while properties of the Athonite monasteries were there to stay, peasants were peasants and going to be taxed as such and the partial tax-immunities seen for the dependent peasants in 1519, have ended by 1525;

h) The overall tax on Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos between 1489 and 1567 (one paralleled generally by the remainder of the *metochia* on the island), does not give the impression of having been too burdensome. We have deduced that Pantokrator's share of the 1489 taxes it paid jointly with the village of Aleksî Pirgoz was 167 *akçes* per annum. In 1519, it rose to 752 *akçes* per annum. Six years later in ca. 1525 this rate was adjusted upward slightly to 840 *akçes* per year. This rate remained in effect until 1557 when a reassessment resulted in a drop to 556 *akçes*. Then in 1567 the annual assessment was raised once again to 650 *akçes*, a rate which the later *tahrirs* indicate was still being paid in 1614.

Since the value of the Ottoman *akçe* (small silver coin) fluctuated

during this period, a more accurate idea of the actual amounts of the taxes paid by Pantokrator can be gained by comparing the *akçe* rates listed with the more stable Florentine gold *florin*. In 1489 the gold *florin* was equal to 49 silver *akçes*, so the monastery's assessment of 167 *akçes* per year equaled 3.41 gold *florins*. By 1519 the Ottoman *akçe* was pegged at the rate of 54 to the gold *florin* and Pantokrator's per annum taxes of 752 *akçes* equaled 13.93 gold *florins*.⁵² Given the fact that in 1519 a peasant listed as poor (*edna-i hal*), paid personal taxes (the *haraç* and *ispence*) at the rate of 45 *akçes*, or .83 of a gold *florin* per year, in addition to the *öşür* or tithe on his crops (the only levy on monasteries), the 13.93 gold *florins* paid by the monks of Pantokrator's *metochi* on Limnos would appear to be in keeping with the overall tax rates on the island.

i) It is difficult to account for the drop in the monastery's taxes from a high of 840 *akçes* in ca. 1525 to only 556 *akçes* in the 1557 *tahrir*. As noted earlier the 1557 register does not provide us with a breakdown of the individual taxes, thereby allowing us to examine this question in detail. We are simply faced with the fact that the monastery's assessment in 1557 dropped by one-third at the time *TT* 307 was drawn up. Even when the 1557 figure of 556 *akçes* per year was increased to 650 *akçes* a decade later in 1567, Pantokrator's levies still remained far below the 840 *akçe* high of ca. 1525.

Nothing in the *tahrirs* allows us to account for this phenomenon. However, the fact remains, that in a known period of ever increasing inflation, as was the second half of the sixteenth century, the taxes paid by the Athonite *metochi* of Pantokrator on Limnos were on the decrease. Is it possible that hidden in these figures is a partial loss of monastic property, i.e., that Pantokrator's holdings had shrunk through confiscation or sale, and consequently the new assessment was made on a smaller tax base? Unfortunately this and similar queries are unanswerable on the basis of the data preserved in the *tahrirs*.

j) Throughout the period of our survey, and particularly in the *tahrir* of 1519 (*TT* 75) which lists the monks of Pantokrator on Limnos

⁵² For a breakdown of the relative values of the Florentine gold *florin* and the Ottoman silver *akçe* at several points in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, see: N. Beldiceanu, *Les Actes des Premiers Sultans* I. (Paris, 1960), 173-77.

by name, the *tahrirs* fail to mention the payment of *haraç* (land tax) by the monks of the *metochi*. Their apparent exemption from this primary Ottoman levy indicates that in the eyes of the bureaucracy they were in fact viewed as the legal owners of the properties in question. This in and of itself was a major concession to the monasteries, for the Ottoman state was one in which the concept of privately held agricultural lands generally did not exist. Aside from small plots of gardens and vineyards (which were inheritable), the remainder of the agricultural land in the Ottoman realm was viewed as state property. Obviously, the Athonite monasteries enjoyed an exemption in this respect which must in many ways have paralleled the *vakıfs* (religious foundations) created on behalf of the majority religion, Islam. That this was in fact the case is shown by a copy of a *vakıfname* (list of properties held by a religious foundation) drawn up in 1568 on behalf of the monks of the Athonite monastery of Dionysiou.⁵³ This document, drawn up by the *kadi* of Serres, lists the properties held by the monastery (including those of their *metochi* on Limnos) in the same terminology as was used for Muslim religious foundations. It leaves no doubt that the protection afforded to religious endowments in Islamic law had been extended to cover similar foundations established by Christian monasteries as well.

In conclusion, a detailed case study of the extant *tahrirs* for the island of Limnos containing information relative to the fate of the *metochi* of the Athonite Monastery of Pantokrator, allows us not only to determine the status of this particular holding, but also to project a more general profile for the status of monastic properties under the Ottomans in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. There can be no doubt but that the Ottoman *tahrir defteri* are an important source for the study of the continued existence of known Byzantine monastic foundations into the opening decades of the *Tourkokratia*.

⁵³ This most interesting document, which only survives in a Greek translation of 1915, was published by Archimandritou Gabriel, *He en Hagio Orei hiera Mone tou Hagiou Dionysiou* (Athens, 1959). The *vakıfname* in question appears on pp.160-166; for the section concerning the Dionysiou holdings on Limnos see: p.164.

Appendix I. Continued: Transcription & Translation

- Line 1: *karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz* – *hassa-i mezkûr*
village of Aleksi Pirgoz – fief of the aforementioned
- 2: *Androniko veled-i Kafori* – *haraç: 20; ispence: 15*
Androniko the son of Kafori – land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
- Yani veled-i Makoryani* – *haraç: 25; ispence: 20*
Yani son of Makoryani – land tax: 25; poll-tax: 20
- Dimitri Ağriboz* – *haraç: 20; ispence: 15*
Dimitri [from] Euboea – land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
- Manol hamal-i Kaloni* – *haraç: 20; ispence: 15*
Manol the servant of Kaloni – land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
- 3: *Tzolinmo Midilli* – *haraç: 20; ispence: 15*
Tzolinmo [from] Mytilene – land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
- Yani veled-i Venzodi* – *haraç: 20; ispence: 15*
Yani son of Venzodi – land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
- Yani veled-i Bolihlo* – *haraç: 20; ispence: 15*
Yani the son of Bolihlo – land tax: 20; poll-tax: 15
- 4: *hane: 7*
households: 7
- 5: *mezraa-i manastır-i Pandkraatıra*
the deserted site of the monastery of Pantokrator
- 6: *hasılı cümlede mahsubdır*
its income is included in the total

7: *hasıl*
income / revenues

8: *ispence* 110
poll-tax 110 [*akçes*]

haraç 145
land tax 145 [*akçes*]

hinta *müd* 1 *kile* 14 *kıymet* 150
wheat *modio* 1 *kile* 14 value 150 [*akçes*]

şair *kile* 15 *kıymet* 45
barley *kile* 15 value 45 [*akçes*]

9: *börülce* *kile* 7 *kıymet* 42
beans *kile* 7 value 42 [*akçes*]

sira *medra* 40 *kıymet* 80
new wine/grape syrup *medra* 40 value 80 [*akçes*]

resm-i dönüm 80
tax on vineyards 80 [*akçes*]

resm-i huk 8
tax on swine 8

10: *yekûn:* 660
total: 660 [*akçes*]

Appendix II. Continued: Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *mnastir-i Pandokrato der kurb0i karye-i Aleksi Pirgoz keşişler oturur eker ve gelirinin ösrini verirler:*

The Monastery of Pantokrator which is located in the vicinity of the village of Aleksi Pirgoz — it is occupied by monks who farm and pay the tithe on their produce.

2: *Papas Konomos, Papas Tziriniki, Papas Yaso, Papas Kiryanos, Papas Piladiyo, Papas Yakomi, Papas Kiko, Papas Maksimo,*

Monk Konomos, Monk Tziriniki, Monk Yaso, Monk Kiryanos, Monk Piladiyo, Monk Yakomi, Monk Kiko, Monk Maksimo,

3: *Papas Nifaton, Papas David.*

Monk Nifaton, Monk David.

4: *reaya-i ki mezkûr manastirda hizmet ederler haracat verirler hassa-i mir liva:*

The peasants in the service of the aforementioned monastery [pay] their land tax to the income of the military commander:

5: *Dimitri 32; Nikola 32; Istimal: 32; Todor 32;*

6: *hasıl-i aşar-i manastir-i mezbur:*

The income from the tithe of the aforementioned monastery:

7: <i>hinta</i>	<i>mud: 2;</i>	<i>kilece: 5;</i>	<i>fî: 10;</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	450
wheat 2 <i>modioi;</i>		5 kiles;	at 10;	value:	450

<i>şâîr</i>	<i>kilece: 19;</i>	<i>fî: 4;</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	76
barley	19 kiles ;	at 4;	value:	76

<i>alef</i>	<i>kilece: 5;</i>	<i>fî: 2;</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	10
straw/fodder/hay	5 kiles;	at 2;	value:	10


<i>ösr-i börülce ve bakla ve nodud:</i>	<i>kilece 4¹/₂</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	45
tithe on beans, broad-beans and chick peas	4 ¹ / ₂ kiles	value:	45
<i>ösr-i kettan</i>		<i>hasıl:</i>	10
tithe on flax		income:	10
<i>resm-i kovan</i>		<i>hasıl:</i>	25
tax on bee-hives		income:	25
8: <i>ösr-i piyaz ve sir</i>		<i>hasıl:</i>	25
tithe on onions and garlic		income:	25
<i>haraç-i bagat</i>		<i>hasıl:</i>	56
land tax on vineyards		income:	56
<i>bad-i hava</i>	<i>fî: 6</i>		55
miscellaneous revenues	at: 6		55
9: <i>yekûn:</i>			880
total:			880 *


* The scribe's total includes the 128 *akçes* paid as *haraç* by the monastery's four dependent peasants in line 5 above.


Appendix III.


Facsimile of TT #434


Folio 81r

Line 1: 


2: 

3: 

4: 

5: 

Folio 82v

6: 

7: 

Appendix III. Continued: Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastir-i pandokratora*
the Monastery of Pantokrator

2: *Papas Konimo, Papas Tzirniki, Papas Yaso, Papas Kiry-
anos, Papas Paladiyo,*
Monk Konimo, Monk Tzirnike, Monk Yaso, Monk Kiry-
anos, Monk Paladiyo,

3: *Papas Yakomi, Papas Niko, Papas Maksimo, Papas
Niyafakdoro, Papas David.*
Monk Yakomi, Monk Niko, Monk Maksimo, Monk
Niyafakdoro, Monk David.

4: *hasil-i âşar-i manastır-i mezbur:*
the income from the tithe of the aforementioned monaste-
ry:

5: <i>hunta</i>	<i>mud: 2;</i>	<i>kilece: 5;</i>	<i>fī: 10;</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	450
wheat	2 modioi;	5 kiles;	at: 10;	value:	450 [akçes]

<i>şâir</i>	<i>mud: 1;</i>	<i>kilece: ;</i>	<i>fī: 5;</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	125
barley	1 modioi;	kiles: ;	at: 5	value	125

<i>alef</i>	<i>kilece: 5;</i>	<i>fī: 2;</i>	<i>kıymet:</i>	10
straw/fodder	5 kiles;	at: 2;	value:	10

öşr-i börölce ve bakla
ve nohud *kilece: 4¹/₂;* *fī: 10;* *kıymet:* 45
tithe on beans, broad-
beans & chick peas 4¹/₂ kiles; at: 10; value: 45

öşr-i kettan 14
tithe on flax 14

6: *resm-i kovan* 25
tax on bee-hives 25

<i>öşr-i piyaz ve sir</i>	25
tithe on onions and garlic	25
<i>haraç-i bağat</i>	56
land tax on vineyards	56
<i>bad-i hava ve cürm-i niyabet</i>	90
miscellaneous fines and levies	90
7: <i>yekûn:</i>	750
total:	750 [akçes]*

* The actual total of the individual entries listed here is 840 *akçes*, i.e., the scribe has made an error in his addition.

Appendix IV.

Facsimile of TT #307: p. 84

Line 1:

2:

Transcription & Translation


Line 1: *manastır-i pandokrato nam-i diğer aleksi pirgoz*
 The Monastery of Pantokrator which is also known as Aleksi
 Pirgoz


2: <i>ösr-i ağnam</i>	506	
tithe on sheep	506	[akçes]
<i>resm-i ağıl</i>	50	
taxes on sheep-folds	50	[akçes]

Appendix V.

Facsimile of TT # 490: p. 168

Line 1: 

2: 

3: 

Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastir-i pandokrato – ter havas-i müşarileyh*
 The Monastery of Pantokrator (fief of the aforementioned)

2: <i>hunta</i> wheat	<i>kile: 15;</i> 15 kiles;	<i>kıymet:</i> value:	<i>195</i> 195 [akçes]
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<i>şatır</i> barley	<i>kile: 20;</i> 20 kiles;	<i>kıymet:</i> value:	<i>120</i> 120
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<i>alef</i> fodder	<i>kile: 10;</i> 10 kiles;	<i>kıymet:</i> value:	<i>50</i> 50
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<i>öşr-i börülce ve nohud ve bakla</i> tithe on beans, broad-beans and chick peas	<i>kile: 13;</i> 13 kiles;	<i>kıymet: 65</i> value: 65
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<i>haraç-i bağat</i> (tithe on vineyards)	84	[akçes]
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3: <i>öşr-i bostan</i> (tithe on gardens)	45
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
<i>asyab</i> (mill)	36 <i>resim</i> (tax)
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<i>öşr-i kovan</i> (tithe on bee-hives)	55
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<i>yekûn</i> (total):	750 (actually 650akçes)
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Appendix VI.

Facsimile of TT #724: p. 117



Transcription & Translation

Line 1: *manastir-i pandokrato – tabi-i m [ezbur]*

The Monastery of Pantokrator – attached to the aforementioned

2: <i>hunta</i> (wheat)	<i>kile</i> : 15;	<i>kıymet</i> (value: 195 [akçes]
<i>şafir</i> (barley)	<i>kile</i> : 20;	<i>kıymet</i> (value: 120
<i>alef</i> (fodder)	<i>kile</i> : 10;	<i>kıymet</i> (value: 50
<i>öşr-i börülce ve nohud ve bakla</i> (tithe on beans, broad-beans, and chick peas):		
		65
<i>haraç-i bagat</i> (land tax on vineyards):		86 *
3: <i>öşr-i bostan</i> (tithe on gardens):		45
<i>asyab</i> (mill):		36 <i>resim</i> (tax)
<i>öşr-i kovan</i> (tithe on bee-hives):		55
<i>yekûn</i> (total):		750 **

* Here the scribe miscopied the 84 *akçes* seen in TT #490 as 86.** While the actual total of the revenue listed is 650 *akçes* (or 652 given the error on the vineyard tax), the scribe compiling this register copied the error made by predecessor who drew up TT #490, and lists the total income as 750 *akçes*.

IV. MONASTERIES, TEKKES AND THEIR FATES : 2

THE LONG-LIVED RELATIONS BETWEEN CHRISTIANS
AND MOSLEMS IN CENTRAL ANATOLIA:

DERVISHES, PAPADHES, AND COUNTRY FOLK

MICHEL BALIVET / ISTANBUL

The usual way of studying the different civilizations in Anatolia, and in particular the Byzantine and the Turkish ones, is to regard them successively and discontinuously. This is a classic conception, since the Byzantine historians themselves employed it, particularly when explaining the decline of the Byzantine political power to the advantage of the Turks¹.

Such a fragmentary vision one may think possible for an approach to pure political history, becomes noticeably inadequate and distorting as far as the history of Anatolian cultures and mentalities is concerned, since it gives a greater importance to factual history, ignoring that of continuous deep phenomena.

This is particularly striking in central Anatolia, in an area limited, northwards by Ankara, eastwards by Kayseri, southwards by the Taurus range and westwards by Konya.

The Cappadocia of Basilian patristics as well as that of the rock-cut churches and the artistic and monastic wealth we know, are to be

¹ Kritoboulos' introduction to his History is as follows: 'Who doesn't know that, ever since men have existed, rule and supreme power did not stay in the same hands, nor were the privilege of one nation or one people; but that, like wandering stars, supreme power passed from people to people, from place to place; it continuously changed its favourites, and established itself everywhere, sometimes with the Assyrians, the Medes and the Persians, sometimes with the Hellenes and the Romans, according to the circumstances and the course of years. It is not surprising then that nowadays we should suffer the same thing, and that the power should leave the Romans to go to others, as in the past it had passed onto them from others, keeping its proper nature and its mobility,' *Critobuli Imbriotae Historiae*, ed. D.R.Reinsch, in *Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae*, XXII (Berlin, 1983), 14.

found in these limits, and so are the capital towns of the three greatest Anatolian dervish orders, Konya and the *Mevlevi*, Hacı Bektaş and the *Bektaşî*, and Ankara and the *Bayramî*.

Now, the last artistic and religious bloom of Byzantine culture in Cappadocia is absolutely contemporaneous with the brightest period of the Seljuk civilization in Asia Minor.

Even, there is often between the two cultural worlds mutual acceptance² and recognition of the links that, from now on, unite Christians and Moslems in the area³. Moreover, many Christians, either Greek- or Turkish-speaking, still lived in these parts up to the beginning of our century⁴.

In the area of our study, the XIIIth-century flowering on both sides, as well as the existence of Christian minorities up to the XXth-century, show that it is never quite right to speak in terms of sudden succession or of brutal exclusion of one civilization by another, in places or at times when very progressive processes of co-penetration and inter-influence have acted deeply to create a common cultural substratum.

This Turkish-Byzantine interaction, particularly extensive at popular level, even exists in apparently as exclusive matters as religion; in the same district, sometimes in the very same village, we meet very similar types of inter-confessional connections, from the

² The existence of a few verses in Greek in the works of Celâleddin Rûmî and by Sultan Veled, is significant: R.Burguière et R.Mantran, "Quelques vers grecs du XIIIe siècle en caractères arabes", *Byzantion*, 22 (1952), 63-80; W.Mirmiroglou, *Οἱ Δεσποταὶ* (Athens, 1940), 391.

³ Cf. St.George of Belisirma, where the Christian husband of the *klitorissa* of the church, emir Basil, is represented clad in his kaftan and his turban as a Seljukid notability, and where, associated in the same dedication, are 'the highest and noblest great sultan' Mas'ûd and the *basileus* Andronicus II; N. and M.Thierry, *Nouvelles églises rupestres de Cappadoce*, (Paris, 1963), 202-204; same double allegiance on an inscription dated 1289, which mentioned the restoration of the church of St.Chariton monastery, near Konya '...under the patriarchate of Kyr Gregory and under the reign of the most pious emperor and autocrat of the Romans Kyr Andronicus, in the days when reigned our master, the noblest great sultan Mas'ûd, son of Kay-Kâüs'; F.W.Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford, 1929), 381.

⁴ S.Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1971), 444 sqq.

Seljuk period to the end of the Ottoman Empire.

We shall try to illustrate this matter through the comparison of two Greek texts and two Turkish texts⁵, which describe the relations between Greek priests, Turkish dervishes, and peasants of central Anatolia.

At Pharassa⁶, a Greek-speaking village up to the population exchanges in 1924⁷, two sheikhs from Hacı Bektaş had come to visit the *papas* of the village:

“...The Father greeted them and offered them coffee. Meanwhile, the sheikhs began to ask him inept and astounding questions... The Father, to get rid of them, told them: “I cannot listen to you because I have a headache”. But they would not understand and one of them said to Father Arsenius: “Papas Efendi, we shall make an amulet⁸ for you and if you wear it, all your life-long you will no longer have any headache”. The Father then replied severely: “My power is greater than yours and, by the power of Christ, I can make you unable to move at all from the place where you are seated”. He then suddenly left them and went to his cell. When they had finished their coffee, the sheikhs wanted to leave but they could not move from their seats as they had the impression that they were attached by an invisible bond; it was then necessary for them to call Father Arsenius to free them off. The Father came immediately but did not speak to them; he just beckoned them away, and this is how they could free themselves from the place. The sheikhs understood their fault, begged pardon from the Father, and told him as they were leaving: “Papas Efendi, pardon us; your strength is great because you hold it from your very great faith. As for us, we work with Satan.””

A Moslem sheikh tells about his Master the following anecdote which takes place in the neighbourhood of Sis⁹: *“When our Master left for Damascus, the caravan of Syria went to a cavern where they dismounted. Forty monks were living there, and they had practised*

⁵ One is in Persian but is about Turkish Anatolia.

⁶ Today Faraşa, on the river Zamantı affluent of the river Seyhan, at about 30 km S.E. of Yahyalı, Türkiye map (Fiziki-idarî, B.Darkot), Geographical Institute De Agostinini (Novare, 1972).

⁷ R.M.Dawkins, *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, 1916), 30-35.

⁸ Μουσαῖ in the Greek text.

⁹ The actual Kozan, at about 50 km. S.E. of Pharassa.

austerities so widely that they were pursuing the mysteries of the world of the superior beings, had some knowledge of the secrets of the inferior world, read the secret thought of men, and received presents and votive offerings from all parts. As soon as they saw our Master, a young boy to whom they had beckoned to jump in the air, thus remained, stopped in his flight a little above the ground. Our Master, his blessed head bent, was observing the scene. The young boy suddenly started shouting: "Come to my help, I am tied up, I shall die here on the spot otherwise, I am terrified by this person looking at me." He was told to come down. "I cannot, said he, it is as if I had been nailed here." They all stepped forward to our Master's feet and begged him saying: "Do not dishonour us." He answered: "The only way, is to formulate the sentence on the Unity of God." Immediately the young boy uttered the profession of faith of the Moslems, and landed lightly on the ground; all, in a body, became true believers and wished to go away with the Master; but the latter would not let them; he said to them: "You must stay here and serve God, and do not forget us in your prayers." Therefore they went on leading their lives of devotion and mortification and came to know the secrets of the superior and inferior worlds; they built a monastery in that place and were helpful to travellers.'

The similarities between our two texts are obvious: geographical, the Taurus range; circumstantial, as in both cases Moslem sheikhs take the initiative to pay a visit to Christian clerics and they are most welcome.

In both instances there is a real competition of supernatural powers, between a reputedly magic force on one hand, and a true spiritual force on the other; the talisman of the *Bektaşî* dervish is of no avail compared with the miraculous power of the *papas* of Pharassa. In the same manner, the levitation trick played by the monks at the cavern, is thwarted by the spiritual power of the sheikh.

In the two stories, the miracle brought on by the holy person has the same "technical" appearance: the two *Bektaşî* ... 'do not succeed in moving...feeling as if bound by an invisible tie;' "I am tied up," cries the young boy in the other story "... it is as if I had been nailed here."

Quite obviously, in the Greek anecdote, the *papas* has the last word, the dervishes admitting his spiritual superiority and the lower nature of the forces which, as for them, they manipulate. On the

contrary, in the Moslem story, the monks throw themselves at the feet of the sheikh confessing the impotency of their magic, and become true believers.

Let us, by the way, point out the "smooth" transformation of a monastic place into a moslem *tekke*, by means of integration and not expulsion; it alludes to, on the hagiographical side, a historical process which did not fail to occur more than once in medieval Anatolia.

New stories, new similarities. In the first anecdote, enters the same priest of Pharassa, whom Greeks and Turks used to call by the nickname of *Haciefendi*: it was Wednesday; a blind Moslem woman has been taken to the priest to be cured, but it was a day when the *papas* would stay in his cell. The blind woman's companions '*...knocked at the door of the cell, and then left the woman outside and made for the village. Meanwhile, a village girl from Pharassa, who had a withered hand, came to the cell of Haciefendi, picked up a handful of earth from the door-step, with which she rubbed her painful hand and felt relieved. So were the Pharassiot people accustomed to do on the two days when (the father) would lock himself in, in order not to disturb him. When she saw the blind woman, she (the village girl) asked her why she was waiting and the blind woman told her the reason. So the Pharassiot girl answered her: "Why do you stay here sitting, wasting your time: Don't you know that Haciefendi never opens his door on Wednesdays and Fridays? Take a little earth from the soil in front of his door and rub your eyes with it to be relieved, as we all do on these days when we are sick."* Having said, she left and went on her errands. The Moslem woman, at first astonished by what she had just heard, felt her way to the doorstep, gathered some earth, rubbed her eyes with it and at once, feebly, she was able to see. She was so happy, she grabbed a stone and started to knock madly on the door of Father Arsenius. The latter opened and when he saw she was a Moslem woman, though he usually would not have spoken on that day, made an exception and asked her what she wanted. She told him, the Father took the Gorpel, exorcised her and immediately she was able to see quite clearly. Happy as she was she then fell at his feet and prostrated herself before him with devotion, but the Father stopped her saying: "If you want to prostrate, do it before Christ, He is the one who gave you light, and not me." Then she left and joined her companions, and they went back to their village.'

A Turkish anecdote is parallel to this story. A sheikh whom the text refers to repeatedly as *Hünkar*¹⁰, is going through a Greek village in Cappadocia called Sinassos¹¹: ‘...*The Master, on the road that goes from Kayseri to Ürgüp, arrived in a Christian village, named Sinassos*¹². *The Christians had been cooking rye bread; among them, a woman was carrying a basketful of that bread on her head. As soon as she saw the Master, she put down the basket saying: “O dervish, take a loaf, please; on our land wheat doesn’t grow, do not disgrace us.” The Master, as soon as he heard these words, (exclaimed): “Let there be (from now on) rye sowings and wheat harvesting in plenty. Make little dough and get big loaves.” Nowadays, still, in the village, they sow rye and harvest wheat. When they bake a small amount of dough, a big loaf comes out of the oven; when they sow rye, it becomes wheat, but when they sow wheat they harvest rye. For that reason, the Christians of the village go on pilgrimage to the Master; every year they gather together to go there and bring presents and votive offerings, and rejoice.*

The parallelism of the two texts is interesting, and the social context is slightly different from the first two.

Here, no more “specialists” on contemplation, either Moslem dervishes or Christian monks, challenge each other; but the same pious men viewed in their intercourse with the country folk that surround them, the Anatolian village people.

¹⁰ Sultan, here sovereign of the spiritual world.

¹¹ A few km. south of Ürgüp, today Mustafa Paşa, Avanos map, Harita Genel Müdürlüğü 1953; cf. I.S. Archelaos, *Ἡ Σινάσσος* (Athens, 1899). On Sinassos, see now *Sinassos in Cappadocia*, ed. F. Pimenides et al. (Athens, National Trust for Greece, 1986).

¹² *Sineson* in the Turkish text; another miracle of the priest of Pharassa is said to have occurred at Sinassos: ‘As he was going from village to village with his chanter *Prodrimos*, Father *Arsenius* one day, went through Sinassos. The Turks in the village prevented him from getting in touch with the Christians. Father *Arsenius* simply said to *Prodrimos*: “Let’s go and you will soon see the Turks run after us”. After half an hour’s walk from the village, *Hacıfendi* fell on his knees and raised his hands. In no time, clouds started to gather and a strong gale burst. The whole village was shaken; the Turks understood immediately their fault and sent two men of arms (ζαπτιέδες, *zaptiye*) to catch up with the father; when they arrived they fell at his feet and begged his pardon in the name of all the village. Father *Arsenius* forgave them and came back to Sinassos. He made the sign of the cross towards the four cardinal points, and, immediately, the storm stopped.’

The village people go spontaneously and unconventionally, if need be, to the representative of another religion. In both cases, besides, they are women, and it is not by accident, if we keep in mind that the female element is very important as a link between the two societies in Anatolia (popular devotion, family traditions, matches outside the community etc...).¹³

The Christian woman at Sinassos, on her own initiative goes to the dervish; her behaviour has a double meaning: for the sake of respect and hospitality, she offers him bread, and at the same time, she manages to show him the great difficulties the village has to cope with.

The Moslem woman at Pharassa requires to be led by her fellow-believers to the *papas*, hoping he will cure her. She has a complete faith in the efficiency, even indirect, of the blessed man, since for lack of his direct presence, she has no hesitation whatsoever in rubbing her eyes with the soil which the thaumaturge has walked on, and this on the advice of a Christian girl. By the way, the latter is not at all surprised or shocked when she sees a Turk waiting at the door of the *papas* and even gives her advice on how to derive the best benefit from the holiness of the place.

At Sinassos, the dervish immediately sympathizes with the Christian woman's complaint, and by a miracle, solves the difficulty.

In the same way, the inopportune enthusiastic attitude of the woman knocking at his door with a stone, on a day when he was supposed to stay in his cell, does not irritate the *papas*. But on the contrary, as soon as he understands that he is dealing with a Moslem woman, he grants her a favour and accepts to cure her.¹⁴

The two saints do not hesitate to spread their blessing to the other communities; the Greek text makes it quite clear: '*...the Father, when sick people were taken to him, never tried to know whether they were Christians or Turks.*'

The consequence of these miracles is a real cult of the benefactor: the Turk of Pharassa falls at the feet of the *papas*, and, back home, does not fail to widen the reputation of the priest towards whom,

¹³ Vryonis, 466.

¹⁴ 'Επειδή είδε πώς ήταν Μουσουλμάνα, ενώ δεν μιλούσε αυτήν την ημέρα, έκανε διάκριση.

regularly, Moslem patients flock. As for the Greek peasants of Sinassos, they spontaneously organise an annual pilgrimage to the saint¹⁵.

The reader has probably realised that the two Moslem texts are medieval: one is from the *Manāqib al-ʿārīfīn* of Aflākī, a work written to celebrate the memory and the miracles of Mevlāna Celāleddin Rūmī, founder of the famous order of the "whirling dervishes"¹⁶. The other extract is from the *Vilāyet-nāme* by Hacı Bektaş, the main source of the *Bektaşī* Golden Legend¹⁷; the first work is from the XIVth century, the second from the XVth, but the two relate facts supposed to have taken place in the XIIIth century, in Seljukid, Laskarid and Palaeologue Asia Minor.

By contrast, the Greek text is a biography of Father Arsenius of Cappadocia, composed in Greece a few years ago from the memories gathered among the refugees from Pharassa. Arsenius of Cappadocia was born towards 1840 at Pharassa and died in Corfu on November the 10th, 1924, shortly after his arrival from Asia Minor¹⁸.

We shall notice a very great chronological amplitude for very close phenomena. This could not be purely incidental, nor be only a matter of similar behaviour of the "homo religiosus universalis". In this parallel approach there is a definite mark of the perennality in the interconfessional behaviour, of a long-lived, centuries old, *modus*

¹⁵ 'O köydeki Hristianlar, Hünkâr'ın oturduğu makamı ziyaret ederler, her yıl toplanıp gelirler.' The *tekke* of Hacı Bektaş was still frequented by Christian pilgrims at the time of V. Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie*, I (Paris, 1892), 341: 'Tout autour de l'une des cours, il y a des chambres à l'usage du grand nombre de visiteurs musulmans et chrétiens qui viennent chaque jour vénérer le tombeau du fondateur Hadji-Bektach-Véli, considéré par les Chrétiens indigènes comme étant le même personnage que Saint Charalambos. Dans cette croyance, en entrant dans le turbé, les visiteurs chrétiens font le signe de la croix, tandis que les pèlerins musulmans vont dans la mosquée attenante faire leur namaz. Les uns et les autres sont bien reçus également.'

¹⁶ Trans. from the Persian by C. Huart, *Les Saints des Derviches tourneurs*, (Paris, 1918-1922), 65.

¹⁷ *Vilāyet-nāme*, *Manākib-ı Hacı Bektaş-ı Velī*, ed. A. Gölpınarlı (Istanbul, 1958), 23-24; E. Gros, "Das Vilayetname des Hadji Bektash", *Türkische Bibliothek* 25 (1927), 43.

¹⁸ (Father Païsios), 'Ο Πατήρ Αρσένιος ὁ Καππαδόκης, (Salonica, 1975): pp.86-87 (the two *Bektaşī* sheiks), pp.84-86 (the blind Moslem woman), p.37 (the Father cures Christians and Turks), pp.37-38 (the miracle at Sinassos).

vivendi between Christians and Moslems, which seems to be a constant in Anatolia from the Middle Ages¹⁹.

It is a type of popular devotion founded on the largest common denominator for separate confessional parties, living in the same place, a devotion based on integration and syncretism, and not exclusion and dogma. That pragmatism urges the faithful to give priority to the magic or religious efficiency of a rite or to that of the minister of the cult, rather than to their strict confessional obedience.

It is necessary to refer to the numerous cases noted by F.W. Hasluck, from the Middle Ages to the First World War, such as among many other examples, the prophylactic use of baptism by the Turk²⁰, the same pilgrimage places and the worship of the saints for both Christians and Moslems²¹, prayers said in common²², etc... Such

¹⁹ The great intimacy between Moslems and Christians among the Seljukid society in Konya, very often shocked the non-Anatolian Moslems: '*Dans le voisinage, on se demandait si les Seldjoukides n'étaient pas devenus païens, mages ou guèbres, et Nour-eddin Zenghi, prince d'Alep, un musulman convaincu, exigea que Kylydj-Arslan II renouvelât, entre les mains de son ambassadeur, la profession de foi de l'islamisme, parce qu'il ne le croyait pas un vrai fidèle*,' C. Huart, *Konia* (Paris, 1897), 14-15; cf. too in 1212, Ibn Arabî's letter calling to order Kay-Kâūs whom the Spanish theologian thinks too liberal towards his Christian subjects: '*Parmi les atteintes portées à l'Islam et aux Musulmans, d'autant que ceux-ci sont peu nombreux (dans les territoires récemment conquis), il y a la sonnerie des cloches, les démonstrations d'incroyance, la prédominance d'un enseignement polythéiste dans ton pays et le relâchement des contraintes imposées aux peuples (non musulmans)*', Ibn Arabî *Les Soufis d'Andalousie (Rûh al-quds et Durrat al-fâkhirah)*, trans. R.W.J. Austin (Paris, 1979), 38.

²⁰ Hasluck, 31-34; the prince of Karaman, had been '*...baptisé en la loy gregues que pour oster le flair*'; Bertrand de la Broquière, *le Voyage d'Outremer*, ed. C. Schefer (Paris, 1892), 115; cf. also, the sultan Izz al-Dîn and his sons who were supposed to have been baptized; George Pachymeres, *Relations Historiques*, ed. A. Failler, in *CFHB*, XXIV/2 (Paris, 1984), 339, 347.

²¹ E.g. the famous and ancient equation Hızır-Elijah-Saint George, already in the XIVth century, in Çantacuzenus: *The martyr of Christ, George, whom, we Christians we honour, and who is also honoured by the Moslems is called by them Χετήρ 'Ἡλίας* ed. Migne, PG 154, col. 512; cf. A. Gökalp, "Hızır, İlyas, Hıdırellez: les maîtres du temps, le temps des hommes", in *Quand le crible était dans la paille... hommage à Pertev Naili Boratav* (Paris, 1978), 211 sqq.; A. Y. Ocak, *İslam-türk inançlarında Hızır yahut Hızır-İlyas kültü*, (Ankara, 1985).

²² The *tekke* of Mamasun, near Aksaray, still in activity in 1916, in which: '*...At the east end is the Holy Table, at which itinerant Christian priests are allowed to officiate, and a*

radically non-conformist principles are sometimes uttered in a very spectacular way: 'a saint is for everybody', they said in Anatolia²³; or: 'any saint, since he is a saint, belongs to my religion'²⁴; or else: 'if the papas cannot do anything for me, I go to the dervish' (and the other way round, of course)²⁵.

The lack of consideration due to these mechanisms of cultural exchanges and religious interpenetration in the study of Turkish-Byzantine and then Ottoman Anatolia, leads one to ignore an essential element in understanding not only the process whereby Byzantine became Ottoman Anatolia, but also the survival of a popular Anatolian culture common to all its peoples until this century.

picture of St.Mamas, while in the south wall is a niche (mihrab) giving the orientation of Mecca to Turkish pilgrims. There is no partition between Christian and Moslem worshippers, but the latter, while at their prayers, are allowed to turn the pictures from them. The sanctuary is administered by dervishes'; Hasluck, 576.

²³ *Ibidem*, 72.

²⁴ At Runkale, on the river Euphrates, the Turks took hold of the famous church of St.Nerses, '...afin de donner à entendre par là qu'ils révèrent les Saints, et que celui auquel cette Eglise est dédiée, estoit de leur party, et Musulman comme eux'; M.Febvre, *Théâtre de la Turquie* (Paris, 1682), 45-46.

²⁵ A characteristic anecdote in Hasluck, 78: a *papas* who was not successful in exorcising his wife, without hesitation decides to consult a magician, a Turkish woman (Τούρκισσα μάγισσα) who succeeds in breaking the possession; see also the scene witnessed by L. de Launay, *Chez les Grecs de Turquie* (Paris, 1897), 182-84, in the crypt of St.Demetrius (Kasimiy camii), in Salonica: 'Un sacristain turc arrive, suivi, de deux Grecs et me fait signe de le suivre... A ce moment commence une véritable scène de sorcellerie du moyen-âge. Imaginez dans l'obscurité de la crypte, ce vieux Turc, le gardien de la mosquée, derrière le cierge allumé, qui, avec sa veilleuse éclaire seul la pièce... Sur sa tête est un haut bennet gris, comme celui des derviches de Scutari... "To onoma, ton nom?" dit le Turc, qui vient de mesurer avec la ficelle, un des ornements du tombeau et a commencé en ce point, un noeud encore lâche. Il tient, en se courbant, l'anneau que forme la corde sur le haut du cierge allumé et attend qu'on lui réponde. "Giorgios", répond le Grec; et le Turc, répétant: "Giorgios", serre le noeud dans la flamme; il fait remarquer au Grec, d'un air satisfait, que le chanvre n'a pas brûlé... Et, quand il a fait ainsi trois noeuds, seigneurusement, il met la ficelle sacrée dans un petit paquet qu'il trempe dans l'huile de la lampe; il ajoute quelques parcelles de la terre du tombeau; il enveloppe le tout et le remet au Grec, qui paraît tout heureux. Il lui explique, d'ailleurs: Si tu es malade, toi, ton père, ta mère, tes enfants, le noeud sur la partie souffrante et vous serez guéris... (Puis), mes deux chrétiens sortirent tout heureux des mystérieuses incantations, qu'un sacristain musulman, au fond d'une mosquée, venait religieusement d'accomplir pour eux.'

V. BEYOND BYZANTINES AND OTTOMANS : 1

BETWEEN ARAB AND TURK: ALEPPO FROM THE
11th TILL THE 13th CENTURIES

JØRGEN S. NIELSEN / BIRMINGHAM

Located on the northern edge of the Fertile Crescent, Aleppo has always been well-situated at a meeting point of long-distance trade routes. Overland commerce between Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia tended to be more secure over the longer northern arc than cutting across the Syrian desert. The city was similarly well-placed to attract the overland routes from Anatolia and the Mediterranean routes through Levantine ports. But these advantages carried with them related drawbacks. Armies and popular migrations tended to follow similar routes, and the area was one which more naturally was a frontier than it was a stable, self-contained economic region.

The financial and military organization of Syria by the Arabs in the 7th century had placed Aleppo initially in the *djund* of Ḥims and then of Qinnasrīn. Its precarious position near the borders of the Byzantine empire was compounded by its location in an area of dispute between Iraq and Egypt. The town was in turn occupied by Tulunids and Ikhshidids, the latter in particular coopting the *Kilābī* bedouin as local agents.¹ Subsequently, for the first time in the Islamic period, Aleppo was the capital of a local dynasty, the Hamdanids, and, sharing in the brilliance of its ruler, Sayf al-Dawla, gave indications of its potential. But the city was sacked by Nicephoros Phocas in 962. The Hamdanids moved their capital east to Mayyāfāriqīn and left Aleppo to the rivalries of Byzantium, Fatimid Egypt and local Arab chieftains. One of these latter, Ṣāliḥ b. Mirdās, made Aleppo his capital in 1023, but his successors' quarrels again brought in Fatimid and Byzantine interests. By this time, the gradual westward movement of Turkish tribes had become irresistible and culminated in the establishment of Seljuk control in Aleppo in 1079. But the marginal position of the city in

¹ "Ḥalab", EI² (Leiden, 1960-).

City of THEBES

Households:

1466	487
1506 c.	900
1540	1467
1570	1497

	Kg per household	akçe per household
Wheat Production:		
1540	660	229
1570	666	296

Sheep:		value in akçe	per household
1506	1100	22000	24
1540	2100	50400	34
1570	12000	336000	224

Cotton Production:

1540	2460	bales	12300	9
1570	4060	„	24360	16

Silk Production

1540	361	ledre	11200
1570	770	„	35000

Mills	1505	17	
	1540	22	
	1570	31	(of which 20 wool presses)

Market dues and revenue of Public Weighing-House

1506	14000 akçe
1540	19000 akçe
1570	30000 akçe

VI. PATRONAGE IN ART AND LITERATURE : 4

MANUEL II PALAIOLOGOS: INTERPRETER OF DREAMS?*

GEORGE CALOFONOS / BIRMINGHAM

Frankish garments [in one's dream] point to very great freedom; in like manner, Franks, Tartars, Turks, Indians, Skythians and every other race of men signify freedom.

This somewhat curious passage appears under the heading "concerning Frankish clothing and colours" in the dreambook attributed to the late Byzantine emperor Manuel Palaiologos.¹ It has been suggested that it reflects his extensive visits to the West and Russia, as well as his captivity at the Turkish court.² The authorship however of Manuel Palaiologos has been disputed, mainly on stylistic grounds.³ The reason which would explain this false attribution – a common practice for most Byzantine dreambooks⁴ – is said to be the interest of

*I would like to thank the "Onassis Scholarship Foundation", whose generous support allowed me to carry on my research on the subject; I am also grateful to Mrs. Anna Frangedaki for her help with Manuel's contorted Greek.

¹ "Oneirokritikon kata Manouél Palaiologon", in A. Dellate (ed.) *Anecdota Atheniensia* 1 (Paris, 1927), 511-24, esp. 516. For the translation of the text see S. Oberhelman, *The Oneirocritic Literature of the Late Roman and Byzantine Eras of Greece* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1985), 597-618, esp. 603.

² S. Oberhelman, *ibid.*, 615 note 35.

³ See K. B. Hase, *Notices et Extraits de Manuscrites de la Bibliothèque Impériale* 8 (Paris, 1810), 317, where the dreambook is presented to be written "...dans un langage barbare et tout-à-fait disparate avec le style soigné et élégant de notre auteur..."; and also M. Berger de Xivrey, "Mémoire sur la vie et les ouvrages de l'empereur Manuel Paléologue", *MémAcInscr.* 19 (1853), 11.

⁴ See eg. D. del Corno, "Ricerche Sull' Onirocritica Greca", *Istituto Lombardo Accademia di Scienze, Lettere, Memorie della Classe di Lettere*, 96 (1962), 334-66; and S. Oberhelman, "Prolegomena to the Byzantine Oneirokritika", *Byzantion*, 50 (1980), 487-503. For the implications of his false attribution of authorship see G. Calofonos, "Dream Interpretation: A Byzantinist Superstition", *BMGS*, 9 (1984/85), 215-20; in

Manuel in dreams, evident in his letter to Andreas Asan which is a philosophical treatise on their origin.⁵

Thus the "barbaric", "superstitious", "popular" text on dream interpretation has been contrasted to the "elegant", "pious", "philosophical" work of the "real" Manuel.⁶ It is true that the two texts belong to two distinct traditions. The first is an oneiromantic one, which includes dreambooks from Antiphon and Artemidoros to several Byzantine ones, and involves the practical skill of dream interpretation. The second is oneirological, and consists mainly of philosophical discussions on the origin and prophetic value (if any) of dreams. These traditions are usually conceived as belonging to two different worlds: the refined, cultivated circles of philosophers on the one hand, and the credulous and superstitious masses on the other.⁷ In our case, style and genre of the texts is assumed to be sufficient evidence for stressing the division once more.⁸

It is not my intention to refute the attribution of these texts to

accordance with M.Foucault's analysis of the function of author-name, it would seem that false attribution of authorship in the Byzantine dreambooks was intended to validate these texts in the eyes of their contemporary readership, rather than devalue their supposed authors in the eyes of modern critics. See also Margaret Alexiou, "Literary Subversion and the Aristocracy in Twelfth Century Byzantium: A Stylistic Analysis of the *Timarion* (ch. 6-10)", *BMGS*, 8 (1982/3), 26-45, and "The Poverty of Ecriture and the Craft of Writing: Towards a Reappraisal of the Prodromic Poems" *BMGS*, 10 (1986), 1-40, who has argued the relevance of Foucault's ideas on authorship to Byzantine literature.

⁵ D. del Corno, *ibid.*

⁶ This attitude, evident in both K.B.Hase, *op.cit.* (note 3), and M.Berger de Xivrey, *op.cit.* (note 3), is carried further by D. del Corno, *op.cit.* (note 4), with his division between oneirology and oneiromancy which I summarize below.

⁷ D. del Corno's division was accepted by A.H.M.Kessels, "Ancient Systems of Dream Classification", *Mnemosyne* 4/22 (1969), 389-424, for the classical period. It would be wrong however to accept its implications for the Byzantine period, when the concept of superstition had changed. See A.Mogmiliano, "Popular Religious Beliefs and the Late Roman Historians", *Studies in Church History*, 8 (1971), 8; and G.Calofonos, *op.cit.* (note 4).

⁸ Stylistic level, however, is not considered anymore sufficient evidence for a definite conclusion on authorship in Byzantine literature. See I. Ševčenko, "Levels of Style in Byzantine Prose", *JÖB*, 31 (1981), 289-312, and 32 (1982), 220-33. For a relevant analysis of the problem referring to the Prodromic Poems see Margaret Alexiou, "The Poverty of Ecriture...", *op.cit.* (note 4).

different authors. I would rather suggest a closer examination of their content before drawing any conclusion on their relative position in Byzantine culture. Here I will confine myself mainly to Manuel's letter which has never been translated, commented upon, or otherwise studied although it is the most extensive Byzantine oneirologic text.⁹

Discussion on the origin of dreams and the art of dream interpretation always fascinated the Byzantines and other medieval people as it is evident, not only within the numerous texts on the subject, but also in hagiographical and historiographical sources.¹⁰

To turn to the letter of Manuel Palaiologos, it was written in fact as an answer to his friend Andreas Asan who believed that all dreams are prophetic if one interprets them correctly, and asked the emperor's opinion on the matter.¹¹ This demonstrates the fact that, whichever Manuel's opinion was, the so-called superstitious belief in oneiromancy had infected even the close circle of the theologian emperor. In answering the question, Manuel produced a small philosophical treatise which in a true Byzantine manner draws extensively on Ancient Greek sources and is validated by New Testament and patristic references.¹²

A tripartite classification of dreams, according to their origin and nature, is proposed. First, there are dreams that originate from the dreamer's disposition and profession, as well as his or her bodily condition, caused by imbalance of the four humours or excess of food. Those dreams, according to Manuel, have no prophetic value.¹³ His second category of dreams includes the ones that derive from the dreamer's soul. During sleep the soul comes closer to its divine origins, but is still under the negative influence of the body. Thus, the soul's

⁹ Manuel II Palaiologos, "Peri Oneiratôn", in J.F. Boissonade (ed.), *Anecdota Nova* (Paris, 1844), 239-46.

¹⁰ Byzantine hagiographies and chronographies are full of references to prophetic dreams. Specific examples of oneiromantic and oneirologic texts will be mentioned below.

¹¹ Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 240,6-14.

¹² There are references in the text to Plato (*ibid.*, 240,4; 243,9-11), but also to Gregory the Theologian (244,5-8), Saint Paul (245,21-24), and "the saints" (242,5-7).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 242,9-12.

dreams can be prophetic, but in an indirect and confused way.¹⁴ The third category consists of the truly and wholly prophetic dreams, that originate from God and are sent to those who have pious and pure souls. The best of those people can also have waking visions.¹⁵ To those major categories a fourth one is added which includes dreams of troubled people who find the solution of their problems in sleep.¹⁶

Prophetic dreams, which derive from divine providence, can be intended not only for their recipients, but also for the guidance of people, irrespective of moral qualities. In the letter's conclusion they are contrasted to the pseudo-prophecy that comes from the devil.

Some prophetic dreams and omens, as well as some other divinatory techniques – excluding dream interpretation¹⁷ – are the ways used by the evil spirit in order to deceive. The devil, however, does not have the gift of prescience: he can only speculate by calculations that either come true or not, and therefore he can be deceived as well as deceive.¹⁸

As Manuel himself acknowledges, a great part of the views expressed are not his own. His section on false dreams, more specifically, incorporates Ancient Greek medical and philosophical theories on dream origin and functions.¹⁹ First, the theory of the four humours and their relation to dreaming, which is also included in the dream classification of Psellos²⁰ as well as in Islamic dreambook compila-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 245,12-5: "Μικρά τινα ἄρα καὶ τεθολωμένω τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ, ὥς ἂν εἴποι τις, καὶ λοξῶς αὐτῇ δύναται, εἴ γε καὶ τοῦτο δοτέον, ἐν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις μαντεύεσθαι καὶ χρησμοδεῖν."

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 245,15-20.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 245,20-4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 246,6-9: "Oneirokritikē" (i.e. dream interpretation) is not mentioned: it had been formally removed from Byzantine lists of evil practices with the *Basilika* of Leo the Wise. See Photios, *Nomokanon*, in G.Ralles-M.Potles (eds.), *Syntagma tōn Theiōn kai Hierōn Kanonōn* 1 (Athens, 1852), 192.

¹⁸ Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 246,12-3.

¹⁹ For Ancient Greek and Roman views on dreaming see E.R.Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1954), 102-34; A.H.M.Kessels, *op.cit.* (note 7); R. van Lieshout, *Greeks on Dreams* (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge, 1972); and F.X. Newman, *Somnium: Medieval Theories of Dreaming and the Form of Vision Poetry* (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton, 1962), who mainly deals with the Western Medieval period.

²⁰ Michael Psellos, *De omnifaria doctrina*, ed. L.G.Westerink (Utrecht, 1948), 63.

tions,²¹ is first found in a pseudo-Hippocratic work on dreams²² and in Galen:²³ dreams – the soul's activities in sleep – are conceived as reflections of the operation of the body and thus become an index of the actual physical condition of the dreamer. Manuel did not consider the diagnostical aspect of this theory, but used it merely as an explanation for non-prophetic dreams. In that way, an excess of warm humour causes dreams of cool waters, while the lack of it causes dreams of fire.²⁴

The second theory involves the belief that the mind dreams of what it is accustomed to when awake. It is quite common to many thinkers including Aristotle,²⁵ Lucretius,²⁶ Petronius,²⁷ Macrobius,²⁸ as well as Anastasios of Sinai²⁹ and Psellos.³⁰ Even the specific examples of such dreams given by Manuel, strongly resemble those of his sources: "The coward dreams of escape, the valiant dreams of victories, the sailor dreams of waves..." etc.³¹

Thirdly, the belief that an excess of food causes false dreams, combines the opinions of pseudo-Hippocrates and Galen³² with those of philosophical schools which attributed a gnostic value to dreams. It

²¹ See e.g. Abdalghani an-Nabulusi, *Ta'fir al-anām fi ta'bīr al-manām* (Cairo, 1316), I, 3-4, cited in G.E. von Grunebaum, "The Cultural Function of the Dream as Illustrated by Classical Islam", in G.E. von Grunebaum and R.Caillois (eds.), *The Dream and Human Societies* (Berkeley, 1966), 7ff.

²² [Pseudo-] Hippocrates, *Regimen*, 4. 87, Loeb 4 (London, 1931), 422.

²³ Galen, "De dignatione ex insomniis"; in C.G.Kühn (ed.), *Medicorum Graecorum Opera que Exstant* (Leipzig, 1823), 6. 832ff.

²⁴ Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 241,3-6.

²⁵ Aristotle, *De insomniis*, 460b, in H.J.Drossaart Lulofs (ed.), *Aristotelis De Insomniis et De Divinatione per Somnum* (Leiden, 1947).

²⁶ Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, 4.962-5, ed. C.Bailey (Oxford, 1947).

²⁷ *Poetae Latini Minores*, 4.110, ed. A.Baehrens (Leipzig, 1879-83).

²⁸ Macrobius, *Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis*, 1.3, ed. J.Willis (Leipzig, 1970).

²⁹ Anastasios of Sinai, *Quaestiones*, PG 89 (1865), col. 761.

³⁰ Michael Psellos, *op.cit.* (note 20).

³¹ Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 241,8-13. Cf. Lucretius and Macrobius, *op.cit.* (notes 26, 28). It should be noted that Macrobius' work had been translated into Greek less than a century before by the influential scholar Maximos Planudes. See N.G.Wilson, *Scholars of Byzantium* (London, 1983), 230.

³² [Pseudo-] Hippocrates, *op.cit.* (note 21), 4.93; Galen, *op.cit.* (note 22), 832.

is found in Plato,³³ Aristotle,³⁴ and the Pythagoreans.³⁵ It continued to be popular in the Middle Ages and it appears in the classifications of Anastasios of Sinai and Psellos,³⁶ but also in the popular dreambooks of the Byzantine period.³⁷

Manuel's discussion of dreams originating from the soul occupies the largest part of the letter and includes his original contribution to the subject, which is a combination of Platonic and Christian doctrines on the soul.³⁸ He placed these dreams on the borderline between the prophetic and the false ones, disputing the belief that, in sleep, the soul, freed from the influence of the body, is revealed in its divine aspect and looks unhindered into the future: a belief evident in Plato,³⁷ Xenophon,³⁹ and Aristotle,⁴⁰ as well as in Cicero's *De divinatione*,⁴¹ and also shared by the Stoics.⁴²

In Manuel's opinion, the soul being divine and imperishable, has indeed the power of prophecy. Its long bondage inside the earthly and perishable body however, draws it towards evil and thus weakens its divine powers.⁴³ Sleep conjures the illusion of freedom from the body but the effort to forecast clearly is still doomed. The soul can only prophesy in a narrow scope, in an indirect and cloudy way.⁴⁴

This view of Manuel is quite important for it leaves an open door to dream interpretation. Although he does not explicitly state it, these

³³ Plato, *Republic*, 571, Loeb (London, 1935).

³⁴ Aristotle, *op.cit.* (note 25), 461a.

³⁵ Cicero, *De divinatione*, 2.58.119, ed. A.S.Pease (Urbana, 1920-24).

³⁶ *Op.cit.* (notes 29, 30).

³⁷ "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Nikephoros", ed. F.Drexel, *Festgabe für Albert Ehrhard, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Christlichen Altertums und der Byzantinischen Literatur* (Bonn, 1922), 94-118, esp. 100; and "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Germanos", ed. F.Drexel, *Laographia*, 7 (1923), 428-48, esp. 448.

³⁸ Plato, *op.cit.* (note 33), 572a.

³⁹ Xenophon, *Cyropedia*, 8.7.20-1, Loeb 2 (London, 1914).

⁴⁰ *The Works of Aristotle: Select Fragments*, ed. D.Ross (Oxford, 1952), 12, 84f.

⁴¹ Cicero, *op.cit.* (note 35), 1.32.70.

⁴² See E.Zeller, *The Stoics, Epicurians and Sceptics*, trans. O.J.Reichel (London, 1880), 377. The same view is expressed also by Philo Judaeus, *Peri tou theopemptous einai tous oneirous (On Dreams)*, 2.1, Loeb 5 (London, 1934).

⁴³ Manuel Palaiologos, *op.cit.* (note 9), 242f.

⁴⁴ See note 14 above.

hazy and unclear predictive dreams could be allegorical and symbolic visions which require the skills of a dream interpreter. In a similar manner, the second century pagan dreambook of Artemidoros, which was in use throughout the Byzantine period, implies a contrast between clear god-sent dreams, and the ones that require interpretation, originating from the dreamer's soul.⁴⁵

Manuel's classification is the last Byzantine example of a series that appeared within the Christian Era. They derive from the effort of the minor Neo-Platonists to combine the various, sometimes conflicting views on dreams of Antiquity.⁴⁶ What is original in Manuel's work, is his discussion of souldreams, but also his organized and detailed exposition of his theories. What is interesting in both Manuel and the other authors, is that they do not condemn oneiromancy as one might have expected.

To go back to the dreambook attributed to Manuel Palaiologos, I should note that it is quite unique in both its content and form. Together with the Middle-Byzantine dreambook of Achmet,⁴⁷ they organize their material into thematic chapters while the rest of the dreambooks are really just alphabetical lists of dream-symbols.⁴⁸

Furthermore the so-called "Dreambook of Manuel" is the only Byzantine one to include explanations of its dream-interpretations. For example, it makes a conscious and extensive use of puns for the derivation of its dream-symbolism, which was a very popular method

⁴⁵ Artemidoros Daldianos, *Onirocriticon*, 32.69 ed. R.A.Pack (Leipzig, 1963), 195,3-7. Moreover, Philo Judaeus states that those god-sent dreams which are received via the dreamer's soul are unclear and require professional interpretation: *op.cit.* (note 42), 2.3-4.

⁴⁶ See F.X.Newman, *op.cit.* (note 19), 66.

⁴⁷ Achmet, *Oneirocriticon*, ed. F.Drexel (Leipzig, 1925).

⁴⁸ This fact has escaped del Corno [*op.cit.* (note 4), 342] who describes the dreambook as "...uno dei soliti onirocritici alfababetici..."(!) If this was true, it would have strengthened his case against Manuel's authorship. The surviving alphabetical dreambooks are five: "Das Traumbuch des Propheten Daniel nach dem cod. Vatic. Palat. gr. 319.", ed. F.Drexel, *BZ*, 26 (1926), 290-314; *Astrampsichi Onirocriticon*, ed. S.Obspeus, in *Sibyllina Oracula* (Venice 1599); "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Nikephoros", *op.cit.* (note 37); "Das Traumbuch des Patriarchen Germanos", *op.cit.* (note 37); and "Das Anonyme Traumbuch des cod. Paris gr. 2511", ed. F.Drexel, *Laographia*, 8 (1925), 347-75.

of both Ancient Greek and Byzantine oneiromancy.⁴⁹ Thus, mosaic icons in a dream mean a fair judgement, because, as the dreambook states, the word for mosaic pebble (psêphos) also means a judgement.⁵⁰ But this and many other interpretations found in Manuel's dreambook do not occur in other works of this kind, which are all interrelated through direct and indirect borrowings.⁵¹ Although it belongs to the same oneiromantic tradition, it is original in its content.

The two surviving manuscript of the dreambook date from the late fourteenth century and make it contemporary to our emperor.⁵² Could he then be the author of the text? Could Manuel II Palaiologos be an interpreter of dreams?

I believe that still one cannot give a definite answer, although his letter and the dreambook show some similarities. Both texts are systematic, lengthy, and quite original. If Manuel was not the author it could be someone from his immediate circle.⁵³

Apart from the passage on Frankish clothing, which I quoted in the beginning, there are some other novel dream interpretations that point to this direction: "If one dreams that he walks into St. Sophia in Constantinople, one will find himself in the midst of a catholic and universal tumult";⁵⁴ and this, in the times of the upheavals caused by the attempt to heal the schism⁵⁵ Also, if one sees that one becomes

⁴⁹ Alexander's satyr-dream [Plutarch, *Alexander*, 24,8-9, Loeb 7 (London, 1971); Artemidoros, *op.cit.* (note 45), 260] is the best known example from Antiquity. A quite similar example from the Byzantine period is the dream of Constans II recorded in Theophanes, *Chronographia* I, ed. C. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883), 346.

⁵⁰ "Oneirokritikon kata Manouël Palaiologon", *op.cit.* (note 1), 518.

⁵¹ See. S.Oberhelman, "Prolegomena...", *op.cit.* (note 4).

⁵² *Ibid.*, 501.

⁵³ This can be also supported by the fact that the dreambook describes specific dreams of Byzantine officials of the times to illustrate various dream-symbols. Those dreams, and in some cases the names of the individuals involved, are not mentioned in the historical sources of the period, indicating that the author of the dreambook was in a position to have first-hand information concerning the imperial court of Constantinople. These historical aspects of the dreambook will be covered in a future study of mine.

⁵⁴ "Oneirokritikon kata Manouël Palaiologon", *op.cit.* (note 1), 518.

⁵⁵ There were two attempts by John V Palaiologos to convert his subjects to the Roman faith, in return for military support from the Pope Innocent VI, in 1355 and 1357. His

emperor, one will "face humility, dishonour, persecution, and accusations at the hands of many people";⁵⁶ a fact Manuel only knew too well.⁵⁷

Indeed, one could argue that Franks, Russians, and Turks were becoming associated with alternative freedoms, at a time when many Byzantines were facing the choice between the Papal tiara and the Sultan's turban.⁵⁸

plan involved also his six year old son Manuel II himself, who was going to serve as a hostage to the Pope. It failed because it met the disapproval of the Byzantines, and was never taken seriously by the Pope. See G.Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey (Oxford, 1980), 535; and *CMH* 4/1 (1966), 368f; and J.W.Barker, *Manuel II Palaiologus: A Study in Late Byzantine Statemanship* (New Brunswick, 1969), xix.

⁵⁶ "Oneirokritikon kata Manouël Palaiologon", *op.cit.* (note 1), 521.

⁵⁷ George Ostrogorsky gives the following description of the imperial office at the time of Manuel's accession to the throne: "The responsibility of the imperial office was indeed far more of a burden than a privilege. Each day brought fresh humiliations, new misery and terror for the Emperor of the Romans." *CMH* 4/1 (1966), 375.

⁵⁸ A similar view has been expressed by N.Oikonomidès, *Hommes d'affaires grecs et latins à Constantinople (XIIIe-XVe siècles)*, (Montréal-Paris, 1979), *passim*. I thank Archie Dunn for bringing this to my attention.